# STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM CP

## NOTES

Acronym list:

SPP = State Partnership Program

NG = National Guard

NGB = National Guard Bureau

PN = Partner Nation

FAF = Foreign Affairs Federalism

## 1NC

### 1NC---Shell

#### The 50 states, through the National Guard State Partnership Program [SPP], should increase their security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the area of <AFF>.

#### SPP initiatives over emerging tech with NATO solves---ensures U.S influence AND bolsters alliances.

Samir Battiss, 13 (Samir Battiss, Lecturer at the University of Quebec in Montreal, May 2013, accessed on 6-30-2022, NORDIKA Programme, NATO Military Partnerships: The US National Guard State Partnership as the driving force for pre-accession and long-term cooperation,” <https://www.frstrategie.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/notes/2013/201310.pdf>, HBisevac)

The **National Guard** **S**tate **P**artnership **P**rogram (SPP) involves establishing a partnership between a State National Guard and other national armed forces of a sovereign country. Initially conceived as **military-to-military** engagement activities, several of these relationships have developed further and, nowadays include **civilian-to-civilian** initiatives. As a **security assistance provider**, it conducts activities and in so doing influences the perceptions and behavior of **regional security actors**. Due to the specific nature of the U.S. National Guard, the **SPP initiatives** have been used as **dual assets** – **national** and **NATO**6. In addition to laying the foundation of goodwill, trust, access and influence, they **pave the way** for allied/allied – allied/partners interactions that go beyond a simple relationship to help **increase** a partner’s ability to **accomplish** a particular task or mission7.

Basic to the issue are the answers to the question “when”, and “how” military assistance is to be made available; especially since the number of recipients has steadily increased over the last 20 years, and this trend is likely to continue, in view of the number of States scheduled to be involved in the growing concept of “Air/Sea Battle in Asia -Pacific”, and of the future challenges in Africa and in Central Asia. This unceasing expansion of potential recipients has introduced dynamism into the framework upon which military assistance rests, making it most difficult to establish any set formula, even in general principles.

When military assistance was first launched as an integral component of national foreign policy, such aid was almost exclusively directed against potential or real threats to Europe, Africa or other areas of national – sometimes collective – strategic interests. With the development of crises in **several parts** of the **world**, provisions from an/the American perspective were made through several security assistance programs like the **SPP**, PfP and other NATO Partnerships, which has not only **broadened** the **geographic scope** of military aid but also introduced a **complex system** of **governing principles**, in order to meet the designed objectives of the expanded policy.

Looking at military considerations, there are apparently **ample reasons** to **positively consider** the connection State Partnership Program / NATO Partnerships. In Europe, the basic principles determining employment of military assistance in Europe have been, first, that they serve to improve its relative military, political, and economic strength, thereby keeping at a **maximum** its ability to contribute to **collective security**; and to protect/shelter the European NATO area from current and future threats. In accordance with these political objectives, military aid is provided to European allies and partners to assist NATO full members – and aspiring countries – with the **modernization** and **maintenance** of their forces, taking into account the latest concepts of warfare; to obtain the greatest possible contribution to **common security** from non-member countries. These objectives reflect the **permanent improvement** of military stature of most allies and partners, since the inception of the NATO partnerships and national programs which have enabled a shift in emphasis from individual country defence to continental and global defence of allies’ interests.

At present Europe remains the **only area** where military assistance is **integrated** with joint, regional defence planning. This is because the individual problem of internal security in Europe being of a relatively minor nature, emphasis was placed on maintaining joint military “forces in being” capable of deterring outside aggression. Areas of interests of the Alliance such as Africa, the Near East, and Asia-Pacific face somewhat akin situations to each other but, at the same time, immensely different from those in Europe. In addition to creating new partnerships with key countries on these continents, the United States’ and allied strategies may **foresee** the **protection** of **common interests** **worldwide** known as “securing access to the global commons” by resorting to “newly” trained and equipped European armed forces. Therefore, the latter may be deployed “out of European area” since the Alliance has increased its geographic scopes and the range of missions because of the globalization of threats and risks that could undermine transatlantic security; the former could be at stake several thousand kilometers away from home.

Nordic/Baltic countries, from security beneficiaries to troops providers in multinational operations

The earliest programs of military assistance were grounded in the principle of relieving to the greatest possible extent any rearmament burden on the restructuring of European economies in the early 1990s. Within less than a decade new developments on the international scene caused a major shift. The 1990s and 2000s marked an epochal change in the overall influences of world geography on both European and North American official circles, including generational change alongst political leaders. Besides these geopolitical influences, programs of national or **multilateral security assistance** program such as the SPP or the PfP and their coincidence over economic relationships could be an **established policy** put in place by major leading countries. Like the Marshall Plan in the late 1940s, NATO/ U.S. Security assistance systems of the early 1990s implied that economic aid for Central/ Eastern European countries – like in other areas closely associated with the Allies – could be used for military production. In the first place, there was the necessity of alleviating the more severe effect of rearmament on the newly achieved levels of economic activity and standards of living in the countries politically connected with NATO members; and although defence support would, to a degree, serve this function, there was no suggestion that U.S. and allied largesse should relieve the beneficiaries of all sacrifices. Moreover, an agreement was implicitly reached as to how the burden of participation in multinational operations. The period since 1990 has seen increasing attention paid to multinational military forces.

Their increasing number of mission types continually requires more and more contributing forces. Operating in multinational forces is nothing new for the armed forces at NATO’s disposal. Experiences inter alia in the former Yugoslavia, the Mediterranean, the Arabian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean have demonstrated the substantial strategic advantages to be gained through coalition and alliance operations. The National Guard SPPs and the PfP activities have made it possible for partnering nations to contribute for NATO-led or ad hoc military operations. Regarded as an integral device to the U.S combatant commands’ theatre engagement plans, their activities have pursued and achieved several defence and military goals, such as: Assuring **dominant coalitions**; Achieving and enhancing **influence**; Contributing to the execution of **stated policy**; Gaining **regional access** and access to **decision makers**; Building **relationships** and **military-to-military contacts**; Acquiring the **right systems** for allies and friends; Developing a **broad portfolio** of **coalition military capabilities**; Capitalizing on rapid technological developments; Preventing proliferation of **technologies** and **weapons** into the wrong hands; Aligning **goals** and **resources** to carry out the job efficiently; Using a performance-based management system to make resource decisions.

But, although they take the form of peacekeeping, peace-support, or/and humanitarian operations, there is evidence to suggest that subtle differences in the organizational and national cultures of the countries that contribute personnel to missions can have an impact on the overall operational effectiveness of the multinational force. There is thus a requirement to consider and integrate the intercultural issues and factors that surround and influence multinational military collaboration, particularly at the strategic and operational level of command.

Because the United States and their Allies share common security interests and common values and face common challenges (threats, risks), they rely on other **partnering nations**. All major NATO nations’ strategies recognize and emphasize the importance of multinational operations; each country reaffirms its will to act with others when it can, giving priority to “regional” or “ideological” allies and friends. Multinational operations are often analyzed as a compromise between military capability and political constraints, usually include a wide spectrum of missions; the intensity ranges from war to long-term tasks with a civilian nature in which the military apparatus plays a minor but necessary role. Multilateral actions of war are the extreme circumstance for conducting operations whose goal is to quickly achieve the multinational collective objectives with as little cost as possible. Peacetime engagement activities involving the military help to shape the security strategic environment by sharing experience in early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation, promotion of human rights, and strengthening democratic reforms. Although they are theoretically based on individual State requests and needs, bilateral military relations with “neutral” States and the State Partnership Program / PfP seek means to achieve **rationalization**, **standardization**, and **interoperability** that will significantly enhance the probability of operational success in multinational missions. For commanders as for political actors, the key is to build relationships, trust, cooperation, and cohesion at all military levels, while overcoming language and cultural barriers and relevantly applying common procedures or norms.

These accomplishments display U.S. commitment in relevant security areas, and are designed to lend **credibility** to its alliances by enhancing regional stability and providing a crisis response capability while **promoting U.S. influence** and **access**. Four significant paths have been followed by the SPP/PfP since the beginning of the 21st century. Several countries from Central and Eastern Europe have become members of NATO, correlatively the number of SPP/ PfP participating countries. NATO has also multiplied several instruments (Individual Partnership Program; Planning and Review Process; Operational Capabilities Concept) which deepen this program by allowing partners to adapt their participation through additional opportunities based upon their national objectives and capacities and perspective (Individual Partnership Action Plan ; Annual National Program; Membership Action Plan). A third dimension of NATO partnership is directly linked to the allied military presence in Afghanistan. At tactical and operational levels, the SPP innovative activities combined with PfP low-tech and low-cost solutions appears to be a way for the United States to avoid **technological shortfalls** and to bypass incapability to **integrate** their **cutting edge technologies** with most of NATO and non- NATO partners. The second aspect here is the growing strategic importance of the Caucasus and Central Asia that come out as the existence of PfP countries/SPP participants in the region and the perspective of the future Afghan participation in NATO partnership initiatives. Finally, the PfP is increasingly used to build cooperative relationships with countries in the region by regionalizing the treatment of security and stabilization missions.

### 1NC---INB---FAF

#### The counterplan linearly increases state involvement in foreign affairs.

Peter Howard, 4 (Peter Howard is the economics director at Policy Integrity, and a former economic fellow, May 2004, accessed on 7-2-2022, International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 5, No. 2, “The Growing Role of States in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the State Partnership Program”, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44218880?seq=1>, HBisevac)

As the preceding case illustrates, states can play a **significant role** in implementing U.S. foreign policy. The National Guard’s State Partnership Program has given states a **critical role** in U.S. engagement programs. The networks of opportunity created by the number of SPP funding sources and potential programs have allowed entrepreneurial state actors to shape a unique course for each partnership. Some innovative state coordinators have, on their own initiative, tapped other funds, such as **cooperative threat reduction** programs or **environmental** programs to further the reach of their state partnership. The participating state National Guards are **uniquely positioned** in this respect—they are connected to both the **state** and **federal** governments through their **dual mission** and contain vast experience including military duties, support to civilians, and regular civilian jobs. This gives an enterprising state a chance to make a **significant impact** in the content of U.S. foreign policy. The meaning attached to that policy is created, in part, by the actions undertaken in the name of that policy. Through their implementation of the SPP, states have **shaped** the meaning of U.S. foreign policy of engaging the former communist states of Eastern Europe and NATO enlargement. This is not to say that all National Guards and Partnerships are equally forward-leaning, but some can be, and in a way not directed or anticipated by the federal government.

Early criticisms that military engagement programs lacked direction (Ulrich, 1999) have receded as programs such as the SPP evolve into more sophisticated enterprise. Recent analyses of the SPP have revealed that all of the program’s “stakeholders,” including the governors, the National Guard, the U.S. Defense Department, and the partner countries, are enamored with the program’s success.”° With ten years of experience, the National Guard has developed a “life cycle” approach to each state partnership. Early in the life of the partnership, mil-mil exchanges dominate. After a certain point, however, the marginal utility of additional military familiarization exchanges declines, and mil-civ and civ—civ exchanges rise to take their place. As the partnerships mature and are dominated by the civilian exchanges, state governments take an even greater role in initiating and implementing international relationships.

An implementation perspective on the analysis of foreign policy makes this insight possible. Analyses of foreign policy that rely solely on a decision-making perspective miss the **important role** that states are playing in U.S. foreign and national security policy. While most of the primary decisions are still made by the president, his administration, and Congress, states are gaining an **ever-increasing role** in implementing those decisions. The SPP is but one example. Guard units are also taking a greater role in peacekeeping activities in the Balkans, and may do so in a postwar Iraq. The intense focus on homeland security is yet another policy area where states will implement most policy decisions. The guard has already been active in domestic security operations, flying combat air patrols and providing airport security, and several studies and senators have advocated an even larger role for the guard in homeland security (Miller, 2002). Emergency response and law enforcement are still state and local responsibilities, and these areas are the new front lines in homeland security and the war on terrorism. The states, which perform these duties, have a vital say in how they will be done. As independent and entrepreneurial implementers, the states are carving out a larger role in shaping the environment in which federal decision makers act.

Policy decisions are important, but many of those decisions lack meaning unless they create content and action. In the long run, **policy implementation**—the practice of what states and countries do with each other—produces the **substance** that give rules and identities their meaning. It is this meaning that ultimately forms the **environment** to which future decision makers **respond**. It is here that the federal government’s monopoly in international affairs begins to erode and it is here that states are finding an ever-growing role in U.S. foreign policy.

#### That creates scope for states to mitigate warming.

Jean Galbraith 17, Assistant Professor at University of Pennsylvania Law School, JD from the University of California-Berkeley School of Law, Order of the Coif, BA in Social Studies and the Comparative Study of Religion from Harvard University, “Book Review: Cooperative and Uncooperative Foreign Affairs Federalism, Foreign Affairs Federalism: The Myth of National Exclusivity”, Harvard Law Review, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 2131, Lexis

D. Climate Policy

Mitigating climate change is a challenge for all levels of government -- international, national, state, and local. As Glennon and Sloane note, some states and cities have embraced climate change mitigation measures (pp. 62-63). In doing so, states have often coordinated with each other and with foreign counterparts in both practical and [\*2149] expressivist ways (pp. 62-63). California's efforts are exceptionally notable. State legislation requires sweeping emissions reductions; California and Quebec have sought to integrate their cap-and-trade programs; and California has spearheaded a coalition of state and local governments around the world who have committed to climate policy. California even sent a large and high-profile delegation to the United Nations conference on climate change in Paris in 2015.

The issue of climate policy is a rebuttal to all three of the "myths" identified by Glennon and Sloane. It is self-evidently a matter of both domestic and foreign affairs; states and local governments are acting in this space; and some states and local governments are doing so in progressive ways. The actions of state and local governments in this space invite constitutional inquiry. Can California constitutionally regulate carbon emissions, enter into a highly formalized agreement with Quebec and softer agreements with other subnational governments, and send delegations to international negotiating conferences?

Yet focusing exclusively on these questions would lead to a highly incomplete sense of the legal scope of California's power to act. For although Glennon and Sloane do not mention it, California is acting amidst a welter of federal laws, regulations, and other executive branch actions applicable to climate change. In 2007, in a lawsuit brought by liberal states against the EPA, the Supreme Court held that the federal Clean Air Act applies to greenhouse gas emissions. This Act explicitly delegates authority to California to pursue stronger emissions [\*2150] measures for new motor vehicles than are undertaken at the federal level and in general involves states in the Act's enforcement through cooperative federalism.

During the Obama Administration, state and local government efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions were not only congruent with the aims of the Clean Air Act (as interpreted to apply to greenhouse gases), but also with the goals of the executive branch. The EPA during the Obama Administration applauded and sought to facilitate state and local efforts. Its leading rule on climate change mitigation measures, known as the Clean Power Plan, explicitly gave states substantial autonomy in crafting their own approaches, although this rule is currently facing a court challenge brought by states that oppose federal efforts to regulate emissions. The Obama White House expressed approval of the transnational coalitions that California and other state and local governments have joined in seeking to address climate change.

All this positive reinforcement will presumably diminish or disappear under the Trump Administration. The Trump Administration may even try to roll back climate change mitigation efforts by progressive states and cities, in addition to undermining or reversing Obama era regulations and international commitments. If it does so, however, the legal questions that such efforts would raise probably have fairly [\*2151] little to do with the constitutional issues posed by traditional foreign affairs federalism. Instead, they would center on administrative law -- around the interpretation of the Clean Air Act and the laws and norms that govern regulatory practice -- as they had already come to do by the end of the George W. Bush Administration.

\* \* \*

These four illustrations are far from unique. Sometimes state and local government activity in relation to foreign affairs occurs against a backdrop of federal inaction, as is the case with the incorporation of unratified human rights treaties into the municipal law of progressive cities. But interaction is far more common, sometimes cooperative and sometimes full of contestation. The executive branch approves of and provides some support for states and cities seeking to promote tourism or encourage exports abroad. The federal government collaborates with states in determining U.S. international negotiating positions with respect to insurance. In private international law, the federal government has shown strong interest in using state law rather than federal law to implement certain treaties. And all levels of government deal with security -- both traditional and cyber -- and interact with each other over it. To understand what is going on, we must focus on the political branches as much as (or even more than) the courts. And we must think not just in terms of constitutional law, but also in terms of international law, administrative law, and state law.

[\*2152] III. COOPERATIVE AND UNCOOPERATIVE FEDERALISM IN THE CONTEXT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

As foreign affairs federalism becomes increasingly interactive, how much will it resemble cooperative and uncooperative federalism in the domestic context? At the very least, scholarship on cooperative and uncooperative federalism as a domestic matter, especially work focused on the political branches, provides a valuable starting point for understanding foreign affairs federalism today. This scholarship offers insights into how the federal government can incentivize state and local governments to help advance federal interests, how these state and local governments can in turn influence and resist federal policy, and how Congress and the executive branch can each use state and local action to build power at the expense of the other branch. These broad themes manifest themselves in the foreign affairs context as well. Yet the foreign affairs context brings some additional complexities because of its ties to international law and global governance and because it comes with stronger presidential powers. This leads to certain differences between cooperative and uncooperative federalism in the realm of foreign affairs, in terms of both how practice proceeds and of what doctrine should be.

A. Structural Implications

The interactions between the federal government and state and local governments in relation to foreign affairs mean that federal policy shapes state and local policy. By providing assistance, financial and otherwise, to the sister-cities program, the federal government makes it easier for cities to participate. By signaling its support for state "Buy American" laws, Congress encourages them -- and the Department of Transportation incentivizes them even further by refusing to participate in contracts governed by state "Buy American" laws that are less strict than the federal ones. In the context of immigration and climate change, the federal government incentivizes (and sometimes comes close to forcing) state and local action in support of federal policy. All of these examples in the foreign affairs context reflect an "increasing concentration of power at Washington in the instigation and supervision of local policies," just as cooperative federalism arrangements do in the domestic context.

In work focused on the domestic context, Heather Gerken shows that the interactive nature of modern federalism also provides state and local governments with ways to influence federal policy. State and local actors exercise "the power . . . of the servant," which offers the [\*2153] chance "not just to complain about national policy, but to help set it." In shaping federal policy, these actors are not simply employing the traditional tools of process federalism; rather, it is their role in administering federal policy that gives them a say in the shape that this implementation will take. Yet the scope of this role also limits what they can do: "power dynamics are fluid; minority rule is contingent, limited, and subject to reversal by the national majority." In related work, Gerken and Jessica Bulman-Pozen elaborate on the ways in which state and local governments can engage in "uncooperative federalism," including by resisting federal policies that they are charged with enforcing.

Building on the core insight that state and local governments can help shape federal policy through their roles in implementing federal law, Bulman-Pozen further shows that these interactions can affect the distribution of power between Congress and the executive branch. In a pair of articles, she describes the ways in which state and local activities can strengthen the powers of one branch against the other. The more that Congress invites or effectively requires state and local participation in the administration of a federal statutory regime, the more these actors can serve as checks on the executive branch's power to implement this regime. On the flip side, such shared roles in implementing previously enacted statutory schemes can empower the executive branch and subnational executive actors to work together in ways that crowd out the current Congress.

[\*2154] Similar dynamics can occur with respect to foreign affairs federalism. Indeed, some of the examples that Gerken and Bulman-Pozen focus on are issues that have transnational implications. With regard to climate, for example, they show how states have used the power of the servant to try to shape federal policy, including efforts by conservative states to push back against the federal regulatory scheme and by progressive states to make it stronger. Bulman-Pozen also uses climate as an example of how "federal and state executives negotiate without Congress" once a broad statutory scheme is in place. Some payoffs for the foreign affairs context here are simply derivative: the more that state and local governments enhance or reduce federal efforts to mitigate climate change, then the more or less the United States does with respect to addressing this global problem. But other implications relate specifically to how the United States engages internationally. Continuing with the climate context, the extent to which President Obama could make commitments on behalf of the United States during the negotiations for the 2015 Paris Agreement was largely limited by the scope of the Clean Air Act, since he had no realistic chance of getting new congressional legislation that would advance his goals with respect to climate. But since California and other progressive state and local actors were doing more than what the Clean Air Act required, President Obama could take this into account in setting the target to which the United States was committing with respect to climate change mitigation. President Obama's option set was thus enhanced by state and local action in the climate context.

#### Extinction.

Dr. Yew-Kwang Ng 19, Winsemius Professor of Economics at Nanyang Technological University, Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia and Member of Advisory Board at the Global Priorities Institute at Oxford University, PhD in Economics from Sydney University, “Keynote: Global Extinction and Animal Welfare: Two Priorities for Effective Altruism”, Global Policy, Volume 10, Number 2, May 2019, pp. 258–266

Catastrophic climate change

Though by no means certain, CCC causing global extinction is possible due to interrelated factors of non-linearity, cascading effects, positive feedbacks, multiplicative factors, critical thresholds and tipping points (e.g. Barnosky and Hadly, 2016; Belaia et al., 2017; Buldyrev et al., 2010; Grainger, 2017; Hansen and Sato, 2012; IPCC 2014; Kareiva and Carranza, 2018; Osmond and Klausmeier, 2017; Rothman, 2017; Schuur et al., 2015; Sims and Finnoff, 2016; Van Aalst, 2006).7

A possibly imminent tipping point could be in the form of ‘an abrupt ice sheet collapse [that] could cause a rapid sea level rise’ (Baum et al., 2011, p. 399). There are many avenues for positive feedback in global warming, including:

• the replacement of an ice sea by a liquid ocean surface from melting reduces the reflection and increases the absorption of sunlight, leading to faster warming;

• the drying of forests from warming increases forest fires and the release of more carbon; and

• higher ocean temperatures may lead to the release of methane trapped under the ocean floor, producing runaway global warming.

Though there are also avenues for negative feedback, the scientific consensus is for an overall net positive feedback (Roe and Baker, 2007). Thus, the Global Challenges Foundation (2017, p. 25) concludes, ‘The world is currently completely unprepared to envisage, and even less deal with, the consequences of CCC’.

The threat of sea-level rising from global warming is well known, but there are also other likely and more imminent threats to the survivability of mankind and other living things. For example, Sherwood and Huber (2010) emphasize the adaptability limit to climate change due to heat stress from high environmental wet-bulb temperature. They show that ‘even modest global warming could ... expose large fractions of the [world] population to unprecedented heat stress’ p. 9552 and that with substantial global warming, ‘the area of land rendered uninhabitable by heat stress would dwarf that affected by rising sea level’ p. 9555, making extinction much more likely and the relatively moderate damages estimated by most integrated assessment models unreliably low.

While imminent extinction is very unlikely and may not come for a long time even under business as usual, the main point is that we cannot rule it out. Annan and Hargreaves (2011, pp. 434–435) may be right that there is ‘an upper 95 per cent probability limit for S [temperature increase] ... to lie close to 4°C, and certainly well below 6°C’. However, probabilities of 5 per cent, 0.5 per cent, 0.05 per cent or even 0.005 per cent of excessive warming and the resulting extinction probabilities cannot be ruled out and are unacceptable. Even if there is only a 1 per cent probability that there is a time bomb in the airplane, you probably want to change your flight. Extinction of the whole world is more important to avoid by literally a trillion times.

### 1NC---INB---Soft Power

#### SPP expansion hedges losses in U.S soft power.

Matthew Hughes, 20 (Matthew Hughes, MD, MPH, Occupational and Environmental Health Specialist, 2-14-2020, accessed on 7-2-2022, Small Wars Journal, “Projecting Soft Power Through the State Partnership Program”, <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/projecting-soft-power-through-state-partnership-program>, HBisevac) \*\*edited for gendered language\*\*

Power is a relative term, especially when referring to the amount of control and influence a nation wields in the global community. In analyzing nations’ sources of power, American political scientist Joseph Nye popularized the concepts of hard power, or “the ability to use carrots and sticks of economic and military might to make others follow your will,” and soft power, an influence which “co-opts [nations] rather than coerces them.”[1] Whereas nations mainly derive hard power from military forces, Nye asserts a nation’s soft power stems from “its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when others see them as legitimate and having moral authority).”[2] Soft power grows through cultural diffusion, which often occurs more rapidly thanks to globalization, but there are also institutions which directly contribute to soft power projection. The United States Department of State (DoS) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) are chief among these institutions cultivating American soft power through initiatives and foreign presence.

Investment into these soft power tools has been under tight scrutiny as U.S. policy shifts toward hard power. A common theme in executive budget proposals between 2017 and 2019 involved funding cuts between 23 and 32 percent for diplomacy and international aid.[3] Although Congress countered these proposals, albeit narrowly by one vote in the Senate in 2018, these proposals mark a clear shift in power priorities rendering the budget for soft power tools volatile and unpredictable.[4] As policymakers consider significant budget cuts in traditional soft power tools, however, other countries are investing resources toward soft power projection. China’s national strategy, for instance, now includes the political jargon wenhua ruan shili (cultural soft power) and plans for cultural influence to permeate.

In the midst of budget cut proposals and foreign competition in the sphere of soft power, the government must continually explore avenues to improve efficacy. One means is to recognize that while there are distinct, traditional tools to project soft power and hard power, roles, responsibilities, and effects can overlap. Joseph Nye noted, “Sometimes the same power resources can affect the entire spectrum of behavior from **coercion** to **attraction**.”[5] The National Guard’s **S**tate **P**artnership **P**rogram (SPP) is one such power resource that can have this **strategic effect**—a traditional hard power entity with **great capacity** to project **soft power** abroad. Established in 1993, the SPP involves partnerships between individual states and sovereign nations whereby states’ National Guard units conduct engagements with partner nations’ security forces, emergency response personnel, and other organizations. In standing up new partnerships, the U.S. sought to optimize efficiency and partner-building capacity by establishing partnerships on factors such as parity in ethnic composition or disparities in state National Guard unit strengths and partner nation (PN) security force weaknesses. In a perennial shaping operation, the SPP yields strategic dividends by fostering trust, shared values, and interoperability with partners in ways that support U.S. policy objectives.

The **longevity** of SPP partnerships and the civilian occupations of ~~Guardsmen~~ [soldiers] foster conditions to **shape conditions abroad**, but partnerships do not yet fully exploit this capacity to project soft power. As American leaders consider budget cuts to diplomacy, leaders should explore the feasibility of leveraging the State Partnership Program to **hedge losses** in **soft power**. Investing in the preparation of personnel coordinating SPP events by training them in the partner nation’s language and providing education on soft power and interagency collaboration can enhance SPP efficacy. Consulting with and including diplomatic considerations in planning and assessments may also enable NG units to project influence. States can further capitalize on opportunities to project soft power through the National Guard’s State Partnership Program by training key SPP personnel in foreign language and soft power considerations and by taking a hybrid approach to gap analysis.

Key Players Require Language Training and Familiarization with Soft Power Considerations

Despite the strategic role and expansive scope of partnerships, program responsibility funnels down to a small group of individuals. Funding for a typical state partnership supports one SPP bilateral affairs officer (BAO) assigned to the U.S. Embassy in the partner nation, one SPP state coordinator located within the state, and five to seven events annually.[6] Partnerships lacking a full-time BAO have a traditional combatant commander’s activities (TCA) coordinator on six-month temporary duty assignment or a state coordinator who travels to the partner nation to coordinate events.[7] Partner nation representatives, security cooperation personnel, or other military or civilian leaders propose events or activities, often based on a partner nation’s requests to help build capabilities by providing expertise. Leaders including, but not limited to, the relevant service section chief (e.g., Army Section Chief), BAO or TCA Coordinator, Senior Defense Attaché, and State Coordinator discuss proposed events and activities to ensure they nest with long-term strategic plans for the partner nation and region. The BAO further develops this plan and, in collaboration with other security cooperation leaders, proposes the plan to state and COCOM leaders for approval. Hence, the SPP model invests a significant amount of influence into one or two individuals—the BAO or TCA coordinator and/or the state coordinator—making them single points of success or failure for a partnership.

The level of training provided to the BAO or TCA coordinator and the state coordinator have significant second- and third-order effects on the outcome of partnerships. BAOs, TCA coordinators, and state coordinators should also have a strong grasp on diplomacy and soft power, including relevant government agencies and the role of the SPP in projecting this type of influence. Historical lessons learned note, however, the need to “educat[e] BAOs that […] building capacity” in sectors such as health through medical engagements “can provide access, influence, and soft power.”[8] (Penn 2012). To properly train personnel on such facets of security cooperation, the Security Cooperation Management State Partnership Course, managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies (DISCS), includes a one-hour introduction to USAID and a three-hour block of instruction on SPP operations that addresses DoS and civilian programs enhancing SPP planning and PN interaction.[9] Such training helps to reduce knowledge gaps among State Coordinators, but BAOs and TCA coordinators do not attend this course. This lack of training is detrimental to partnerships heavily reliant on TCA coordinators, especially in SOUTHCOM where TCA coordinators outnumber BAOs.

Remarks in after action reviews and lessons learned raise other concerns about BAO knowledge gaps, especially with regard to foreign language proficiency. Generally, units identify Officers who are already proficient in the PN’s official language or push to provide a new BAO with rudimentary training or foreign immersion. Occasionally, however, BAOs or TCAs report without proficiency in the language. The fact that these billets are not language-coded billets perpetuates this issue, as the billets do not necessitate language proficiency, despite the bilateral nature of that office and the inherent benefits of speaking that language. Not only would language training help new BAOs or TCAs develop rapport with PN officials, but these personnel would better be equipped to analyze DOTMLPF and identify gaps and opportunities as they read PN military doctrine and other publications, such as PN Officers’ professional military education reports on their nation’s readiness and capability gaps.

States Should Adopt a Hybrid Approach to Partner Nation Gap Analysis

States conduct gap analysis at the commencement of a new partnership and periodically (e.g., every five years) thereafter. This process involves key stakeholders or an analysis team assessing a Partner Nation’s current capabilities in a series of focus areas (e.g., human resources, security forces, training, logistics and maintenance, etc.), describing the desired state in each area, and identifying gaps between the present and desired states. This analysis informs SPP planners and facilitates planning for effective SPP activities. Regularly conducting this process helps to steer partnerships by objectively evaluating efficacy of engagements through measured progress in these focus areas.

Despite the common practice of performing gap analysis for partnerships, there is a limited amount of doctrine or tactics, techniques, and procedures shared among units regarding this process. The Army’s Center for Lessons Learned published a bulletin on SPP best practices, which provides general guidance on SPP functions and objectives, but does not discuss the concept of gap analysis or the mission analysis process behind planning SPP activities. Without doctrine, a handbook outlining best practices or providing templates, or a dialogue on lessons learned, gap analysis products vary significantly in scope, focus, and detail by partnership, as does the efficacy of partnership activities. Increased interagency collaboration can help to remedy this deficiency and optimize partnership gap analysis.

Similarly, dialogue between National Guard units and other government agencies is rare. Instead, gap analysis usually involves key stakeholders and staff from the National Guard unit with limited to no consultation with agencies such as USAID or the DoS.[10] National Guard units can enhance gap analysis by utilizing USAID and DoS reports and historical data as inputs to their partnership analysis. States should also institutionalize a formal gap analysis similar to USAID, which typically involves stakeholders and assessment teams conducting desktop research and team discussions, a gap assessment workshop, field visits, focus group discussions, analysis and report writing, and a validation workshop yielding comprehensive analysis products. Incorporating USAID and DoS will approach the measure of interagency collaboration outlined in Presidential Policy Directive 23, which calls for “the establishment of a common, collaborative and effective approach to the planning [of] successful security sector assistance activities.”[11] Such collaboration will also help to resolve incomplete gap analysis mentioned in after action reviews and lessons learned regarding SPP activities, such as failing to explore possible soft power engagements as key stakeholders do not recognize the potential payoff of such events.[12] Similarly, historical partnership assessment products list operational capacity and capability among evaluation variables, but scoring criteria is vague and subjective.

A recent initial partner gap analysis conducted by the Nevada National Guard for its new partnership with Fiji reveals the utility of taking a hybrid approach. Leaders referenced USAID and DoS assessments of Fiji as inputs and included diplomatic considerations among their key indicators.[13] This approach deviated from the traditional list of indicators directly relating to war fighting functions or staff sectors (e.g., human resources, security forces, logistics, information systems, etc.), typical of a SPP partnership gap analysis. The Nevada National Guard Gap Analysis Team assessed these areas, yielding several potential high-payoff engagements. This innovative approach cultivated informed discussion and fostered interagency collaboration in coordinating whole-of-government efforts behind SPP objectives.

The Nevada National Guard’s best practice of making interagency collaboration a fundamental facet of gap analysis should be transformed to doctrine; this should be the norm, rather than the exception. These tactics, techniques, and procedures, such as using key indicators like medical care and emergency response, ensure planners consider soft power projection in determining the most meaningful SPP activities to pursue. Considering these soft power sectors also enables the National Guard to leverage units and individual ~~Guardsmen~~ [soldiers] with unique skillsets. Institutionalizing a hybrid approach to gap analysis by incorporating soft power variables and considerations can help planners identify new opportunities to network with DoS, USAID, and partner nation organizations.

Conclusion

As countries dedicate more resources toward diplomacy, budgets for U.S. traditional soft power tools seem uncertain. The National Guard’s State Partnership Program is one means whereby the United States can hedge against potential losses in influence threatened by budget cuts. While SPP activities have **influenced** **p**artner **n**ation**s** and **strengthened** their **ties** to the U.S., this program is capable of projecting more **soft power** by ensuring key SPP personnel satisfy training requirements and by refining planning and assessments. Training BAOs or TCA coordinators and SPP state coordinators on soft power and exposing them to organizations engaged in diplomacy will **foster inclusion** of **soft power** considerations in state partnership planning. Strong language proficiency among these key players will help them to build rapport with partner nation counterparts and develop meaningful SPP activities addressing partner nation concerns raised in their own reports and studies. States should also strive to incorporate soft power considerations into partnership activity planning and assessments. Formal gap analysis involving interagency collaboration can help to identify opportunities to influence partner nations through engagements promoting American soft power. These changes will better enable leaders to leverage the National Guard State Partnership Program as a tool to project soft power.

#### That averts a laundry list of existential impacts.

Margaret Seymour, 21 (Margaret Seymour, 2020 Lt. Gen. Bernard E. Trainor USMC Veterans Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, is Currently a Graduate Student at the University of Missouri Studying Journalism and Strategic Communications, 3-19-2021, accessed on 7-4-2022, Foreign Policy Research Institute, “Building Soft Power Back Better?”, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/03/building-soft-power-back-better/>, HBisevac)

The Biden administration has multiple **competing priorities**: COVID-19 and its economic impacts, long-ignored racial fissures, and a growing tenuous relationship with truth, **reality**, and trust among the populace, just to name a few. President Joseph Biden also has the challenge of representing the United States on the **foreign stage**. In that capacity, he is charged with crafting a **new foreign policy**—one that champions a balance of hard and soft power, tailored for the most efficient use of resources and the most effective results.

He is off to a good start; in his interim national security guidance released in early March, President Biden acknowledges the role of soft power resources in building and maintaining U.S. strength, even if he doesn’t call the concept out by name. He posits,

Achieving these goals rests on a core strategic proposition: The United States must renew its enduring advantages so that we can meet today’s challenges from a position of strength. We will build back better our economic foundations; reclaim our place in international institutions; lift up our values at home and speak out to defend them around the world; modernize our military capabilities, while leading first with diplomacy; and revitalize America’s unmatched network of alliances and partnerships.

Focusing on econ**omic strength**, alliances, and institutions and exporting American values and ideals are good starts to restoring American soft power abroad—a critical component of American leadership. In fact, the post-WWII world order, and, more recently, the post-Cold War international system with the United States emerging at the sole superpower, was only possible through U.S. soft power. Historically, the United States has maintained its power and influence abroad, in part, due to its appeal. This appeal must be restored.

This is not a call for a post-Trump 180, the path away from soft power and towards a hard power-dominant foreign policy is decades-long. True reinvigoration is going to require not only a criticism of the past four years, but also deep introspection on President Biden’s own contribution to the trend as a senator and vice president. In other words, building a smart power approach to foreign policy is going to take more than simply rejoining a few international accords or hosting some impressive state dinners. Frankly, it’s going to take more time than this administration has, even with the possibility of a second term. But if we take Biden at his promise to serve as a transitional leader, we can certainly start rebuilding the foundation of a foreign policy approach that will serve generations of Americans and citizens abroad for decades.

This starts with rebuilding relationships. Based on Biden’s picks for high-level positions, it appears that he understands the power of relationships, choosing long-term confidants and establishment experts. Biden values trust and interpersonal history—and this approach must be applied to international relations.

President Biden campaigned on his personal relationships with key international leaders, which is critical, but the administration must also craft relationships with populations and other non-state actors. While the new administration understands the potential threat from non-state actions, it would be well-advised to also consider the potential opportunities in non-state groups and craft a national security strategy that acknowledges the growing power and role of such groups. For example, this strategy must include a prioritization of immigration and refugee programs, such as the Special Immigration Visa Program. While the Trump administration infamously decreased the levels of immigrants admitted under this program, the United States has arguably never fulfilled its responsibilities to the men and women who have assisted missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Not only should the Biden administration reintroduce the Iraqi Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) Program, but it also should offer a permanent fix to the Afghan program as well as create a new program to reward our allies in the Syrian conflict. Such programs would establish the United States as a leader in refugee rights and protections. The success of future conflicts will be heavily reliant on the ability to gain and maintain the trust of civilian populaces. Without interpreters, translators, and other host-nation citizens, the success of U.S. missions abroad would and will continue to be threatened. More than that, failing to uphold promises to allies abroad threatens American legitimacy and standing in the international community.

In the new world order described by the administration, these wicked international problems “respect no borders or walls, and must be met with collective action.” While the COVID-19 pandemic has made the increasingly global nature of the international order abundantly clear, biological disease isn’t the first challenge to transcend borders. Counterterrorism, the threat of nuclear war, economic structures, and climate change all present challenges not to a single state or region, but to an entire international structure. These problems can only be addressed with global solutions.

## NET-BENEFITS

### 2NC---INB---FAF

#### Warming causes extinction from oxygen, disease, ice melt, and cognitive failure

Bill McKibben 19, Schumann Distinguished Scholar at Middlebury College, Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, “This Is How Human Extinction Could Play Out”, Rolling Stone, 4/9/2019, https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/bill-mckibben-falter-climate-change-817310/

Oh, it could get *very* bad.

In 2015, a study in the Journal of Mathematical Biology pointed out that if the world’s oceans kept warming, by 2100 they might become hot enough to “stop oxygen production by phyto-plankton by disrupting the process of photosynthesis.” Given that two-thirds of the Earth’s oxygen comes from phytoplankton, that would “likely result in the mass mortality of animals and humans.”

A year later, above the Arctic Circle, in Siberia, a heat wave thawed a reindeer carcass that had been trapped in the permafrost. The exposed body released anthrax into nearby water and soil, infecting two thousand reindeer grazing nearby, and they in turn infected some humans; a twelve-year-old boy died. As it turns out, permafrost is a “very good preserver of microbes and viruses, because it is cold, there is no oxygen, and it is dark” — scientists have managed to revive an eight-million-year-old bacterium they found beneath the surface of a glacier. Researchers believe there are fragments of the Spanish flu virus, smallpox, and bubonic plague buried in Siberia and Alaska.

Or consider this: as ice sheets melt, they take weight off land, and that can trigger earthquakes — seismic activity is already increasing in Greenland and Alaska. Meanwhile, the added weight of the new seawater starts to bend the Earth’s crust. “That will give you a massive increase in volcanic activity. It’ll activate faults to create earthquakes, submarine landslides, tsunamis, the whole lot,” explained the director of University College London’s Hazard Centre. Such a landslide happened in Scandinavia about eight thousand years ago, as the last Ice Age retreated and a Kentucky-size section of Norway’s continental shelf gave way, “plummeting down to the abyssal plain and creating a series of titanic waves that roared forth with a vengeance,” wiping all signs of life from coastal Norway to Greenland and “drowning the Wales-sized landmass that once connected Britain to the Netherlands, Denmark, and Germany.” When the waves hit the Shetlands, they were sixty-five feet high.

There’s even this: if we keep raising carbon dioxide levels, we may not be able to think straight anymore. At a thousand parts per million (which is within the realm of possibility for 2100), human cognitive ability falls 21 percent. “The largest effects were seen for Crisis Response, Information Usage, and Strategy,” a Harvard study reported, which is too bad, as those skills are what we seem to need most.

#### Multiple, simultaneous climate shocks causes global system collapse

Dr. Michael T. Klare 20, Five Colleges Professor of Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College, Ph.D. from the Graduate School of the Union Institute, BA and MA from Columbia University, Member of the Board of Director at the Arms Control Association, Defense Correspondent for The Nation, All Hell Breaking Loose: The Pentagon’s Perspective on Climate Change, Metropolitan Books, Paperback

COMPOUNDING SYSTEM SHOCKS

The Arab Spring exemplified a new type of security threat from global warming: one arising not from a single natural disaster, limited in time and space, but from a compound series of events, spreading quickly across the planet. Such events—call them climate shock waves—are far more threatening than the dangers discussed earlier in this book, as they have the capacity to destabilize numerous states simultaneously rather than just one at a time. Moreover, they can also imperil the world-spanning trade and logistical systems upon which the international economic order—and American prosperity—rests. These systems, such as the grain markets so affected by the Russian heat wave of 2010, are essential for the well-being of almost every country on Earth, yet are highly vulnerable to global climate shocks. Other critical networks, such as the worldwide flow of energy and the global public health system, are equally at risk to shocks of this sort. When such systems fail, vital commodities become scarce and chaos may ensue—posing a severe risk to fragile states and a potential threat to U.S. national security. Accordingly, climate shock waves represent an even higher level of danger than the other warming-related perils we have examined up to this point.

The risks to national and international stability from climate shock waves have been a concern of America’s military and intelligence communities for some time. In its initial 2008 National Intelligence Assessment on the security threats posed by climate change, the National Intelligence Council underscored America’s reliance on reliable global networks. The United States, it pointed out, “depends on a smooth-functioning international system ensuring the flow of trade and market access to critical raw materials such as oil and gas, and security for its allies and partners.” Climate change could imperil all of that, it noted, resulting in the downfall of friendly states, a loss of access to vital materials, and disruptions to “the global economy more broadly.”18

Following the Arab Spring, the U.S. Intelligence Community sought to acquire a more sophisticated understanding of the role that climate change might play in triggering such far-reaching calamities. To this end, the IC commissioned the National Research Council of the American Academy of Sciences to conduct a study of warming’s socioeconomic consequences, which was published in 2013 as Climate and Social Stress: Implications for Security Analysis. The NRC study examined a number of scenarios already discussed in earlier chapters of this book, including humanitarian disasters, resource scarcities, and state collapse. But it also included a section on “global system shocks,” continent-spanning crises triggered by some combination of climate change and “globally integrated systems other than the climate itself.” As world temperatures rise and global supply networks become more interdependent, the report noted, “there are numerous ways in which climate events could create shocks to integrated global social, economic, health, or technological systems and thus have effects far removed geographically from where the events occur.”19

Because we have become so dependent on these global supply networks, the NRC’s analysts concluded, a major climate event that disrupts or damages a significant component of them can inflict immediate and substantial pain. Many nations rely on those systems for deliveries of food, energy, and other vital commodities; when shortages of such goods arise, their prices soar and all those with limited means begin to suffer. If governments fail to address these challenges in a timely and equitable manner, unrest and conflict can erupt in multiple countries at once. Such upheavals can also produce follow-on effects, including mass migrations and pandemics, that undermine yet other countries. States that are already vulnerable to dissolution can fail one after another.20

The authors of the NRC report were particularly struck by the degree to which climate change is combining with globalization to increase the risk of upheaval. Not only are extreme climate events occurring more frequently, they noted, but warming’s effects are being amplified by our reliance on international trading networks for essential goods and services—in particular, the globe-spanning matrix of pipelines, rail lines, and shipping lanes used to transport food and energy supplies. These networks are relatively robust under ordinary conditions, but can be severely disrupted by extreme climate-related events, as with hurricane damage to refineries, pipelines, and oil terminals.21 To make matters worse, severe climate events are occurring more frequently in “clusters,” magnifying the shock to the system—much as when the 2010 heat wave in Russia coincided with severe flooding in Pakistan and drought in China.22

Global supply chains’ vulnerability to severe climate effects is especially evident in the case of food. The crops that account for a large share of the world’s caloric intake—wheat, maize (corn), rice, soy beans, and a few others—require copious amounts of water to achieve maximum yield, along with temperatures that remain within a certain range. Always unpredictable in the best of times, these benign growing conditions will prove increasingly uncommon as severe heat waves, prolonged droughts, and catastrophic floods become the norm. Under these circumstances, shortages of one staple or another are likely to occur on a recurring basis.23 On top of this, the number of grain-producing nations capable of generating a surplus for export is rather small, while the number of countries dependent on those few exporters for their essential food requirements is large. A clustering of extreme weather events that reduces or eliminates exports from just two or three of the major exporters would thus have a powerful effect on the global market, squeezing supplies for all importers and sending prices skyward.24

The disruptiveness of such price increases is amplified by the social and economic difficulties in a number of the countries dependent on food imports. In water-stressed areas of the developing world, many poor farmers—no longer able to secure an adequate livelihood from their increasingly barren fields as temperatures rise and rainfall diminishes—are migrating to the cities in search of alternative options, and must scramble to acquire food there. This trend, the NRC pointed out, can only increase these countries’ vulnerability to global food-supply problems, creating larger urban populations that are particularly sensitive to food prices. With more displaced agriculturalists moving to the cities, it stated, “the dependence of low-income populations on imported food supplies provided by global markets may increase their vulnerability to climatic or economic events in other parts of the world that sharply increase the prices of the foods they have come to depend upon.”25

This combination of circumstances, IC analysts believe, can only lead to more Arab Spring–like upheavals in the future—a risk given close scrutiny in the National Intelligence Council’s 2015 report, Global Food Security. Although humans are theoretically capable of producing enough foodstuffs to meet the basic caloric requirements of everyone on the planet, that report indicated, large segments of the global population are vulnerable to food shortages and sudden price spikes of the sort witnessed in 2010–11 because of unreliable distribution systems, flawed government policies, and relentless poverty.26 “We judge that the overall risk of food insecurity in many countries of strategic importance to the United States will increase,” the NIC report concluded. “In some countries, declining food security will almost certainly contribute to social disruptions or large-scale political instability or conflict.”27

This concern—that growing world food insecurity and climate-driven price spikes will generate widespread instability and conflict—continues to permeate U.S. strategic calculations. It is evident, for example, in the “worldwide threat assessment” delivered each year to Congress by the director of national intelligence on behalf of the IC as a whole. In his February 2018 presentation, the current director, Daniel R. Coats, stated that “extreme weather events in a warmer world have the potential for greater impacts and can compound with other drivers to raise the risk of humanitarian disasters [and] conflict,” with “food shortages” and “price shocks” playing major contributing roles.28

ENERGY SHOCK WAVES

Warming’s threat to global food distribution networks has, in general, constituted the primary focus of U.S. military and intelligence analysts concerned about climate shock waves. However, they have also sounded the alarm about the potential for other highly disruptive events: breakdowns in global energy systems, outbreaks of global pandemics, and new, destabilizing mass migrations. As with a collapse of global food-supply chains, these climate shocks would involve extreme climate events that arise in one or more parts of the world and provoke havoc in many others, ultimately endangering American national security and prompting U.S. military action of some sort.

After global food supplies, American security analysts have worried most about warming’s capacity to disrupt the world’s vital energy systems. As with food supplies, today’s world is highly reliant on global commerce for many essential fuels, especially oil and natural gas. While a handful of countries are largely self-sufficient in one or both of those fuels, most industrial powers—including Japan, the United States, and the EU countries—depend on imports for at least some of their energy needs. In 2018, for example, Japan relied on imports for nearly 100 percent of its petroleum requirements, the EU countries for 89 percent, and the United States for 25 percent. These import dependencies are expected to persist well into the future, with the developing nations of Asia assuming an ever-increasing share of global energy demand. China now relies on imported petroleum for 65 percent of its requirements and India for 82 percent; by 2040, their import dependence is projected to climb to 80 and 91 percent, respectively.29

It is true, of course, that some countries are working very hard to reduce their reliance on fossil fuels, including oil and natural gas, so as to diminish their contributions to global warming. Japan, for example, has reduced its oil consumption from a peak of 4.7 million barrels per day in 2012 to 3.9 million battels in 2018. Most European countries have also experienced a decline, with consumption by the European Union as a whole dropping from 14.8 million barrels per day in 2008 to 13.3 million barrels in 2018.30 Some analysts believe, therefore, that the global demand for petroleum will gradually subside. But in many parts of the world, especially Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, oil consumption is projected to continue growing, especially as more people enter the middle class and purchase cars, trucks, and motorcycles; these surges in demand are expected to outweigh declines elsewhere, ensuring continuing increases in global oil consumption. The worldwide demand for natural gas is also expected to climb, as countries around the world work to phase out older coal-powered electrical plants. As a result of all this, the trade in oil and gas is likely to remain a critical feature of international commerce for decades to come.

To transport oil, coal, natural gas, and electricity from one end of the world to another, energy-exporting and -consuming nations have constructed a vast matrix of railroads, pipelines, transmission lines, and maritime shipping routes. On any given day, a large share of the world’s energy supply is being transported via one of these vital conduits. According to BP, on an average day in 2018, some seventy-one million barrels of crude petroleum and refined fuels—approximately 75 percent of daily world output—were being shipped from one country to another; for natural gas, the share of world output in transit was about 24 percent.31 In many cases, the pipelines and tankers used in carrying these supplies pass through or near areas of recurring conflict, such as the Middle East and North Africa; most of the time, moreover, they travel across areas vulnerable to storms, wildfires, flooding, and other climate-related disasters.

American security analysts have long been concerned about disruptions in the global flow of energy arising from war and political interference. Those concerns were given particular urgency in the 1970s following two crippling “oil shocks” generated by political turbulence in the Middle East—the first, occurring in 1973–74, when Arab members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) imposed an embargo on exports to the United States in retaliation for its support of Israel in the October War of 1973; the second in 1979–80, following the Islamic Revolution in Iran. In response to those two oil shocks, the United States charged its military with taking ever greater responsibility for ensuring the safety of oil deliveries from the Persian Gulf.32 Following the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Jimmy Carter proclaimed that any hostile effort to impede those deliveries “will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America,” and, as such, “will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”33

To enforce that edict—quickly dubbed the “Carter Doctrine”—the Department of Defense established the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force and assigned it responsibility for protecting Persian Gulf oil exports; that force later served as the nucleus of the U.S. Central Command. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 and appeared to be poised for an attack on Saudi Arabia, President George H. W. Bush invoked the Carter Doctrine to justify the deployment of American forces to the Gulf and the onset of what became Operation Desert Storm.34 Although the United States no longer relies on Persian Gulf oil for a large share of its energy needs—as a result of advances in extraction technology, this country now obtains an ever-greater proportion of its energy needs from domestic shale formations—U.S. leaders continue to worry about the safety of the global oil flow, given its critical importance to the world economy. In particular, they worry about threats being made by Iranian leaders to block oil traffic through the Gulf in case of a U.S. attack on Iranian nuclear facilities; to counter any such move, Centcom has long deployed a powerful array of ships and planes in the region.35

But while American strategists continue to think about the threats to oil flow posed by terrorism and hostile powers, they are becoming increasingly concerned about dangers to the global web of energy systems arising from the effects of climate change. A great deal of the world’s energy is transported via extended pipelines, shipping lanes, and transmission lines that are naturally at risk from such climate-related perils as severe flooding, turbulent seas, and major wildfires. This danger is compounded by the fact that, in search of ready access to maritime shipping channels, a very substantial proportion of the world’s oil and natural gas infrastructure is situated in coastal areas, which in many cases are highly vulnerable to hurricanes and storm surges. As global warming advances, therefore, international energy trade will become increasingly susceptible to severe climate shocks.36

With the world increasingly dependent on these extended, highly vulnerable energy-supply networks, the NRC concluded in its 2013 report, future climate shocks could produce instant shortages and price hikes around the world, much as with the food-price shock waves it had studied.37 In support of this assessment, the report pointed to a series of powerful hurricanes that struck America’s Gulf Coast in the early years of the twenty-first century: Katrina and Rita in 2005, followed by Gustav and Ike in 2008. These storms damaged or destroyed many offshore rigs and disrupted operations at refineries and distribution facilities, sharply reducing U.S. oil and gas output and causing a spike in global prices.38 Sea-level rise, the NRC noted, will amplify the disruptive consequences of future storms and hurricanes, as many power plants—both nuclear and coal-fired—are located in low-lying coastal areas; when storms occur, these plants are at risk of flooding, causing systemic damage and power outages. This occurred, for example, in the New York metropolitan region following Superstorm Sandy in 2012: several of the region’s power plants, including all of its nuclear stations, were either damaged or experienced temporary shutdowns due to high winds and flooding.39

The NRC further noted that climate change may disrupt the global energy supply system in other ways. Prolonged droughts and heat waves can reduce the amount of water available to hydropower facilities and water-cooled thermoelectric power plants, cutting into the electricity delivered to international grids.40 A disruption of just this sort occurred during a European heat wave in 2003 that was blamed for the deaths of over thirty-four thousand people. As river levels dropped in France—Europe’s leading exporter of electricity—the government was forced to shut down several nuclear reactors for lack of adequate cooling water. This, in turn, resulted in a 50 percent decline in France’s power exports, producing electricity shortages throughout the region.41

Major disruptions to the global energy system have occurred before, and no doubt will occur again in the future for a variety of reasons, including those cited above. Given the multiplicity of international networks available for energy delivery, the world economy can probably absorb several such disruptions happening sequentially, as they have in the past. What worried the authors of the NRC report, however, is the possibility that advancing climate change will result in several major disruptions occurring simultaneously, severely testing the ability of global supply networks to cope. Such a scenario, they warned, could produce significant energy shortages around the world and a rapid spike in prices. This, in turn, could result in an economic recession and political unrest. As happened with the 2010–11 spike in food prices, “an oil-price shock could increase instability, particularly in a situation that is already politically sensitive.”42

Initially, such an outcome would prove most disruptive in developing countries that are highly dependent on energy imports and can ill afford a sudden spike in prices. But climate-related supply interruptions could also generate havoc in advanced nations that rely heavily on imports, as well as in energy-exporting states that depend on foreign sales to finance government operations. Any significant disruption in Persian Gulf oil exports, for example, will punish oil-producing countries as well as their overseas clients. As warming advances and global supply chains prove more unreliable, major energy-consuming nations may adopt a more nationalistic and militaristic stance toward energy, thereby generating yet additional international tensions. This could also lead to conflict among the major powers—a topic to be addressed in the next chapter.

GLOBAL PANDEMICS

In addition to their concern about global food-price and energy-price shocks, American strategists worry about another potential climate-instigated shock wave: the rapid spread of lethal infectious diseases across the globe, causing widespread illness in multiple locations and, in so doing, adding to the pressures on already overstressed societies. Deadly pandemics have, of course, long bedeviled human society, going back to the outbreaks of plague that periodically decimated European populations. Modern medicine has helped reduce the risk of such calamities, but now climate change is threatening to overwhelm those gains. Rising world temperatures, increased precipitation, and higher levels of humidity all facilitate the spread of diseases transmitted by mosquitoes and other insects. Mosquitoes need pools of water to breed, and the hotter and wetter it is, the faster they can reproduce. As global warming widens the geographic extent of hot, moist breeding areas, the range of many virus-bearing mosquitoes will grow as well.43

Malaria, one of the deadliest diseases transmitted by mosquitoes, is already thought to be spreading from the tropics to temperate zones as a consequence of climate change.44 Other “vector-borne” diseases, such as the Zika virus and dengue fever, are also expected to spread into new areas as global warming advances.45 “Increased temperatures and more frequent and intense precipitation events can create conditions that favor the movement of vector-borne diseases into new geographic regions,” the U.S. Global Change Research Program noted in its Fourth National Climate Assessment.46 Adding to the danger of future pandemics is the looming breakdown of public health systems in many poor and conflict-ravaged countries. Epidemics that can effectively be controlled by medical authorities in well-functioning societies are likely to gain momentum when health systems collapse—an outcome that will prove increasingly likely as more and more states are impacted by climate shock waves.47

Globalization is also contributing to the risk of global pandemics, by facilitating air and sea travel from one corner of the world to another. “Outbreaks occurring in other countries can impact U.S. populations and military personnel living abroad and can sometimes affect the United States,” the Fourth Assessment warned.48 Unless a quarantine is imposed when a potential epidemic is first detected, visitors to a country with mosquito-borne diseases may become infected and return to their home country before any symptoms have appeared, potentially creating new centers of infection. In this manner, the effects of climate change could combine with international transportation networks to ignite a global health shock wave, akin to the food and energy shock waves described above.

As suggested by analysts at the National Research Council, climate effects and globalization are combining to increase the risk of global health shocks. “Weather and climate changes,” they noted, “have the potential of interaction with other factors to alter both the geographic range and the intensity of transmission of a number of infectious diseases, thereby creating the potential for pandemics.”49 If these pandemics arise in or spread to developing nations with inadequate public health systems, they can lead to widespread panic and civic unrest, prompting terrified citizens to seek refuge in other countries—possibly carrying the pathogens with them and so igniting fresh outbreaks of contagion. Once this occurs, it is but a short step to a global humanitarian crisis, which could easily result in the involvement of the American military due to its unique ability to deploy on short notice to virtually any location on the planet and provide emergency services.50

All this was given dramatic immediacy by the West African Ebola epidemic of 2014–16, which ravaged Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone and affected several other countries, claiming an estimated 11,300 lives. An often fatal viral disease, Ebola is thought to be transmitted to humans from bats and other wild animals, usually in situations where humans live in close proximity to such creatures and rely on them as a supplemental source of food, as is true in some poor, rural areas of Africa.51 The 2014–16 Ebola outbreak, the most severe of its kind, first arose in Guinea and then quickly spread to neighboring Liberia and Sierra Leone when panicked citizens—some carrying the infection—moved from one country to another across poorly marked borders in search of safety from the outbreak. Local public health systems, poorly staffed and poorly equipped to begin with, quickly became overwhelmed as medical workers themselves came down with the disease. By some estimates, one in ten of Ebola fatalities during the early stages of the epidemic were among nurses, doctors, medical students, and other clinical staff.52

The Ebola epidemic also threatened to spread to other parts of the world as foreign health workers returned to their home countries after volunteering in one of the affected West African states and as panicked citizens of those countries traveled elsewhere in the hope of avoiding infection. Indeed, several Ebola cases were identified in Europe and the United States under exactly such circumstances, prompting fears of a global pandemic and accompanying social disorder. As an indication of what might occur, fighting broke out in Monrovia, the capital of Liberia, when police tried to cordon off the heavily infected neighborhood of West Point and panicked residents fought back.53 For American security officials, it had all the earmarks of a potential international crisis.

In a remarkable expression of these fears, President Obama explicitly warned of Ebola’s threat to global security, announcing a major U.S. effort to combat the disease:

In West Africa, Ebola is now an epidemic of the likes that we have not seen before. It’s spiraling out of control. It is getting worse. It’s spreading faster and exponentially. Today, thousands of people in West Africa are infected. That number could rapidly grow to tens of thousands. And if the outbreak is not stopped now, we could be looking at hundreds of thousands of people infected, with profound political and economic and security implications for all of us. So this is an epidemic that is not just a threat to regional security—it’s a potential threat to global security if these countries break down, if their economies break down, if people panic. That has profound effects on all of us, even if we are not directly contracting the disease.

With stakes this high, combating the Ebola outbreak was declared a “national security priority,” and every relevant arm of government would be mobilized to prevent its spread.54

To manage this effort and conduct its most urgent missions, Obama turned to the U.S. Africa Command. Africom, he announced in September 2014, would establish a “military command center in Liberia to support civilian efforts across the region,” with General Darryl Williams, commander of Africom’s U.S. Army contingent, overseeing the operation. This was an unusual arrangement, as the Department of Defense had never before conducted what it termed “a disease-driven foreign humanitarian assistance mission.”55 However, given the magnitude of the peril and the lack of any other institution capable of taking on such a Herculean task, Obama placed this responsibility on the U.S. military. “Our Department of Defense is better at that, our Armed Services are better at that, than any organization on Earth,” he declared.56

At Obama’s behest, Africom undertook a massive logistical effort in West Africa, establishing emergency hospitals and clinics in each of the three most heavily affected countries and providing support services for a bevy of doctors and other health workers flown in from the United States and other countries. At least three thousand U.S. military personnel participated in this extraordinary effort, dubbed Operation United Assistance. Although not directly involved in the medical treatment of patients—that task was performed solely by civilian personnel—these troops played a vital role in fighting Ebola by providing essential logistical support to the doctors and nurses on the front lines of treatment.57

For many observers, the Ebola epidemic of 2014–16 represents a preview of what can be expected in the future as global warming advances, certain infectious diseases extend their range, and vulnerable states prove unable to cope with the multiple challenges of extreme weather, resource scarcity, and inadequate public institutions. This peril was highlighted again in early 2019, as a fresh outbreak of Ebola occurred in parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where inadequate government institutions and ethnic strife impeded efforts by the international community to provide emergency care. And, as the NRC points out, the danger will only increase as temperatures continue their rise and extreme events cluster together more frequently, undermining the ability of the international community to provide emergency relief and assistance. Should a pandemic occur at a time when international supply systems for medications are already impaired by climate change, the consequences would be dire.58

MASS MIGRATION EVENTS

Whenever U.S. security analysts have considered the risks of climate change, a perpetual concern has been that extreme events and prolonged droughts could trigger a massive flight of desperate people seeking refuge in other locales, provoking chaos and hostility wherever they travel. This anxiety was evident in some of the analysts’ earliest public statements on the national security implications of warming, and it has remained a major theme to the present day. In its initial 2007 report on climate change, for example, the CNA Corporation warned that severe climate effects “can fuel migrations in less developed countries, and these migrations can lead to international political conflict.”59 Defense Secretary Hagel sounded a similar note in his 2014 address to the Conference of the Defense Ministers of the Americas. “Drought and crop failures can leave millions of people without any lifeline, and trigger waves of mass migration,” he declared.60

In talking about the risk of mass migrations, U.S. security analysts are typically discussing long-term pressures—such as prolonged drought and coastal erosion—that deprive people of their livelihoods and force them to move elsewhere in search of jobs and income. “When water or food supplies shift or when conditions otherwise deteriorate (as from sea level rise, for example), people will likely move to find more favorable conditions,” the CNA explained.61 The ongoing relocation of impoverished farmers from scorched inland areas to urban centers, for instance, fits this pattern. But American analysts also worry about sudden-onset climate events that would spark rapid, large-scale movements of people from one country to another, setting off a political firestorm. Such destabilizing events, which could become more frequent as global warming advances, are akin to the other types of climate shock waves discussed in this chapter.

A migratory shock wave of this type could be ignited by various kinds of climate events, such as a cluster of severe hurricanes or crop failures. If, under these circumstances, local governments prove unable to provide adequate emergency assistance or collapse entirely, vast numbers of people may simultaneously choose to move to adjacent (or even distant) countries in search of refuge and a new start in life. Some environmentalists are predicting that the numbers of such “climate refugees,” as they have sometimes been termed, could reach into the hundreds of millions as global warming advances; others have cautioned against such predictions, saying the evidence for them is still inconclusive. Whatever the exact numbers, the arrival of large groups of outsiders—many, if not most, in need of substantial assistance—is bound to generate unease and, in all likelihood, hostility in the destination countries. The fact that the newcomers often differ in their race and religion from the natives only adds to the risk of antagonism.62

A foretaste of what this might look like was provided by the migratory surges from North Africa and the Middle East into southern Europe following the Arab Spring of 2011, as desperate residents of battleground countries such as Libya and Syria sought to escape the fighting and accompanying decline in economic conditions. The situation in Libya was particularly fraught for migrant workers from the Sahel region and sub-Saharan Africa, who made up as much as 10 percent of Libya’s population prior to the revolt against Gadhafi. Those workers (mostly young men) had already fled their own countries because of drought, desertification, and joblessness, seeking low-level positions in various state-backed enterprises in Libya under the old regime. After Gadhafi’s removal, they lost their jobs and faced intense hostility from native Libyans, who viewed them as interlopers and Gadhafi loyalists. Reluctant to return to their own impoverished countries, huge numbers of these migrant workers sought to move farther north, fleeing in rickety ships across the Mediterranean to Europe—where, if they survived the journey, they usually encountered fresh animosity.63

An even greater number of people sought to flee the fighting and abysmal living conditions in Syria. Beginning in 2012, and reaching a flood tide in 2015, vast multitudes of desperate Syrians sought to reach the relative security of Europe, mostly by traveling by raft from southwestern Turkey to Lesbos and other Greek islands in the Aegean Sea; from there they sought passage to wealthier European countries farther north, especially Germany, Austria, and Norway. Although welcomed at first by sympathetic Europeans (most notably German chancellor Angela Merkel), the Syrian refugees started arriving in such massive numbers that many residents of the receiving nations turned hostile, embracing measures such as fencing off their borders and using armed police to repel the migrants—steps taken by Hungary in 2015 as hundreds of thousands of refugees moved north from Greece.64 With anti-refugee sentiment growing throughout the region, European officials were forced to adopt ever more stringent means to stem the flow, including mobilizing NATO’s naval fleets to patrol waters of the Aegean Sea and assist the Greek coast guard in blocking migrant vessels from Turkey.65

When examining the causes of the massive migrant flood that overwhelmed Europe in 2015, most analysts have concluded that the principal driving forces were the ongoing violence in Syria and the lack of meaningful economic opportunities both there and in transit countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. Nevertheless, some analysts believe that climate change had a contributing role in sparking the migratory shock wave, largely by causing a severe drought in 2007–10 that decimated Syrian agriculture and drove impoverished farmers into overcrowded urban centers, where they helped launch the anti-Assad rebellion.66 “Syria’s drought has destroyed crops, killed livestock and displaced as many as 1.5 million Syrian farmers,” observed John Wendle in Scientific American. “In the process, it touched off the social turmoil that burst into civil war,” impelling millions of people to flee.67 Other analysts discount the role of climate change in provoking the Syrian civil war and resulting migratory impulse, insisting on the primarily political nature of the conflict.68 But even if warming’s role was relatively modest in this case, the events of 2012–15 provide an indication of what we might expect from future migratory shock waves as temperatures rise, farming becomes untenable in vast areas of the planet, and masses of people move about in search of new ways to survive.

While Europe—given its proximity to climate-sensitive areas of Africa and the Middle East—is expected to prove the principal objective of many of these migratory surges, North America is also considered a likely destination for future mass migrations. The CNA Corporation, for example, has suggested that the greatest climate-related threat to American security—other than its direct impacts on the U.S. homeland itself—would arise from the migratory implications of climate disasters occurring in nearby countries, especially in Central America and the Caribbean. As warming advances, it noted, severe climate events will afflict many of these areas, destroying entire habitats and impelling millions of people to head north in search of refuge and employment opportunities.69

General John F. Kelly, while serving as commander of the U.S. Southern Command, spoke of such occurrences as “mass migration events,” and emphasized the importance of taking steps to prevent future climate refugees from entering the United States. With that goal in mind, he told the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2014, “We regularly exercise our rapid response capabilities in a variety of scenarios, including responding to a natural disaster [and a] mass migration event.”70 In one such exercise, Southcom revealed, Kelly’s staff established a Joint Task Force-Migrant Operations (JTF-MIGOPS) at Naval Station Guantánamo Bay to oversee a mock crisis-response mission. According to Rear Admiral Jon G. Matheson, deputy Joint Task Force commander of JTF-MIGOPS in 2013, this allowed Southcom to “flesh-out some of the processes and resources we would need if a mass migration were to occur.”71

Southcom conducted another iteration of these exercises two years later, with Fort Sam Houston, Texas, serving as the host of a reconstituted JTF-MIGOPS. The 2015 exercise, a Pentagon reporter noted, “anticipated the mass migration of people from multiple Caribbean islands after a series of hurricanes devastate the area.” With this in mind, “the goal of the exercise scenario was to effectively interdict and repatriate the migrants at sea who were attempting to enter the United States.” In other words, the military services are practicing to do whatever might be needed to prevent large numbers of disaster-driven refugees from gaining access to U.S. territory.72 As participants in the exercise explained, this means stopping migrant-laden ships at sea and transporting the migrants to the U.S. Navy base at Guantánamo, where they would be detained in giant tent camps until they can be ferried back to their home country.73

Whether originating in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, or the Caribbean, mass migration events are destined to become more common in the years ahead as global warming takes an ever greater toll on the livelihoods and living conditions of people in highly exposed areas. As the European migrant crisis of 2015 demonstrates, moreover, such events are likely to prove highly disruptive and to trigger military-type responses. The construction of fortified border walls and fences is one expression of this, as are the preparations being undertaken by Southcom to house vast numbers of detained migrants at Guantánamo Bay. Wherever and whenever such events occur, the outcome is almost certain to prove wrenching and violent.

WHEN SYSTEMS COLLAPSE

For American military and intelligence analysts, the implications of all this are hard to escape: as global warming advances, one climate shock after another will ricochet across the planet, leaving chaos and misery in their wake. Try to picture a food-price crisis occurring at more or less the same time as a major pandemic and a mass migration event: the resulting chaos, distress, and contention are almost unimaginable. The most likely consequence of such a multi-shock calamity would be the failure of fragile states and resulting anarchy—with the failures occurring not one at a time, as in some less fearsome scenarios, but one right after another, as during the Arab Spring. But it will not be just fragile states in the developing world that will suffer from the impacts of these shocks, but all nations, as the global networks on which we all rely for essential goods and services begin to break down.

The potential for systemic collapse of this sort was given close attention by the Fourth National Climate Assessment, released in November 2018. Like the NRC study before it, the Fourth Assessment highlights the world’s growing reliance on global networks and the ways these systems have become inextricably linked—and so have become vulnerable to unexpected shocks. “A long history of research on complex systems,” it noted, “has shown that systems that depend on one another are subject to new and often complex behaviors.… These behaviors, in turn, raise the prospect of unanticipated, and potentially catastrophic risks. For example, failures can cascade from one system to another.” Climate change, it observed, is likely to provide exactly the sort of external jolt that could trigger such a cascade of failures, sowing havoc across the planet.74

#### Independently, CO2 causes ocean acidification---extinction

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The biggest extinction event in planetary history was driven by the rapid acidification of our oceans, a new study concludes. So much carbon was released into the atmosphere, and the oceans absorbed so much of it so quickly, that marine life simply died off, from the bottom of the food chain up. That doesn’t bode well for the present, given the disturbingly similar rate that our seas are acidifying right now. Parts of the Pacific, for instance, are already so acidic that sea snails’ shells begin dissolving as soon as they’re born. The biggest die-off in history, the Permian Extinction event, aka the Great Dying, extinguished over 90 percent of the planet's species—and 96 percent of marine species. A lot of theories have been put forward about why and how, exactly, the vast majority of Earth life went belly up 252 million years ago, but the new study, published in Science, offers some compelling evidence acidification was a key driver. A team led by University of Edinburgh researchers collected rocks in the United Arab Emirates that were on the seafloor hundreds of millions of years ago, and used the boron isotopes found within to model the changing levels of acidification in our prehistoric oceans. Through this “combined geochemical, geological, and modeling approach,” the scientists say, they were able to accurately model the series of “perturbations” that unfolded in the era. They now believe that a series of gigantic volcanic eruptions in the Siberian Trap spewed a great fountain of carbon into the atmosphere over a period of tens of thousands of years. This was the first phase of the extinction event, in which terrestrial life began to die out. The study explains that the second phase of the event happened much more quickly. “During the second extinction pulse, however, a rapid and large injection of carbon caused an abrupt acidification event that drove the preferential loss of heavily calcified marine biota," the authors write. So does this study mean we should be especially worried about the phenomenon taking hold today? "Yes," said Dr. Rachel Wood, a professor of carbonate geoscience at the University of Edinburgh and one of the paper's authors. "We are concerned about modern ocean acidification," she told me in an email. "Although the amount of carbon added to the atmosphere that triggered the mass extinction was probably greater than today's fossil fuel reserves, the rate at which the carbon was released was at a rate similar to modern emissions." In other words, the Siberian Traps probably spewed out more carbon in total, but we're spewing out just as fast. And that's overwhelming the planetary equilibrium. "This fast rate of release was a critical factor driving ocean acidification," Wood said. Why? "The rate of release is critical because the oceans absorb a lot of the carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere, around 30 percent of the carbon dioxide released by humans," Wood said. "To achieve chemical equilibrium, some of this CO2 reacts with the water to form carbonic acid. Some of these molecules react with a water molecule to give a bicarbonate ion and a hydronium ion, thus increasing ocean 'acidity' (H+ ion concentration)." Marine animals whose skeletons are comprised of calcium carbonate—and that’s a lot of them (think snails, coral), which form a crucial part of the food chain—dissolved or couldn’t form in the first place. And that is what’s happening today. "Between 1751 and 1994, surface ocean pH is estimated to have decreased from approximately 8.25 to 8.14, representing an increase of almost 30 percent in H+ ion concentration in the world's oceans," Wood said. That's a major uptick in ocean acidity in a relatively short amount of time, and it's happening because humans have burned fossil fuels like coal, oil, and gas with reckless abandon since the Industrial Revolution. That's fueling climate change, of course, as well as its less-discussed, but potentially equally cataclysmic sibling, ocean acidification. "Scientists have long suspected that an ocean acidification event occurred during the greatest mass extinction of all time, but direct evidence has been lacking until now,” study coordinator Dr. Matthew Clarkson said in a statement. “This is a worrying finding, considering that we can already see an increase in ocean acidity today that is the result of human carbon emissions." Much of marine life is already in grave danger from acidification. It's contributing to the bleaching of coral reefs around the world, and, as mentioned before, it's killing sea snails in the Pacific. If it worsens, acidification could threaten the whole of the marine biosphere, and, obviously, the land-dwelling creatures that depend on it too. In 2013, marine scientists released a "State of the Oceans" report that found that the rate of current acidification was “unprecedented.” They noted that the seas were acidifying faster than any point in the last 300 million years. That study didn’t take into account the new data, of course, but that’s the timeline we’re dealing with: The last time the oceans were so acidic was in the midst of the greatest extinction in the history of the world.

### 2NC---INB---Soft Power

#### Soft Power averts a laundry list of existential catastrophes.

Brooks ’14 [Rosa; November 14; Professor of Law at Georgetown University, Senior Fellow with the New America and Arizona State University Future of War Project, former Senior Advisor at the U.S. State Department; Foreign Policy, “Embrace the Chaos,” https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/14/embrace-the-chaos/; RP]

I. The Character of the Mess

Defining the character of the current mess is the easy part. Briefly:

* The last century’s technological revolutions have made our world more globally interconnected than ever.
* Power (along with access to power) has become more democratized and diffuse in some ways, but more concentrated in other ways.
* For most individuals around the globe, day-to-day life is far less dangerous and brutal than in previous eras; for the species as a whole, however, the risk of future global catastrophe has increased.
* The continuously accelerating rate of technological and social change makes it increasingly difficult to predict the geopolitical future.

Nothing is particularly original about these observations; they’re repeated in some fashion in every major national strategic document produced over the last decade. They probably teach this stuff to kindergarteners now. Indeed, we’ve heard it all so often that it’s tempting to dismiss such claims as meaningless platitudes: Been there; theorized that. Can we get please get back to foreign-policy business as usual?

No, we can’t. Not if we want our children and grandchildren to live decent lives. If we care about the future at all, we need to do more than prattle on at cocktail parties about globalization, interconnectedness, complexity, danger, and uncertainty. We need to feel these seismic changes in our bones.

So bear with me. Let’s try to breathe some life into the clichés.

I’ve written about these issues before (here and here), and at risk of being both a narcissist and a broken record, I’ll quote myself:

The world has grown more complex. Believe it. The world now contains more people living in more states than ever before, and we’re all more interconnected. A hundred years ago, the world population was about 1.8 billion, there were roughly 60 sovereign states in the world, the automobile was still a rarity, and there were no commercial passenger flights and no transcontinental telephone service. Fifty years ago, global population had climbed to more than 3 billion and there were 115 U.N. member states, but air travel was still for the wealthy and the personal computer still lay two decades in the future.

Today? We’ve got 7 billion people living in 192 U.N. member states and a handful of other territories. These 7 billion people take 93,000 commercial flights a day from 9,000 airports, drive 1 billion cars, and carry 7 billion mobile phones around with them.

In numerous ways, life has gotten substantially better in this more crowded and interconnected era. Seventy years ago, global war killed scores of millions, but interstate conflict has declined sharply since the end of World War II, and the creation of the United Nations ushered in a far more egalitarian and democratic form of international governance than existed in any previous era. Today, militarily powerful states are far less free than in the pre-U.N. era to use overt force to accomplish their aims, and the world now has numerous transnational courts and dispute-resolution bodies that collectively offer states a viable alternative to the use of force. The modern international order is no global utopia, but it sure beats colonial domination and world wars.

In the 50 years that followed World War II, medical and agricultural advances brought unprecedented health and prosperity to most parts of the globe. More recently, the communications revolution has enabled exciting new forms of nongovernmental cross-border alliances to emerge, empowering, for instance, global human rights and environmental movements. In just the last two decades, the near-universal penetration of mobile phones has had a powerful leveling effect: All over the globe, people at every age and income level can use these tiny but powerful computers to learn foreign languages, solve complex mathematical problems, create and share videos, watch the news, move money around, or communicate with far-flung friends.

All this has had a dark side, of course. As access to knowledge has been democratized, so too has access to the tools of violence and destruction, and greater global interconnectedness enables disease, pollution, and conflict to spread quickly and easily beyond borders. A hundred years ago, no single individual or nonstate actor could do more than cause localized mayhem; today, we have to worry about massive bioengineered threats created by tiny terrorist cells and globally devastating cyberattacks devised by malevolent teen hackers.

Even as many forms of power have grown more democratized and diffuse, other forms of power have grown more concentrated. A very small number of states control and consume a disproportionate share of the world’s resources, and a very small number of individuals control most of the world’s wealth. (According to a 2014 Oxfam report, the 85 richest individuals on Earth are worth more than the globe’s 3.5 billion poorest people).

Indeed, from a species-survival perspective, the world has grown vastly more dangerous over the last century. Individual humans live longer than ever before, but a small number of states now possess the unprecedented ability to destroy large chunks of the human race and possibly the Earth itself — all in a matter of days or even hours. What’s more, though the near-term threat of interstate nuclear conflict has greatly diminished since the end of the Cold War, nuclear material and know-how are now both less controlled and less controllable.

Amid all these changes, our world has also grown far more uncertain. We possess more information than ever before and vastly greater processing power, but the accelerating pace of global change has far exceeded our collective ability to understand it, much less manage it. This makes it increasingly difficult to make predictions or calculate risks. As I’ve written previously:

We literally have no points of comparison for understanding the scale and scope of the risks faced by humanity today. Compared to the long, slow sweep of human history, the events of the last century have taken place in the blink of an eye. This should … give us pause when we’re tempted to conclude that today’s trends are likely to continue. Rising life expectancy? That’s great, but if climate change has consequences as nasty as some predict, a century of rising life expectancy could turn out to be a mere blip on the charts. A steep decline in interstate conflicts? Fantastic, but less than 70 years of human history isn’t much to go on….

That’s why one can’t dismiss the risk of catastrophic events [such as disastrous climate change or nuclear conflict] as “high consequence, low probability.” How do we compute the probability of catastrophic events of a type that has never happened? Does 70 years without nuclear annihilation tell us that there’s a low probability of nuclear catastrophe — or just tell us that we haven’t had a nuclear catastrophe yet?…

Lack of catastrophic change might signify a system in stable equilibrium, but sometimes — as with earthquakes — pressure may be building up over time, undetected….

Most analysts assumed the Soviet Union was stable — until it collapsed. Analysts predicted that Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak would retain his firm grip on power — until he was ousted. How much of what we currently file under “Stable” should be recategorized under “Hasn’t Collapsed Yet”?

This, then, is the character of world messiness in this first quarter of the 21st century. So on to the next question: Where, in all this messiness, does the United States find itself?

II. The United States in the Mess: Goodbye, Lake Wobegon?

For Americans, the good news is that the United States remains an extraordinarily powerful nation. The United States has “the most powerful military in history,” Obama declared in a recent speech. Measured by sheer destructive capacity, he is surely right. The United States spends more on its military than China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, and India combined. The U.S. military can get to more places, faster, with more lethal and effective weapons, than any military on Earth.

The United States also manages to gobble up a disproportionate share of the world’s wealth and resources. By the year 2000, wrote Betsy Taylor and Dave Tilford, the United States, with “less than 5 percent of the world’s population,” was using “one-third of the world’s paper, a quarter of the world’s oil, 23 percent of the coal, 27 percent of the aluminum, and 19 percent of the copper.” In 2010, Americans possessed 39 percent of the planet’s wealth.

The bad news for Americans? U.S. power and global influence have been declining. In part, this is because various once-weak states have been growing stronger, and in part, it’s because no state can be as autonomous today as it might have been in the past. The United States’ geographical position long helped protect it from external interference, while its strong military and economy enabled it to dominate or control numerous less powerful states. But globalization has reduced every state’s autonomy, creating collective challenges — from climate change to the regulation of capital — that no state can fully address on its own.

U.S. power and global influence have also declined in absolute terms, as America’s own political and economic health has been called into question. The United States now has greater income inequality than almost every other state in the developed world — and most states in the developing world. American life expectancy ranks well below that of other industrialized democracies, and the same is true for infant mortality and elementary school enrollment. Meanwhile, the United States has the world’s highest per capita incarceration rate, and on international health and quality-of-life metrics, the United States has been losing ground for several decades. This domestic decline jeopardizes the country’s continued ability to innovate and prosper; it also makes American values and the American political and economic systems less appealing to others.

Worse, the political system that Americans rely on for reform and repair seems itself to be broken; the federal government shutdown in 2013 offered the world a striking illustration of U.S. political dysfunction. Add to this the divisive national security policies of George W. Bush’s administration — many of which were continued or expanded by the Obama administration — and it’s no surprise that the United States has recently become less admired and less emulated around the globe, reducing American “soft power.”

No matter how you slice it, it comes to the same thing: Compared with 30 years ago, the United States today has a greatly reduced ability to control its own destiny or the destiny of other states. The United States still has unprecedented power to destroy (Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden both discovered this, to their detriment). But the country’s capacity for destruction is not equaled by its capacity to shape the behavior of other states or their populations, and the United States has less and less ability to insulate itself from the world’s woes.

Unfortunately, American political leaders share a bipartisan inclination to deny these realities. Mostly, they succumb to the Lake Wobegon effect: “Declinism” and “declinist” have entered the American political vocabulary, but only as purely pejorative terms.

This is both stupid and dangerous. How can we adapt our global strategy to compensate for the ways in which U.S. power has been declining if we refuse to admit that decline?

Continued U.S. decline is certainly not inevitable, and some argue that the United States is in fact poised for an economic and political resurgence. There is no way to know for sure — but it’s worth recalling that, historically, every significant empire has eventually declined. Are we prepared to bet that the United States will prove an exception?

There is also no way to know for sure what form continued or eventual U.S. decline will take. We don’t know whether it will be fast or slow; we don’t know whether the American Empire is in for a hard landing or a soft one. Will the United States crash, like the former Soviet Union? Or will a slow decline in power leave the country an intact and influential nation, like the United Kingdom? Will America’s future be more like Canada’s present, or more like Brazil’s?

III. Behind the Veil of Ignorance: Uncertainty as Lodestone

We don’t know what America’s future will look like, and we can make fewer and fewer geopolitical predictions with confidence. The world has changed too much and too fast for us to accurately assess the probabilities of many types of future events. Perhaps this is why it’s so tempting for Americans to stay in Lake Wobegon, with eyes closed and fingers crossed. Uncertainty is frightening.

But paradoxically, this very uncertainty should be a lodestone, pointing realists and idealists alike toward a sensible, forward-looking global strategy. In fact, radical uncertainty can be a powerful tool for strategic planning.

That may seem oxymoronic, but consider one of the 20th century’s most influential thought experiments: In his 1971 book, A Theory of Justice, philosopher John Rawls famously sought to use a hypothetical situation involving extreme uncertainty to derive optimal principles of justice.

Imagine, said Rawls, rational, free, and equal humans seeking to devise a set of principles to undergird the structure of human society. Imagine further that they must reason from behind what Rawls dubbed a “veil of ignorance,” which hides from them their own future status or attributes. Behind the veil of ignorance, wrote Rawls, people still possess general knowledge of economics, science, and so forth, and they can draw on this knowledge to assist them in designing a future society. Their ignorance is limited to their own future role in the society they are designing: “no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like.”

If we were collectively designing social structures and rules, but could not know our own individual future positions in that social structure, what structures and rules would we come up with? Applying a version of decision theory, Rawls concluded that in the face of such radical uncertainty, rational, free, and equal beings behind the veil of ignorance would be drawn toward a “maximin” (or “minimax“) rule of decision, in which they would seek to minimize their losses in a worst-case scenario. Since those behind the veil of ignorance don’t know whether they’ll be among the haves or among the have-nots in the society they are designing, they should seek to build a society in which they each will be least badly off — even the luck of the draw leads them to start with the fewest advantages.

Rawls posited that such a rule of decision should lead those behind the veil of ignorance to support two core principles: the first relating to liberty (“each person [should] have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others”), and the second relating to social and economic goods. (Social goods should be distributed equally, unless an unequal distribution would serve the common good and be “to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged,” while “offices and positions [should remain] open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.”)

This is in some ways intuitive: On a national level, it is the reason Americans across the political spectrum continue to express substantial support for the maintenance of unemployment benefits, Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, and so on. Any one of us might someday face a job loss or illness; nearly all of us will eventually face old age. We know we might someday need those benefits ourselves. In the face of uncertainty about the future, we all recognize the value of insurance, savings, and at least some minimal social safety net.

In the international arena, the same is true.

This has obvious implications for global strategy. Empires, like individuals, can sink into poverty, illness, or simple old age — and in an era of uncertainty, empires, like individuals, would do well to hedge against the possibility of future misfortune.

Indeed, two decades after the publication of A Theory of Justice, Rawls sought to apply a form of this thought experiment to derive the core principles that he believed would characterize a just global order. His arguments are complex, and I can’t do justice to them here — but fortunately, unlike Rawls, I am not interested in coming up with abstract principles of global justice. My less lofty agenda is limited to arguing that a crude version of Rawls’s thought experiment can help us delineate the contours of a sensible U.S. global strategy — a “maximin” strategy that is well-suited to protecting the interests of the United States and its people, both in today’s messy world and in a wide range of future messes.

Here’s my thought experiment.

Imagine a crude version of Rawls’s veil of ignorance, with only the United States behind it. This veil of ignorance doesn’t require us to disavow what we know of history (America’s or the world’s), nor does it require us to disavow what we know of recent trends, present global realities, U.S. values, or our current conception of the good. It only hides our future from us: Behind this veil of ignorance, we don’t know whether energy, food, water, and other vital resources will be scarcer or more plentiful in the decades to come; we don’t know whether global power will be more or less centralized; we don’t know whether new technologies and new forms of social organization will make existing technologies and institutions obsolete.

Most of all, we don’t know whether, in the decades to come, the United States will be rich or poor, weak or strong, respected or hated. For that matter, we don’t know whether the United States — or even the form of political organization we call the nation-state — will exist at all a century or two from now. In the face of such radical uncertainty, what kind of grand strategy should a rational United States adopt?

Of course, this shouldn’t really be called a “thought experiment” at all: The United States already operates behind a veil of ignorance, if we could only bring ourselves to admit it. We know the past; we have a reasonable understanding of recent trends; we know that the world is messy and dangerous; we know that the potential for rapid and potentially catastrophic change is real; and we know that our ability to predict future changes and quantify various risks is profoundly limited.

This knowledge is profoundly unsettling. Thus, we try our best to know and not know, at the same time: We speak glibly of complexity, accelerating change, danger, and uncertainty, but then fall back into the comfortable assumption that continued U.S. global dominance is a given and that catastrophic change is unlikely to occur. As long as we remain willfully ignorant of the veil of ignorance that hangs over us, we can avoid asking hard questions and making harder choices.

But this is shortsighted and dangerous. Empires that refuse to accept reality tend to rapidly decline. A clear-eyed acceptance of uncertainty and risk is the surest route to a more secure future. Instead of blinding us or paralyzing us, the uncertainty of our future should motivate us to engage in more responsible strategic planning.

If the United States can manage to be as rational as Rawls’s hypothetical decision-makers, it should adopt a similar maximin rule of decision: It should prefer international rules and institutions that will maximize America’s odds of thriving, even in a worst-case future scenario. In fact, we should wish for international rules and institutions that will be kindest to the individuals living in what is now the United States and their descendants, even if the United States should someday cease to exist entirely.

Could happen, folks. Look around you. Do you see the Roman Empire, or the Aztec Empire, or the Ottoman Empire?

IV. From Messiness to Strategy: A Preliminary Sketch

This has urgent implications for U.S. strategic planning. Precisely because U.S. global power may very well continue to decline, the United States should use the very considerable military, political, cultural, and economic power it still has to foster the international order most likely to benefit the country if it someday loses that power.

The ultimate objective of U.S. grand strategy should be the creation of an equitable and peaceful international order with an effective system of global governance — one that is built upon respect for human dignity, human rights, and the rule of law, with robust mechanisms for resolving thorny collective problems.

We should seek this not because it’s the “morally right” thing for the United States to do, but because a maximin decision rule should lead us to conclude that this will offer the United States and its population the best chance of continuing to thrive, even in the event of a radical future decline in U.S. wealth and power.

But, one might argue, the United States already tries to promote such a global order — right?

Sure it does — but only inconsistently, and generally as something of an afterthought. We pour money into our military and intelligence communities, but starve our diplomats and development agencies. We fixate on the threat du jour, often exaggerating it and allowing it to distort our foreign policy in self-destructive ways (cf. Iraq War), while viewing matters such as United Nations reform or reform of global economic institutions or environmental protection rules as tedious and of low priority. If we take seriously the many potential dangers lurking in the unknowable future, however, fostering a stronger, fairer, and more effective system of international governance would become a matter of urgent national self-interest and our highest strategic priority — something that should be reflected both in our policies and in our budgetary decisions.

An effective global governance system would need to be built upon the recognition that states remain the primary mode of political and social organization in the international sphere, but also upon the recognition that new forms of social organization continue to evolve and may ultimately displace at least some states. An effective and dynamic international system will need to develop innovative ways to bring such new actors and organizations within the ambit of international law and institutions, both as responsible creators of law and institutions and as responsible subjects.

#### That soft power is key to effective leadership and reinvigorating multilateral alliances

Jervis, 9

(Professor of international politics at Columbia University. (Robert, Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective, World Politics Volume 61, Number 1, January 2009)

To say that the system is unipolar is not to argue that the unipole can get everything it wants or that it has no need for others. American power is very great, but it is still subject to two familiar limitations: it is harder to build than to destroy, and success usually depends on others’ decisions. This is particularly true of the current system because of what the U.S. wants. If Hitler had won World War II, he might have been able to maintain his system for some period of time with little cooperation from others because “all” he wanted was to establish the supremacy of the Aryan race. The U.S. wants not only to prevent the rise of a peer competitor but also to stamp out terrorism, maintain an open international economic system, spread democracy throughout the world, and establish a high degree of cooperation among countries that remain juridically equal. Even in the military arena, the U.S. cannot act completely alone. Bases and overflight rights are always needed, and support from allies, especially Great Britain, is important to validate military action in the eyes of the American public. When one matches American forces, not against those of an adversary but against the tasks at hand, they often fall short. Against terrorism, force is ineffective without excellent intelligence. Given the international nature of the threat and the difficulties of gaining information about it, international cooperation is the only route to success. The maintenance of international prosperity also requires joint efforts, even leaving aside the danger that other countries could trigger a run on the dollar by cashing in their holdings. Despite its lack of political unity, Europe is in many respects an economic unit, and one with a greater gdp than that of the U.S. Especially because of the growing Chinese economy, economic power is spread around the world much more equally than is military power, and the open economic system could easily disintegrate despite continued unipolarity. In parallel, on a whole host of problems such as aids, poverty, and international crime (even leaving aside climate change), the unipole can lead and exert pressure but cannot dictate. Joint actions may be necessary to apply sanctions to various unpleasant and recalcitrant regimes; proliferation can be stopped only if all the major states (and many minor ones) work to this end; unipolarity did not automatically enable the U.S. to maintain the coalition against Iraq after the first Gulf War; close ties within the West are needed to reduce the ability of China, Russia, and other states to play one Western country off against the others. But in comparison with the cold war era, there are fewer incentives today for allies to cooperate with the U.S. During the earlier period unity and close coordination not only permitted military efficiencies but, more importantly, gave credibility to the American nuclear umbrella that protected the allies. Serious splits were dangerous because they entailed the risk that the Soviet Union would be emboldened. This reason for avoiding squabbles disappeared along with the USSR, and the point is likely to generalize to other unipolar systems if they involve a decrease of threats that call for maintaining good relations with the superpower. This does not mean that even in this particular unipolar system the superpower is like Gulliver tied down by the Lilliputians. In some areas opposition can be self-defeating. Thus for any country to undermine American leadership of the international economy would be to put its own economy at risk, even if the U.S. did not retaliate, and for a country to sell a large proportion of its dollar holding would be to depress the value of the dollar, thereby diminishing the worth of the country’s remaining stock of this currency. Furthermore, cooperation often follows strong and essentially unilateral action. Without the war in Iraq it is not likely that we would have seen the degree of cooperation that the U.S. obtained from Europe in combating the Iranian nuclear program and from Japan and the PRC in containing North Korea. Nevertheless, many of the American goals depend on persuading others, not coercing them. Although incentives and even force are not irrelevant to spreading democracy and the free market, at bottom this requires people to embrace a set of institutions and values. Building the world that the U.S. seeks is a political, social, and even psychological task for which unilateral measures are likely to be unsuited and for which American military and economic strength can at best play a supporting role. Success requires that others share the American vision and believe that its leadership is benign.

#### Multilateralism is an impact filter – great power sharing checks escalation of conflict

Pouliot, 11

Professor of Political Science at McGill University (Vincent, “Multilateralism as an End in Itself”, International Studies Perspectives (2011) 12, 18–26)

Because it rests on open, nondiscriminatory debate, and the routine exchange of viewpoints, the multilateral procedure introduces three key advantages that are gained, regardless of the specific policies adopted, and tend to diffuse across all participants. Contrary to the standard viewpoint, according to which a rational preference or functional imperative lead to multilateral cooperation, here it is the systematic practice of multilateralism that creates the drive to cooperate. At the theoretical level, the premise is that it is not only what people think that explains what they do, but also what they do that determines what they think (Pouliot 2010). Everyday multilateralism is a self-fulfilling practice for at least three reasons. First, the joint practice of multilateralism creates mutually recognizable [and] patterns of action among global actors. This process owes to the fact that practices structure social interaction (Adler and Pouliot forthcoming).2 Because they are meaningful, organized, and repeated, practices generally convey a degree of mutual intelligibility that allows people to develop social relations over time. In the field of international security, for example, the practice of deterrence is premised on a limited number of gestures, signals, and linguistic devices that are meant, as Schelling (1966:113) put it, to ‘‘getting the right signal across.’’ The same goes with the practice of multilateralism, which rests on a set of political and social patterns that establish the boundaries of action in a mutually intelligible fashion. These structuring effects, in turn, allow for the development of common frameworks for appraising global events. Multilateral dialog serves not only to find joint solutions; it also makes it possible for various actors to zoom in on the definition of the issue at hand—a particularly important step on the global stage. The point is certainly not that the multilateral procedure leads everybody to agree on everything—that would be as impossible as counterproductive. Theoretically speaking, there is room for skepticism that multilateralism may ever allow communicative rationality at the global level (see Risse 2000; Diez and Steans 2005). With such a diverse and uneven playing field, one can doubt that discursive engagement, in and of itself, can lead to common lifeworlds. Instead, what the practice of multilateralism fosters is the emergence of a shared framework of interaction—for example, a common linguistic repertoire—that allows global actors to make sense of world politics in mutually recognizable ways. Of course, they may not agree on the specific actions to be taken, but at least they can build on an established pattern of political interaction to deal with the problem at hand—sometimes even before it emerges in acute form. In today’s pluralistic world, that would already be a considerable achievement. In that sense, multilateralism may well be a constitutive practice of what Lu (2009) calls ‘‘political friendship among peoples.’’ The axiomatic practice of principled and inclusive dialog is quite apparent in the way she describes this social structure: ‘‘While conflicts, especially over the distribution of goods and burdens, will inevitably arise, under conditions of political friendship among peoples, they will be negotiated within a global background context of norms and institutions based on mutual recognition, equity in the distribution of burdens and benefits of global cooperation, and power-sharing in the institutions of global governance rather than domination by any group’’ (2009:54–55). In a world where multilateralism becomes an end in itself, this ideal pattern emerges out of the structuring effects of axiomatic practice: take the case of NATO, for instance, which has recently had to manage, through the multilateral practice, fairly strong internal dissent (Pouliot 2006). While clashing views and interests will never go away in our particularly diverse world, as pessimists are quick to emphasize (for example, Dahl 1999), the management of discord is certainly made easier by shared patterns of dialog based on mutually recognizable frameworks. Second, the multilateral procedure typically ensures a remarkable level of moderation in the global policies adopted. In fact, a quick historical tour d’horizon suggests that actors engaged in multilateralism tend to avoid radical solutions in their joint decision making. Of course, the very process of uniting disparate voices helps explain why multilateralism tends to produce median consensus. This is not to say that the multilateral practice inevitably leads to lowest common denominators. To repeat, because it entails complex and often painstaking debate before any actions are taken, the multilateral procedure forces involved actors to devise and potentially share similar analytical lenses that, in hindsight, make the policies adopted seem inherently, and seemingly ‘‘naturally,’’ moderate. This is because the debate about what a given policy means takes place before its implementation, which makes for a much smoother ride when decisions hit the ground. This joint interpretive work, which constitutes a crucial aspect of multilateralism, creates outcomes that are generally perceived as inherently reasonable. Participation brings inherent benefits to politics, as Bachrach (1975) argued in the context of democratic theory. Going after the conventional liberal view according to which actors enter politics with an already fixed set of preferences, Bachrach observes that most of the time people define their interests in the very process of participation. The argument is not that interests formed in the course of social interaction are in any sense more altruistic. It rather is that the nature and process of political practices, in this case multilateralism, matter a great deal in shaping participants’ preferences (Wendt 1999). In this sense, not only does the multilateral practice have structuring effects on global governance, but it is also constitutive of what actors say, want, and do (Adler and Pouliot forthcoming). Third and related, multilateralism lends legitimacy to the policies that it generates by virtue of the debate that the process necessarily entails. There is no need here to explain at length how deliberative processes that are inclusive of all stakeholders tend to produce outcomes that are generally considered more socially and politically acceptable. In the long run, the large ownership also leads to more efficient implementation, because actors feel invested in the enactment of solutions on the ground. Even episodes of political failure, such as the lack of UN reaction to the Rwandan genocide, can generate useful lessons when re-appropriated multilaterally—think of the Responsibility to Protect, for instance.3 From this outlook, there is no contradiction between efficiency and the axiomatic practice of multilateralism, quite the contrary. The more multilateralism becomes the normal or self-evident practice of global governance, the more benefits it yields for the many stakeholders of global governance. In fact, multilateralism as an end in and of itself could generate even more diffuse reciprocity than Ruggie had originally envisioned. Not only do its distributional consequences tend to even out, multilateralism as a global governance routine also creates self-reinforcing dynamics and new focal points for strategic interaction. The axiomatic practice of multilateralism helps define problems in commensurable ways and craft moderate solutions with wide-ranging ownership—three processual benefits that further strengthen the impetus for multilateral dialog. Pg. 21-23

#### Otherwise, *Extinction*

Brooks, 14 [Rosa, 11/13, Prof of Law @ Georgetown & Schwartz Sr. Fellow at the New America Foundation http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/11/13/a\_strategyless\_nation\_america\_democrats\_grand\_strategy\_foreign\_policy]

I've written about these issues before (here and here), and at risk of being both a narcissist and a broken record, I'll quote myself: The world has grown more complex. Believe it. The world now contains more people living in more states than ever before, and we're all more interconnected. A hundred years ago, the world population was about 1.8 billion, there were roughly 60 sovereign states in the world, the automobile was still a rarity, and there were no commercial passenger flights and no transcontinental telephone service. Fifty years ago, global population had climbed to more than 3 billion and there were 115 U.N. member states, but air travel was still for the wealthy and the personal computer still lay two decades in the future. Today? We've got 7 billion people living in 192 U.N. member states and a handful of other territories. These 7 billion people take 93,000 commercial flights a day from 9,000 airports, drive 1 billion cars, and carry 7 billion mobile phones around with them. In numerous ways, life has gotten substantially better in this more crowded and interconnected era. Seventy years ago, global war killed scores of millions, but interstate conflict has declined sharply since the end of World War II, and the creation of the United Nations ushered in a far more egalitarian and democratic form of international governance than existed in any previous era. Today, militarily powerful states are far less free than in the pre-U.N. era to use overt force to accomplish their aims, and the world now has numerous transnational courts and dispute-resolution bodies that collectively offer states a viable alternative to the use of force. The modern international order is no global utopia, but it sure beats colonial domination and world wars. In the 50 years that followed World War II, medical and agricultural advances brought unprecedented health and prosperity to most parts of the globe. More recently, the communications revolution has enabled exciting new forms of nongovernmental cross-border alliances to emerge, empowering, for instance, global human rights and environmental movements. In just the last two decades, the near-universal penetration of mobile phones has had a powerful leveling effect: All over the globe, people at every age and income level can use these tiny but powerful computers to learn foreign languages, solve complex mathematical problems, create and share videos, watch the news, move money around, or communicate with far-flung friends. All this has had a dark side, of course. As access to knowledge has been democratized, so too has access to the tools of violence and destruction, and greater global interconnectedness enables disease, pollution, and conflict to spread quickly and easily beyond borders. A hundred years ago, no single individual or nonstate actor could do more than cause localized mayhem; today, we have to worry about massive bioengineered threats created by tiny terrorist cells and globally devastating cyberattacks devised by malevolent teen hackers. Even as many forms of power have grown more democratized and diffuse, other forms of power have grown more concentrated. A very small number of states control and consume a disproportionate share of the world's resources, and a very small number of individuals control most of the world's wealth. (According to a 2014 Oxfam report, the 85 richest individuals on Earth are worth more than the globe's 3.5 billion poorest people). Indeed, from a species-survival perspective, the world has grown vastly more dangerous over the last century. Individual humans live longer than ever before, but a small number of states now possess the unprecedented ability to destroy large chunks of the human race and possibly the Earth itself -- all in a matter of days or even hours. What's more, though the near-term threat of interstate nuclear conflict has greatly diminished since the end of the Cold War, nuclear material and know-how are now both less controlled and less controllable. Amid all these changes, our world has also grown far more uncertain. We possess more information than ever before and vastly greater processing power, but the accelerating pace of global change has far exceeded our collective ability to understand it, much less manage it. This makes it increasingly difficult to make predictions or calculate risks. As I've written previously: We literally have no points of comparison for understanding the scale and scope of the risks faced by humanity today. Compared to the long, slow sweep of human history, the events of the last century have taken place in the blink of an eye. This should ... give us pause when we're tempted to conclude that today's trends are likely to continue. Rising life expectancy? That's great, but if climate change has consequences as nasty as some predict, a century of rising life expectancy could turn out to be a mere blip on the charts. A steep decline in interstate conflicts? Fantastic, but less than 70 years of human history isn't much to go on.... That's why one can't dismiss the risk of catastrophic events [such as disastrous climate change or nuclear conflict] as "high consequence, low probability." How do we compute the probability of catastrophic events of a type that has never happened? Does 70 years without nuclear annihilation tell us that there's a low probability of nuclear catastrophe -- or just tell us that we haven't had a nuclear catastrophe yet?... Lack of catastrophic change might signify a system in stable equilibrium, but sometimes -- as with earthquakes -- pressure may be building up over time, undetected.... Most analysts assumed the Soviet Union was stable -- until it collapsed. Analysts predicted that Egypt's Hosni Mubarak would retain his firm grip on power -- until he was ousted. How much of what we currently file under "Stable" should be recategorized under "Hasn't Collapsed Yet"? This, then, is the character of world messiness in this first quarter of the 21st century. So on to the next question: Where, in all this messiness, does the United States find itself?

### 2NC---NB---DoD

#### SPP funding comes from the National Guard.

DoD, 16 (Department of Defense, 10-12-2016, accessed on 7-2-2022, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, DOD INSTRUCTION 5111.20 “STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM (SPP)”, <https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/511120p.pdf>, HBisevac) NG = National Guard

3.1. SPP FUNDING.

a. Funds authorized to be appropriated to DoD, including funds authorized to be appropriated for the ARNG and ANG:

(1) May be used to pay costs incurred by the NG of a State or territory to conduct activities under a State Partnership that are otherwise authorized by law.

(2) May be used to pay costs incurred by the NG to administer, manage, and conduct activities under State Partnerships established pursuant to Section 1205(a) of P.L. 113-66, as amended.

(3) May be used to pay incremental expenses of personnel of a foreign country to conduct activities under a State Partnership.

(4) May not be used for the participation of a member of the NG of a State or territory in SPP activities in a foreign country unless the member is on active duty orders (either Active Duty for Operational Support or Active Guard and Reserve) under Title 10, U.S.C., in the Armed Forces at the time of such participation.

b. Costs associated with approved SPP activities, including SPP planning conference costs not involving personnel from PNs, will be **funded** **from** **available** **NG appropriations**.

#### It’s comparatively cheaper than the AFF.

Bradley Bowman & Thomas Pledger, 20 (Bradley Bowman is senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Maj. Thomas G. Pledger is a visiting military analyst at Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 8-10-2020, accessed on 6-30-2022, Breaking Defense, “Modernize The National Guard’s State Partnership Program”, <https://breakingdefense.com/2020/08/modernize-the-national-guards-state-partnership-program/>, HBisevac)

The United States has a low-key, **low-cost tool** to build relationships with friendly militaries around the world. But after 27 years of success, the State Partnership Program – originally created for post-Cold War Europe – needs a review to ensure it is optimized for Washington’s current national security needs. Why does SPP matter? With threats growing and **budgets** under **pressure** from COVID-19, the Pentagon needs a **cost-efficient** way to build **stronger relationships** and **military capacity** with partner nations in each combatant command. Ideally, this approach would not place **additional burdens** on the active duty U.S. military and would operate largely below the radar of America’s adversaries and competitors. **That is where the SPP excels**. But the program is overdue for a strategic assessment to ensure it is appropriately resourced and properly focused on the objectives of the National Defense Strategy, which refocuses the US military from counterinsurgency to strategic competition against Russia and China.

#### It's cheap!

Samir Battiss, 13 (Samir Battiss, Lecturer at the University of Quebec in Montreal, May 2013, accessed on 6-30-2022, NORDIKA Programme, NATO Military Partnerships: The US National Guard State Partnership as the driving force for pre-accession and long-term cooperation,” <https://www.frstrategie.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/notes/2013/201310.pdf>, HBisevac)

Because the United States and their Allies share common security interests and common values and face common challenges (threats, risks), they rely on other **partnering nations**. All major NATO nations’ strategies recognize and emphasize the importance of multinational operations; each country reaffirms its will to act with others when it can, giving priority to “regional” or “ideological” allies and friends. Multinational operations are often analyzed as a compromise between military capability and political constraints, usually include a wide spectrum of missions; the intensity ranges from war to long-term tasks with a civilian nature in which the military apparatus plays a minor but necessary role. Multilateral actions of war are the extreme circumstance for conducting operations whose goal is to quickly achieve the multinational collective objectives with as little cost as possible. Peacetime engagement activities involving the military help to shape the security strategic environment by sharing experience in early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation, promotion of human rights, and strengthening democratic reforms. Although they are theoretically based on individual State requests and needs, bilateral military relations with “neutral” States and the State Partnership Program / PfP seek means to achieve **rationalization**, **standardization**, and **interoperability** that will significantly enhance the probability of operational success in multinational missions. For commanders as for political actors, the key is to build relationships, trust, cooperation, and cohesion at all military levels, while overcoming language and cultural barriers and relevantly applying common procedures or norms.

These accomplishments display U.S. commitment in relevant security areas, and are designed to lend **credibility** to its alliances by enhancing regional stability and providing a crisis response capability while **promoting U.S. influence** and **access**. Four significant paths have been followed by the SPP/PfP since the beginning of the 21st century. Several countries from Central and Eastern Europe have become members of NATO, correlatively the number of SPP/ PfP participating countries. NATO has also multiplied several instruments (Individual Partnership Program; Planning and Review Process; Operational Capabilities Concept) which deepen this program by allowing partners to adapt their participation through additional opportunities based upon their national objectives and capacities and perspective (Individual Partnership Action Plan ; Annual National Program; Membership Action Plan). A third dimension of NATO partnership is directly linked to the allied military presence in Afghanistan. At tactical and operational levels, the SPP innovative activities combined with PfP low-tech and **low-cost solutions** appears to be a way for the United States to avoid **technological shortfalls** and to bypass incapability to **integrate** their **cutting edge technologies** with most of NATO and non- NATO partners. The second aspect here is the growing strategic importance of the Caucasus and Central Asia that come out as the existence of PfP countries/SPP participants in the region and the perspective of the future Afghan participation in NATO partnership initiatives. Finally, the PfP is increasingly used to build cooperative relationships with countries in the region by regionalizing the treatment of security and stabilization missions.

#### It saves resources.

Tracey Poirier, 17 (Lieutenant Colonel Tracey Poirier, Vermont Army National Guard, 1-4-2017, accessed on 7-1-2022, United States Army War College Strategy Research Project, “Increasing Interoperability and Preparedness through the State Partnership Program”, <https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3481.pdf>, HBisevac)

The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) has continually received **rave reviews** from Combatant Commanders. Major General Frederick S. Rudesheim, US Army South Commander, called the program “almost incalculable.”3 Admiral James Winnefeld, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called it “one of the best foreign policy bargains our nation has.”4 Perhaps the most ringing endorsement comes from Admiral James Stavridis, Former US European Command Commander, when he stated the SPP is, “a **very powerful tool**. It is unmatched. They are, **bang for the buck**, one of the best things going. Anything that enhances state partnership is **money in the bank** for the regional combatant commanders.” 5 In fact, it is **difficult** to find a **criticism** of the program from **anyone** who has experienced it on the ground. Given such reviews, why would the US government not expand its model to include more interactions that would improve interoperability with partner nations?

#### The counterplan does not use DoD funds

Hightower 17, PhD in Public Policy and Management (Rudolph, “National Security Policy Complexity: An Analysis of U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Program Effects on Political Terror,” Proquest Dissertations)

Defense Security Cooperation Efficaciousness

Currently, the senior-most foreign military and civilian decision makers who have previously and are currently participating in the program view the State Partnership Program in glowing terms. The following illustrates the level of endorsement of the security cooperation program: "…Multiply that by 22 all around Europe and you can see the bang for the buck here is really quite significant.[SPP] is a very powerful tool. It is unmatched. They are, bang for the buck, one of the best things going. Anything that enhances state partnership is money in the bank for the regional combatant commanders.” - Admiral James Stavridis, Former USEUCOM Commander Retired US Navy Admiral Stavridis’ glowing praise of SPP is not unique. There is evidence of a significant quantitative knowledge gap between security cooperation stakeholders and government policy evaluators. National Guard leadership and foreign partners continually state these qualitative outcomes of SPP. Conversely, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) and Congressional Research Service (CRS) have concluded that SPP needs far more quantitative data collection and analysis to properly assess program efficiency and effectiveness. The measurable outcomes, not merely public budgeting line item outputs, on democratic consolidation principles such as reducing political terror in partner nations, are needed to assess SPP program effectiveness.

### 2NC---NB---DoD---Troops

#### The counterplan requires zero active-duty troops

Hightower 17, PhD in Public Policy and Management (Rudolph, “National Security Policy Complexity: An Analysis of U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Program Effects on Political Terror,” Proquest Dissertations)

Escalating political violence that does not result in a failed or collapse state can still lead to tragic consequences that are less than civil war. This quasi-conflict condition of becoming a continuing simmering state with the potentially violent state action referred to as a “Frozen Conflict”. Examples of potential for unchecked political terror are the Frozen Conflicts in Moldova, Armenia, and NagornoKarabakh. In these nations, there are no massively scaled, centrally coordinated military operations ongoing, but nonetheless, repressive actions of government forces continue against an indigenous separatist population seeking autonomy. In addition, while there is no US commitment of active duty, military combat troop to any of these three nations, the US consistently shows its commitment to improving partner nation security and preventing political terror by running State Partnership Program engagement activities for two of these countries via the North Carolina and Kansas National Guards, respectively16.

### 2NC---NB---DoD---AT FG Involved

#### If there is FG involvement, it’s The State Department rubber-stamping the initiative, but the states are the implementing agency

Ahlness 14, Associate of Arts degree from Century College, Ahlness plans to continue her work as a graduate student in Political science upon graduation from MSU-Mankato. After earning her doctoral degree, she anticipates participating in an international volunteer organization, followed by teaching either International Relations or Scandinavian studies at the university level. (THE STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM: STATES AS GLOBAL ACTORS THE IMPLICATIONS OF NONAGGRESSIVE NATIONAL FORCES, *Journal of Undergraduate Research at Minnesota State University, Mankato*, 14.1)

The State Partnership Program links state National Guard units to the military reserve components of other countries through U.S. military engagement programs. This typically involves going through the U.S. Department of State, implying that at the national level diplomats have control over the program. Even though the yearly exchanges require federal ‘goaheads,’ the state-level National Guard has become, and remains, the primary agency for implementing U.S. military engagement programs within the reserve forces. From an institutional perspective, it is clear that the State Partnership Program provides states an increasingly growing role in shaping U.S. foreign policy. Looking at the ‘second level’ of international politics, as discussed by Waltz, neither foreign policy nor federalism is able to address the growth of state policies because of the divided nature of the programs used. That is, implemented on a national level, while carried out on a provincial level.

### 2NC---NB---PTX

#### The counterplan is just the states. It has to follow DoS and DoD directives, but requires no federal action.

CALL 18 (The Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Security Cooperation and the State Partnership Program,” https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/19-01%20State%20Partnership%20Program%20%28Lo%20Res%29.pdf)//BB

The SPP is administered by the National Guard Bureau (NGB) in accordance with Department of Defense (DOD) regulations and directives, guided by Department of State foreign policy goals, implemented by the geographic combatant commands (GCCs), and sourced by National Guard forces. The National Guard executes SPP activities to maintain enduring partnerships that ensure access and influence; enhance the capabilities of both the State; National Guard and the partner country’s defense and security forces build partner nation’s military capacity; increase interoperability; and to promote National Guard core competencies of civil support, humanitarian assistance/disaster assistance and joint force headquarters’ (JFHQ) institutional functions. Activities are identified, approved, and coordinated through the GCCs, U.S. Embassy country teams, and other agencies as required to ensure that SPP activities are tailored to meet U.S. and partner country objectives.

#### Even if the FG is tangentially involved, the SPP completely avoids politics

Hightower 17, PhD in Public Policy and Management (Rudolph, “National Security Policy Complexity: An Analysis of U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Program Effects on Political Terror,” Proquest Dissertations)

Currently, the senior-most foreign military and civilian decision makers who have previously and are currently participating in the program view the State Partnership Program in glowing terms. The following illustrates the level of endorsement of the security cooperation program: "…Multiply that by 22 all around Europe and you can see the bang for the buck here is really quite significant.[SPP] is a very powerful tool. It is unmatched. They are, bang for the buck, one of the best things going. Anything that enhances state partnership is money in the bank for the regional combatant commanders.” - Admiral James Stavridis, Former USEUCOM Commander Retired US Navy Admiral Stavridis’ glowing praise of SPP is not unique. There is evidence of a significant quantitative knowledge gap between security cooperation stakeholders and government policy evaluators. National Guard leadership and foreign partners continually state these qualitative outcomes of SPP. Conversely, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) and Congressional Research Service (CRS) have concluded that SPP needs far more quantitative data collection and analysis to properly assess program efficiency and effectiveness. The measurable outcomes, not merely public budgeting line item outputs, on democratic consolidation principles such as reducing political terror in partner nations, are needed to assess SPP program effectiveness. Though the program is wildly popular, there remains a disconnection between leadership’s pronouncements and a testable, measurable program evaluation. Until most recently, SPP effectiveness as has been qualitatively evaluated and the results consistently associated with the value of trust-building and strengthening relationships with foreign partners (NGAUS, 2016). Evaluation metrics included outputs related to the number of foreign engagement missions, the numbers of individual troops participating in SPP events, and the dollars spent in implementing the SPP annually. The evaluation of program effectiveness has not broached the broader concept of the whether the program affects long-term outcomes on democratic consolidation and political terror. Countering the possibly biased qualitative assessment of stakeholders, the official US Government’s assessments of security cooperation programs in general, and of SPP, in particular, offer much more tempered endorsements of such programs: According to the private National Guard of the United States Association (NGUSA): The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) is one of the most innovative low-cost security cooperation tools available to the United States…In addition to military-to-military engagements; SPP leverages the whole-of-society relations and capabilities to facilitate broader interagency and whole-of-government engagements. Though policymaker support for DSC programs is strong and pronouncements of great success are common, there is a counter-argument to its success. There are obvious real-world events that challenge the efficaciousness of DSC programs in building stabilization and/or stemming the use of state security forces to violently suppress political dissent or for soldiers to attack the government. These counter arguments are usually in real world news headlines from around the world. 31

#### The process makes it appealing.

James N. Williams, 12 (Lieutenant Colonel James N. Williams, Army National Guard, March 2012, accessed on 6-30-2022, United States Army War Project Strategy Research Project, “The National Guard State Partnership Program: Element of Smart Power”, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA562110.pdf>, HBisevac)

Any new directives, regulations or statutory authorities would be most effective with a “**bottom-up**” **approach**, using input from the National Guard to the **greatest extent possible**. Given the vastness and diversity of the programs requirements, the coordinators at the National Guard Bureau level should be the “trusted advisors” to ensure that **language incorporated** into evolving **guidance** ensure the **flexibility** required to administer the program **effectively** “where the rubber meets the road.”

The Bureau can **most effectively synthesize** the **discrete nuances** across the program into a **cohesive representation** for the further **development** of **directives** and authorities. Without initial input from the program level, any top-driven attempts to develop guidance will ultimately fail to achieve the balance and flexibility required to effectively administer the program. The National Guard Bureau has had over twenty years experience with this program and is the only single agency that truly has the “big picture.” The Bureau is more than capable of fairly and honestly representing the needs of the partner nations consistent with the requirements of the Department of State, the Geographic Combatant Commanders and the American taxpayers.

#### States avoid partisan fights---lower visibility flies under the radar

Monica Prasad 12 (Monica Prasad is a professor of sociology at Northwestern, June 2012, accessed 8/3/21, “State-level renewable electricity policies and reductions in carbon emissions”, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0301421512001413)AGabay

These **state policies** are **surprising** in **many w**ays. For example, they are often **driven** by **bipartisan** **coalitions**, and, perhaps because of their **lower visibility**, they seem to have **escaped** the **partisan wrangling** that has **limited national-level policy**. Both George W. Bush and Christine Todd Whitman were pioneers of alternative energy policy at the state level, as governors of Texas and New Jersey respectively, before they went on to obstruct environmental policy at the federal level as president and head of the EPA (Rabe, 2004). Texas, a state that produces reliably conservative and anti-environmental contingents at the national level, is a leader in wind energy.

#### States get all the credit for policies, but the perm doesn’t shield because state action must be independent and prior.

Ferraiolo 8 – Dr. Kathleen Ferraiolo, Professor of Political Science at James Madison University, “State Policy Innovation and the Federalism Implications of Direct Democracy”, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Volume 38, Number 3, January, p. 496-498

Ballot Initiatives that Respond to Federal Inaction

There were a number of policy issues that appeared on multiple state ballots during the past several election cycles. Voters have cast their ballots on topics ranging from same-sex marriage and gambling to education, energy, election reform, and taxes. Eminent domain, the minimum wage, abortion, government finances, and animal rights were other subjects that occupied voters’ attention. This study focuses on four issue areas, most of which were considered in multiple states and targeted federal policy either by responding to perceived inaction or by challenging federal law.

The Minimum Wage

Until the newly elected Democratic Congress tackled the issue in early 2007, the federal government had not enacted a minimum wage increase since 1997, when it was raised to five dollars and fifteen cents an hour. Not content to wait for the federal government to act on what they perceived to be an important issue, in 2006 voters in six states (Nevada, Arizona, Ohio, Colorado, Missouri, and Montana) ratified initiatives to increase the minimum wage and index it to inflation, in some cases overwhelmingly. Eleven state legislatures approved raises in 2006 as well. The average ‘‘yes’’ vote for the 2006 ballot measures was 66 percent, and the average margin of victory was thirty-one points. In 2004, voters in Florida and Nevada overwhelmingly supported minimum wage ballot measures. In total, the National Conference of State Legislatures (2007b) reports that thirty states and the District of Columbia have adopted state minimum wages that are higher than the federal minimum wage. Clearly, despite inaction at the federal level there is much support for raising the minimum wage among both state voters and elected officials, including Democratic and some Republican governors and legislators.

The ballot presence of hot-button issues such as same-sex marriage and the minimum wage has led scholars to investigate the mobilizing effects of these issues (Abramowitz 2004; Smith 2006; Nicholson 2005) and to uncover evidence of initiatives’ educative and electoral spillover effects. Smith and Tolbert, among the first to study the educative effects of direct democracy, found that initiative use is associated with increases in voter turnout, civic engagement, political interest, and political knowledge (Tolbert and Smith 2006; Smith and Tolbert 2004). Smith and Tolbert (2001), Kousser and McCubbins (2005), and others document the spillover effects of ballot initiatives on broader electoral and political processes such as citizens’ voting behavior in candidate elections and political party and interest group strategies. Smith (2006) notes that political officials (such as Arnold Schwarzenegger) and party operatives have skillfully used the initiative process to advance their policy agendas, threaten the legislature into action, and frame candidate elections. Smith, DeSantis, and Kassel (2006) find a positive correlation between support for anti-same-sex marriage measures and the vote for George W. Bush in Ohio and Michigan in 2004. Kousser and McCubbins (2005) describe how Democratic party activists in Colorado helped sponsor a successful 2004 initiative to increase mass transit funding that contributed to high voter turnout and Democratic victories in an election when Republican candidates dominated in many other states. In a wide-ranging study, Nicholson (2005) finds that ballot measures have agenda-setting, priming, and electoral spillover effects, altering the weight voters assign to various issues, the standards by which they evaluate candidates for congressional and gubernatorial offices, and the strategies of political candidates and parties.

No longer the exclusive domain of citizens or interest groups, political party organizations, candidates, and elected officials now use initiative elections for many purposes: To increase voter registration and turnout, advance their political agendas and ideologies, circumvent contribution and expenditure limits in candidate races, selectively mobilize support for their own candidates, prime vote choice for issues on which they believe they have an advantage, or drive a wedge in opponent coalitions (Smith 2005, 2006; Kousser and McCubbins 2005; Smith and Tolbert 2001). As candidates and parties seek initiative success for policy or ideological reasons, they also force their opponents to drain their resources in attempting to defeat initiatives that run counter to their own policy and political goals.

The minimum wage ballot measures that experienced overwhelming success in 2004 and 2006 were part of a concerted effort by progressive activists to mobilize sympathetic voters and sway candidate elections. Support for Florida’s 2004 minimum wage initiative by the Association of Community Organization for Reform Now (ACORN) led to the adoption of the measure as well as a successful voter registration drive. The group appeared to achieve its goals of ‘‘‘driving heightened Democratic turnout, passing the initiative, and building permanent political capacity for future gains’’’ (quoted in Kousser and McCubbins 2005, 973). In 2004 progressive activists in Nevada and Florida, with the approval of the Democratic National Committee, used focus groups and pre-election surveys to pretest the language of a variety of minimum wage proposals. They selected those they believed would mobilize low-income voters who would also support Democratic candidates, including presidential nominee John Kerry (Smith 2006). In 2006, the belief that minimum wage ballot initiatives could mobilize Democratic-leaning voters was an attractive possibility for labor unions (particularly the AFL-CIO, which launched its ‘‘America Needs a Raise’’ campaign that year) and other progressive groups such as ACORN interested in unseating the Republican congressional leadership (Broder 2006; Andrews 2006). The objectives of minimum wage sponsors, then, were manifold, including bringing about both state and federal policy change, boosting voter registration and turnout, and influencing candidate elections.

Even before they appeared on state ballots and in Congress, proposals to increase the minimum wage received high levels of support in public opinion polls (Roper Center 2007, 55). Democrats in Congress are certainly more sympathetic to a minimum wage increase than are most Republicans, and it is not surprising that they would choose to address the issue as one of their signature initiatives in the 110th Congress in early 2007. Still, the evidence presented here suggests that supporters of raising the minimum wage were able to simultaneously achieve three objectives: Advocates took independent state-level action to address a policy issue of public concern; they had a hand in helping to bring about an electoral majority in Congress more favorable to increasing the minimum wage; and their efforts led to increased turnout (if not Democratic victories) in at least some of the states where the measures appeared.

As predicted, the success of minimum wage initiatives in multiple states during the 2004–2006 election cycle ultimately resulted in intergovernmental policy consensus. Impatient with the pace of federal efforts to raise the minimum wage, state lawmakers and voters used the legislative process and direct democracy institutions to address the issue, ultimately producing a divergence in policy not only between states and the federal government but across states as well. The newly elected Democratic Congress resolved this federal–state policy diversity (if not state-to-state diversity; many states set their minimum wage rates higher than the federal level) by acting to raise the minimum wage for the first time in ten years. However, some evidence suggests that state voters and policymakers, and not federal lawmakers, receive most of the credit for policy innovations that originate at the state level. The House of Representatives passed a bill to raise the minimum wage during the second week of the congressional session, but in an early February 2007 poll fewer than one in five respondents gave the House credit for this accomplishment (Roper Center 2007, 131); 84 percent of survey respondents favored a minimum wage increase in 2006, but in March 2007 a mere 2 percent of respondents cited the issue when asked what was the most important thing Congress had done in its first few months (Roper Center 2007, 090). While Congress received little credit for its support for a minimum wage increase, the initiatives’ overwhelming success and the Democratic takeover of Congress in 2007 brought state and federal policy more in line with public opinion, enhancing the opinion-policy connection particularly at the state level and fostering vertical policy consensus and diffusion.

### 2NC---NB---PTX---AT: Follow On Links

#### Even a fast follow-on shields.

Ferraiolo 8 - Professor of Political Science at James Madison University (Kathleen Ferraolo, “State Policy Innovation and the Federalism Implications of Direct Democracy,” *Publius*)//BB

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Not content to wait for the federal government to act on what they perceived to be an important issue, in 2006 voters in six states (Nevada, Arizona, Ohio, Colorado, Missouri, and Montana) ratified initiatives to increase the minimum wage and index it to inflation, in some cases overwhelmingly. Eleven state legislatures approved raises in 2006 as well. The average ‘‘yes’’ vote for the 2006 ballot measures was 66 percent, and the average margin of victory was thirty-one points. In 2004, voters in Florida and Nevada overwhelmingly supported minimum wage ballot measures. In total, the National Conference of State Legislatures (2007b) reports that thirty states and the District of Columbia have adopted state minimum wages that are higher than the federal minimum wage. Clearly, despite inaction at the federal level there is much support for raising the minimum wage among both state voters and elected officials, including Democratic and some Republican governors and legislators. 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In a wide-ranging study, Nicholson (2005) finds that ballot measures have agenda-setting, priming, and electoral spillover effects, altering the weight voters assign to various issues, the standards by which they evaluate candidates for congressional and gubernatorial offices, and the strategies of political candidates and parties. No longer the exclusive domain of citizens or interest groups, political party organizations, candidates, and elected officials now use initiative elections for many purposes: To increase voter registration and turnout, advance their political agendas and ideologies, circumvent contribution and expenditure limits in candidate races, selectively mobilize support for their own candidates, prime vote choice for issues on which they believe they have an advantage, or drive a wedge in opponent coalitions (Smith 2005, 2006; Kousser and McCubbins 2005; Smith and Tolbert 2001). As candidates and parties seek initiative success for policy or ideological reasons, they also force their opponents to drain their resources in attempting to defeat initiatives that run counter to their own policy and political goals. The minimum wage ballot measures that experienced overwhelming success in 2004 and 2006 were part of a concerted effort by progressive activists to mobilize sympathetic voters and sway candidate elections. Support for Florida’s 2004 minimum wage initiative by the Association of Community Organization for Reform Now (ACORN) led to the adoption of the measure as well as a successful voter registration drive. The group appeared to achieve its goals of ‘‘‘driving heightened Democratic turnout, passing the initiative, and building permanent political capacity for future gains’’’ (quoted in Kousser and McCubbins 2005, 973). 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### 2NC---NB---Shields Russia Backlash

#### Security cooperation causes Russian miscalc

Bergmann and Schmitt 21 [Max Bergmann, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College; Alexandra Schmitt, a senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School; "A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance"; Center for American Progress; Published: 4-22-2015; Accessed: 6-20-2022; https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/; KL]

Security assistance in a tense era of great power competition is extremely sensitive and can increase tension and lead to miscalculation. The risk in today’s geopolitical environment is that providing sensitive and potentially provocative assistance will not receive the same scrutiny from policymakers and will become the norm for the administering agency, the DOD. In the last era of great power competition, the Cold War, security assistance often stoked tension between the United States and the Soviet Union and led to spiraling commitments. For instance, Soviet provision of nuclear missiles to Cuba led to a nuclear standoff, while U.S. military support for Vietnam led to deepening U.S. engagement.

As competition with China and Russia increases, security assistance could once again prove a major source of tension and cause miscalculation. Providing aid in this environment is not a mere technical military matter, but ultimately a political and diplomatic concern that is highly sensitive. Yet today, it is the DOD that is driving assistance to countries such as Ukraine and regions such as Southeast Asia.13 When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, the National Security Council became significantly involved in policymaking and limited types of assistance that could be provided, including lethal aid.14 Such unique scrutiny was warranted because there was a crisis involving a U.S. partner and a nuclear-armed state. But the nature of White House intervention was necessary in large part because the security assistance process—for both decision-making and for providing assistance—was broken.

A military-led response can overprioritize military engagement and could unintentionally steer American engagements into high-risk confrontations. Without careful calibration and understanding of broader political context, there is real concern that the DOD could get ahead of U.S. policy or drive it in a more military-centric direction. For example, China could interpret the DOD’s provision of some security assistance through the agency’s Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative as an act of aggression if it is not carefully and effectively calibrated against broader political concerns in the region.15 Given the political sensitivities of great power competition, responsibility and oversight for security assistance decisions should rest with the agency most in tune with broader U.S. foreign policy concerns and diplomatic developments: the State Department.

#### Counterplan avoids Russian blowback

Ahlness 14, Associate of Arts degree from Century College, Ahlness plans to continue her work as a graduate student in Political science upon graduation from MSU-Mankato. After earning her doctoral degree, she anticipates participating in an international volunteer organization, followed by teaching either International Relations or Scandinavian studies at the university level. (THE STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM: STATES AS GLOBAL ACTORS THE IMPLICATIONS OF NONAGGRESSIVE NATIONAL FORCES, *Journal of Undergraduate Research at Minnesota State University, Mankato*, 14.1)

This paper identifies the dependent and independent variables before moving into a brief history of the State Partnership Program and its precursor, the Norwegian Reciprocal Exchange Program. The focus will then be on the implications of using reserve forces in military exchange programs, looking specifically at Norway and Poland as examples of countries involved in partnership programs. The dependent variable of this case study is the level of perceived aggression the United States displays through involvement in military exchange programs. This variable can be measured in relative terms by examining the actions taken by opposing states to try and restore the balance of power, and thus their own security. The U.S.’s State Partnership Program, created during the time of the Soviet Union collapse, reached out to former Soviet countries as well as other countries that had been independent, yet still under the Russian sphere of influence. Several independent variables play into the level of perceived aggression. First is the geographical location of the state with whom the U.S. partnered. Soviet Russia would be less 4 concerned by a military partnership with Norway, which is further away from Russia and is more economically and culturally tied to Western Europe, than it would be with a partnership with Poland, which is adjacent to the Soviet Union and is of ideological importance to the union. Additionally, the kind of military force that is used in a military exchange can affect the perceived level of aggression. For example, active duty forces or Special Forces would be seen as extremely threatening by Russia, especially in the wake of the Cold War. Conversely, the use of National Guard or Reserve forces would be less threatening, since these are part-time military members.

#### The counterplan solves without initiating foreign blowback

Bradley Bowman & Thomas Pledger, 20 (Bradley Bowman is senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Maj. Thomas G. Pledger is a visiting military analyst at Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 8-10-2020, accessed on 6-30-2022, Breaking Defense, “Modernize The National Guard’s State Partnership Program”, <https://breakingdefense.com/2020/08/modernize-the-national-guards-state-partnership-program/>, HBisevac)

Why does SPP matter? With threats growing and budgets under pressure from COVID-19, the Pentagon needs a **cost-efficient way** to build **stronger relationships** and **military capacity** with partner nations in each combatant command. Ideally, this approach would **not place** additional **burdens** on the active duty U.S. military and would operate largely below the radar of America’s **adversaries** and competitors. That is where the **SPP excels**. But the program is overdue for a strategic assessment to ensure it is appropriately resourced and properly focused on the objectives of the National Defense Strategy, which refocuses the US military from counterinsurgency to strategic competition against Russia and China.

## COMPETITION/THEORY

### 2NC---Perm---AT: Do Both

#### Doing both ruins the process and decks effectiveness.

James N. Williams, 12 (Lieutenant Colonel James N. Williams, Army National Guard, March 2012, accessed on 6-30-2022, United States Army War Project Strategy Research Project, “The National Guard State Partnership Program: Element of Smart Power”, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA562110.pdf>, HBisevac)

Any new directives, regulations or statutory authorities would be most effective with a “**bottom-up**” **approach**, using input from the National Guard to the **greatest extent possible**. Given the vastness and diversity of the programs requirements, the coordinators at the National Guard Bureau level should be the “trusted advisors” to ensure that **language incorporated** into evolving **guidance** ensure the **flexibility** required to administer the program **effectively** “where the rubber meets the road.”

The Bureau can most effectively synthesize the discrete nuances across the program into a cohesive representation for the further development of directives and authorities. Without initial input from the program level, any top-driven attempts to develop guidance will ultimately fail to achieve the **balance** and **flexibility** required to **effectively administer** the program. The National Guard Bureau has had over twenty years experience with this program and is the only single agency that truly has the “**big picture**.” The Bureau is more than capable of fairly and honestly representing the needs of the partner nations consistent with the requirements of the Department of State, the Geographic Combatant Commanders and the American taxpayers.

### 2NC---Perm---AT: Do CP

#### The “United States federal government” precludes the states.

U.S. Legal ’16 [U.S. Legal; 2016; Organization offering legal assistance and attorney access; U.S. Legal, “United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition,” <https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/>]

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

#### “Federal government” is national.

Thompson ’21 [Thompson School District; 2021; Public school district for Loveland, Colorado and surrounding area; Thompson Schools, “Structures of Government,” <https://www.thompsonschools.org/cms/lib/CO01900772/Centricity/Domain/3627/Structures%20of%20Government.pdf>]

Australia, Switzerland, Canada, Mexico, Germany, India, and some 20 other stats also have federal forms of government today. In the United States, the term ‘Federal Government’ is often used to refer to the National Government, but note that the 50 state governments are unitary in structure, not federal.

### 2NC---Theory---AT: 50 State Fiat Bad

#### States CPs are good---we get CPs that test federal action on international topics:

#### 1---Neg Ground---it’s the only universal generic---their interp wrecks fairness and protects AFF side bias---the topic is huge and disjointed with three huge areas

#### 2---Topic Education---on NATO policy, the devil’s in the details.

Clint Peinhardt & Todd Sandler, 15 (Clint Peinhardt is a Professor in the Political Science department at UT, and Todd Sandler is a professor of economics at the University of Wyoming and has received a NATO postdoctoral fellowship in science and a National Defense Education Association fellowship, August 2015, accessed on 5-24-2022, Oxford Scholarship Online, “Principles of Collective Action and Game Theory”, https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199398607.001.0001/acprof-9780199398607-chapter-2, HBisevac)

A final distinction is between cooperative and noncooperative games. A noncooperative game has each player acting on his/her own. In contrast, cooperative game theory involves players acting in unison as a coalition to maximize some joint gain that is subsequently divided among coalition members. The **devil is in the details** because how to divide the **collective gain** is **never clear** and can be done in **various ways**. Even though this book is about transnational cooperation, we rely exclusively on noncooperative game theory for a number of reasons. First, all cooperative games can be expressed as a noncooperative game. Second, a noncooperative game can encompass cooperative or mutually beneficial outcomes along with mutually deficient outcomes. Third, by eschewing cooperative games, we do not have to impose a payoff division assumption that can always be subject to question. Fourth, countries cherish their sovereignty and rarely form tight, enforceable ties With Other countries that allow the collective to act as one, as required by cooperative game. For example, **NATO allies** must vote unanimously on **key policies** (for example, membership **expansion** or **changes** in **military doctrine**), thereby effectively preserving **members**' **sovereignty**. As such, NATO is a loose alliance because allies can block undesirable policy changes or decisions. Fifth, cooperative games require a good deal of algebra, which we can avoid by staying with a noncooperative game representation.

#### 3---Lit Checks---our evidence is comparative between actors AND AFFs have built in deficits

#### 4---Predictable---it tests ‘federal’ and ‘its’, making it predictable ground that finds the best policy

#### 5---Education.

Peart ’06 — Raphael; Security Specialist at Federal Emergency Management Agency. March 15, 2006; “NATIONAL GUARD STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM: SUPPORTING U. S. SOUTHERN COMMAND SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAM”; *USAWC Strategic Research Project*; <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA449738.pdf>; //CYang & HBisevac

\*SPP = state partnership program

The continued strategic relevance of SPP to the Combatant Commanders is evident by the growth in the number of activities conducted as the program has matured and adapted to a rapidly changing environment.51 However, SPP must continue to be joint in nature and develop ways to deal with life-cycle issues. One of these very important issues includes ways to leverage the limited state assets available to form new partnerships with other countries of interest. The majority of the partnerships are one-to-one. Currently, states that already have a partner country are not viewed favorably by NGB-IA as candidates for additional partnerships during the partner state approval process. This may change in the future as NBG-IA develops solutions to this problem and the pool of available states becomes more limited.

## SOLVENCY

### 2NC---Solvency---T/L

#### State SPP security cooperation solves better than federal action.

James N. Williams, 12 (Lieutenant Colonel James N. Williams, Army National Guard, March 2012, accessed on 6-30-2022, United States Army War Project Strategy Research Project, “The National Guard State Partnership Program: Element of Smart Power”, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA562110.pdf>, HBisevac) \*\*edited for gendered language\*\*

Using the National Guard as a primary tool to develop relationships with potential allies is a **diplomatic multiplier**, and its utility across the various domains of diplomacy was recognized after only a few years of effort. In a 2002 article in the Washington Quarterly, former Colorado Governor Bill Owens touted the State Partnership Program as a proven approach for “**strategic democracy building**.” 23 Governor Owens was one of the first to document the SPP’s “quiet achievements” in facilitating the development of **emerging democracies** beyond the typical military-to-military exchanges. For perhaps the first time, under SPP **state governments** became **involved** in helping the federal government in achieving **diplomatic goals** abroad.

By 1995, the program had expanded its scope to include “multifaceted engagement activities…in the social, economic and military spheres.” 24 In cooperation with state and municipal agencies, the program provided assistance and training in “emergency management, disaster relief operations, civil and criminal justice, judicial processes, and law enforcement.” 25 As a result of these engagements over time, more informal relationships developed. “Through SPP, many countries have established successful governmental, educational, and medical relationships with counterpart agencies from the partner states.” 26

This is the greatest advantage of the State Partnership Program. Because of the **dual-status nature** of the National Guard as both a **federal** and a **state** agency, ~~manned~~ [staffed] by **citizen-soldiers**, it is only natural for relationships to develop beyond the **military aspect** of the partnership. The citizen-soldiers of the National Guard are natural ambassadors for the American people, who also happen to have military skills. And while their military skills are the primary tools for engagement, their civilian skills and experiences also add intangible factors that enhance these interactions with their counterparts.

National Guard soldiers are more closely tied to their families and their communities than the typical active component soldiers living on large bases. They also have a certain local perspective that they bring to the table and, all politics being local, citizen-soldiers understand issues that are important to the common man, his family and his community. It is from this perspective that **sincere** and **lasting relationships** are developed with their counterparts.

Governor Owens was not the only state executive to understand the value of the State Partnership Program. Former Wisconsin Lieutenant Governor Barbara Lawton not only understood the program’s inherent value, she also saw vast untapped potential for further **public** and **citizen diplomacy**. In 2010 she chaired a roundtable discussion calling for more citizen-diplomacy, using SPP as a model for what she described as a “State Partnership Framework” to facilitate increased contact at the state and local level. In the report of the discussion, the SPP was recognized by Lieutenant Governor Lawton as one of two existing, trusted state institutions (the other being state universities), that “are ideally positioned to develop a strategic hybrid of public and citizen diplomacy in fifty states.” 27

The conference’s focus on the potential role of the citizen and the individual states in shaping **U.S. foreign relations** goes **straight to the heart** of the potential of SPP. While public diplomacy is government-centric, citizen diplomacy, through face to face personal encounters, carries “greater credibility with foreign audiences.” 28 Some suggested areas for **state facilitation** of **citizen diplomacy** include education, economic development, **science** and **technology**. While the forum was centered on citizen diplomacy and the role of the state, it was clear the State Partnership Program was recognized as having already transcended the gap between government and citizen diplomacy.

The ability to establish **enduring relationships** is a unique attribute of the National Guard. “The SPP model has proven successful in building and sustaining enduring and **trusting strategic partnerships** in environments where conventional U.S. government efforts may not be as effective. Individuals in leadership may change, but the commitment of a state National Guard as a more intimate, **accessible**, and agile **partner** than a national entity – has proven to be **reliable** for partner countries.”29

Conference participants included representatives from the Departments of Defense and State, as well as academia. Among the notable attendees was Reta Jo Lewis, **State Department** Special Representative for Intergovernmental Affairs, who also **touted** the **program’s role** in **diplomacy**. Although the federal government, not the states, has the responsibility for conducting Foreign Policy, Ms Lewis remarked that networks of state and local leaders can help the Department of State to “establish **durable foreign partnerships**…at the sub-national level.” “Sometimes the **personal relationships** that are created through the SPP can have a **stronger** and more intimate **connection** than those we establish at the national and diplomatic level.”30

#### There’s an empirical record of complete and total success

Dickerson 13, Lieutenant Colonel @ US National Guard (Jeffrey, “Shifting State Partnership Program Resources to the Asia-Pacific Region,” <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA589403.pdf)//BB>

SPP countries demonstrated success in reforming their defense sectors and enabling and facilitating enduring broad-spectrum security relationships. The outcomes have been dramatic, with partners supporting U.S. and international security objectives through training received and transformation performed through SPP. SPP partners made significant contributions to collective defense efforts in NATO by supporting peace and stability operations in the Balkans and uniting in a fight against violent extremism through support to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2003. For example, Slovenia assisted the U.S. and NATO in its efforts to stabilize and bring peace 8 to the Balkans by providing troops in support of Stabilization Force (SFOR) in the 1990s. SPP countries’ support of the war effort in Iraq and Afghanistan clearly demonstrated the ability of partners to provide military forces to operations. After the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, thirty-eight other countries joined this “coalition of the willing” to help depose Saddam Hussein and topple his regime.21 Twenty-five of the troopcontributing states were SPP partners, which made up 65.7% of the troop contributing countries to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). 22 For example, Thailand, partnered with the state of Washington, and the Philippines, partnered with Hawaii, provided military support for reconstruction efforts in Iraq while other SPP countries provided combat brigades. When the country of Georgia deployed one of its brigades to Iraq in 2007, several Soldiers from the Georgia Army National Guard deployed along with them and served with them throughout their deployment.23 This Georgian brigade’s capability to deploy and fight stemmed from a concerted SPP effort to develop their sustainment capabilities during the year prior. After returning from a deployment to Iraq in 2006, a fortuitous visit by the Brigade Commander of the 48th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) of the Georgia Army National Guard on a training visit to Tbilisi, Georgia, in early 2007 led to the development of a four month training program from April through July 2007 to improve the combat service support capabilities of the Georgian Army. In conjunction with the Georgia Security and Stability Operations Program (GSSOP II), the 48th IBCT deployed teams of National Guardsmen to Georgia to train the Georgians in supply and maintenance operations.24 In addition to the country of Georgia, Poland also provided 9 combat units to support the war effort in Iraq. In both instances, the brigades from these countries deployed along with embedded Soldiers from their partnered states in the form of Bilateral Embedded Support Teams (BEST). In these two cases, Illinois and Georgia each deployed Soldiers alongside their partnered countries.25 In several instances, the troop-contributing SPP countries would only provide troops if their SPP partners from the U.S. accompanied them.26 Opportunities like this enabled the U.S. military to be reinforced with troops from an unexpected source, and these sources were even more heavily relied upon during the war in Afghanistan. As of 2012, fifty separate countries contributed combat forces to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan,27 and SPP countries made up a significant percentage of the overall troop contributing nations to ISAF – twenty-three out of the forty eight troop contributing nations.28 Collectively, SPP countries provided over 8,200 troops to ISAF.29 For example, Poland, partnered with Illinois, provided an entire Battle Group that served and fought as a battle space owner in Afghanistan. Other countries participating in the SPP, such as Jordan, Macedonia, and Mongolia, also provided troops in support of ISAF for purposes such as force protection.30 Several other SPP countries provided troop support to ISAF in the form of Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs), which made up a large percentage of these SPP country troop contributions. The OMLTs were responsible for embedding with and training and mentoring the Afghan National Army (ANA).31 Latvia, the very first SPP country, along with its partnered state, Michigan, deployed the first BEST OMLT to Afghanistan in support of OEF in 2008.32 In all, twenty-four separate countries provided OMLTs to Afghanistan in support of ISAF 10 efforts to develop and train the ANA, and of those twenty four OMLT providing countries, ten are countries participating in the SPP. The contemporary historical examples of partnership extended beyond the war fighting role and also included examples of supporting partner capacity to build and recover, developing professional forces, and facilitating enduring relationships. These contemporary examples of SPP partnership activities and outcomes are much more representative of civilian diplomacy and the whole of government approach to partnering. These examples include port security, humanitarian assistance, defense support to civil authorities (DSCA), government and economic development, and combating transnational criminal activities in support of the four SPP goals. “The unique civil-military nature of the National Guard allows the SPP to engage in a wide range of Security Cooperation activities, such as: Disaster Preparedness, Humanitarian Assistance, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear, Cyber, Reserve Component Reform, Counterdrug, Border/Port Security, and Public/Private Partnerships.”33 Serbia provides an example. In 1999, the United States and NATO conducted offensive air operations against Serbian forces as a part of Operation Allied Force in order to deter Serbian aggression in Kosovo.34 Over a decade later, the relationship between Serbia and the United States evolved into a much more peaceful one. Serbia has since entered into an SPP agreement with the National Guard in the state of Ohio. In 2010, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) from the Serbian Army graduated from the Ohio National Guard NCO academy, and these partners’ military–to-military engagements recently included humanitarian missions to rehabilitate several schools 11 damaged during a powerful 5.3 magnitude earthquake in November 2010.35 This partnership, which began in 2006, is more than just a military to military partnership. Their goals are also to further develop the cultural bonds between the United States and Serbia through enhanced engagements between universities and youth programs. In September 2010, Ambassador Mary Burce Warlick, U.S. Ambassador to Serbia, praised the SPP for playing a critical role in improving U.S. and Serbian relations.36 SPP also facilitated private organizations and business engagements as well as government to government engagements as it developed enduring relationships. The SPP effectively built relationships at the local level and linked local U.S. leaders with national leaders from other countries, such as Senegal. After expressing a desire to develop their country’s ability to conduct crisis management and search and rescue operations, as well as improve the professionalism of their NCO corps and develop family support programs, Senegalese leaders entered into a SPP agreement with the State of Vermont in 2009.37 In September 2010, President Abdoulaye Wade, President of Senegal, visited Burlington, Vermont, and remarked that he will take back to Senegal a better understanding of the state’s economic model as well as a better understanding of the relationship and interaction between business, services, and tourism and their contributions to quality of life.38 SPP built partner capacity to deter, prevent, and prepare for threats to trade and commerce. Thailand and its partner state, Washington, conducted several port security exercises between 2003 and 2012. These exercises focused on responding to hazard material and WMD incidents, crisis management, port security, and disaster planning and included participants from the Royal Thai Army, Navy, and Marine Department, as 12 well as the Thai National Security Council and other civilian agencies along with members of the Washington Air and Army National Guard and other U.S. civilian participants.39 This partnership improved port security operations at the Port of Tacoma in Tacoma, Washington, which handles a significant amount of cargo exported from port at Leam Chabang in Thailand every year.40 These examples clearly demonstrate the SPP’s ability to achieve success in the goal of building partnership capacity to deter, prevent, and prepare for natural/manmade disasters with emphasis on civil-military and interagency cooperation while also building partnership capacity to respond and recover from attack and man-made disasters. It also clearly develops the ability to support partners’ defense reform and professional development, as well as enabling and facilitating enduring broad-spectrum security relationships in support of the DoS and other lead agencies. While each of these examples provides far more concrete evidence of the SPP’s effectiveness, military and civilian leadership testimony provides additional support to the effectiveness of the program. During a speech delivered on July 17, 2012, at a National Guard Symposium on Mutual Security Cooperation, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, stressed the imperative for major powers to develop partnerships that work within a “competitive fiscal and security environment” in order to confront the decentralized threats of the 21st century. He went on to praise the SPP for its ability to provide continuity in relationships among the leaders of the partnered states and countries. He also remarked, “the State Partnership Program has reaped benefits far 13 beyond what was initially conceived” and added that it was “a modest investment for a pretty substantial return.”41 During recent testimony regarding their GCC Defense Posture Statements before the Senate Armed Services Committee, several GCC Commanders testified regarding the effectiveness of the program. They praised the value of the SPP within their respective GCCs, and requested additional SPP support. For example, in 2009, General Brantz Craddock, Commander, USEUCOM, testified that the SPP “continues to be one of our most effective [build partner capacity] programs…the unique civil-military nature of the National Guard allows it to participate actively in a wide range of security cooperation activities and help bridge the gap between DoD and DoS responsibilities…”42 His successor, Admiral James Stavradis, also testified in 2012 that the program is “one of European Command’s most unique, cost effective, and essential international engagement tools…that support key Theater Security Cooperation objectives and preserve and develop these important strategic partnerships...”43 The Commander of USAFRICOM, General Carter F. Hamm testified in 2012 that the SPP was an “important component” of USAFRICOM’s “efforts to strengthen defense capabilities of African partners”.44 He further added that he had asked NGB to add two additional partnerships and consider further expansion of the program.45 U.S. civilian leadership also provide testament to the success of the SPP. “In a 2010 survey of Ambassadors to USEUCOM SPP nations: 6 said SPP is their most significant program; 14 said SPP is a significant program that adequately supports their objectives; and 1 said SPP adequately supports their objectives, but would like to see increased engagements.”46

#### The CPs whole of society approach solves better.

James N. Williams, 12 (Lieutenant Colonel James N. Williams, Army National Guard, March 2012, accessed on 6-30-2022, United States Army War Project Strategy Research Project, “The National Guard State Partnership Program: Element of Smart Power”, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA562110.pdf>, HBisevac)

As the nation confronts its current economic crisis, the Department of Defense faces budget reductions between four hundred billion and one trillion dollars over the next ten years. Yet in spite of constrained resources the United States must continue to meet National Security challenges in this “era of persistent conflict”. The strategy to meet these challenges and overcome diminished capacity will rely more heavily than ever on security cooperation, engagement and building partner capacities. Gaining security cooperation and aiding partner nations to develop their capabilities is a way to **shape** the **environment**, **deter conflict** and assure access and **assistance** in the event of conflict. For nearly two decades, the National Guard State Partnership Program has done **all of this** **and more**. Since long before the term “smart power” was coined, the State Partnership Program has evolved, almost imperceptibly, as a means to employ a “**whole of society**” approach to **building partner capacity**. This paper will demonstrate that the State Partnership Program is an effective and economical tool that facilitates a bridge between **military engagement** and **civilian diplomacy** in support of the National Security Policies of the United States.

#### State partnerships are comparatively the most effective approach to Security Cooperation

Hightower 17, PhD in Public Policy and Management (Rudolph, “National Security Policy Complexity: An Analysis of U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Program Effects on Political Terror,” Proquest Dissertations)//BB

Defense Security Cooperation Efficaciousness

Currently, the senior-most foreign military and civilian decision makers who have previously and are currently participating in the program view the State Partnership Program in glowing terms. The following illustrates the level of endorsement of the security cooperation program: "…Multiply that by 22 all around Europe and you can see the bang for the buck here is really quite significant.[SPP] is a very powerful tool. It is unmatched. They are, bang for the buck, one of the best things going. Anything that enhances state partnership is money in the bank for the regional combatant commanders.” - Admiral James Stavridis, Former USEUCOM Commander Retired US Navy Admiral Stavridis’ glowing praise of SPP is not unique. There is evidence of a significant quantitative knowledge gap between security cooperation stakeholders and government policy evaluators. National Guard leadership and foreign partners continually state these qualitative outcomes of SPP. Conversely, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) and Congressional Research Service (CRS) have concluded that SPP needs far more quantitative data collection and analysis to properly assess program efficiency and effectiveness. The measurable outcomes, not merely public budgeting line item outputs, on democratic consolidation principles such as reducing political terror in partner nations, are needed to assess SPP program effectiveness.

#### Solves security cooperation---includes defense management building AND innovation.

William Spence, 13 (Lieutenant Colonel William Spence, Idaho Army National Guard, 2013, accessed on 7-2-2022, United States Army War College, “National Guard State Partnership Program: Building Partnership Capacity”, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=815338>, HBisevac)

Within these four goals, the SPP facilitates the development of a regional and global environment congruent with the U.S. national interests of security, prosperity, values, and international order. 21 In addition, these goals facilitate a stable global environment that influences U.S. partners and potentially adversaries away from negative and disruptive approaches.

The first goal, to deter adversaries and regional conflict is supplementary to the second goal to respond and recover from attacks and disasters. The focus of the two goals are developing **defense management capacity**, training **personnel** with the capabilities to deter internal and external adversaries, and utilizing **appropriate action** when events occur. **Interagency** and **civil military cooperation** is critical to the **development**, **sustainment**, and **execution** of the capability. 22 The National Guard core missions provide a unique capability and institutional knowledge to meet these two goals. At the federal, state, and local levels, the National Guard supports the land and air component missions, the homeland defense mission, and the support of civilian authorities and disaster relief missions. The National Guard capacity to mentor and train at the various levels with the partner is representative of the U.S. armed forces. Interagency integration is standard practice at the local, state, and federal levels within the National Guard. These two goals provide the partner a core capacity for developing force sustainment and growth in the last two goals

The third goal supports the partner nation’s **defense innovation** and **professional development** with concern for the challenges faced in the global community today and in the future.23 This goal enables the partner to **strengthen** and **sustain capacity** through development of institutions that establish and maintain **standards**. The foundation of standards directly supports interoperability with the U.S., regional partners, nongovernment organizations (NGO) and International Government Organizations (IGO). Every National Guard state has a Regional Training Institute that supports collective and individual development. The partner is able to utilize the National Guard knowledge of military schooling operations to develop their own institutions through exchanges and training programs. At the state level, the National Guard develops and submits annual budgets and requests to NGB for operational maintenance, equipping the force, and sustaining bases and armories. Through mentoring and engaging with key partner leaders, the SPP can assist the development of a **sustainable partner defense management** that understands how ways and means achieve the ends identified by civilian leadership.

The last goal seeks to facilitate partner involvement in regional and international organizations. 24 Development of regional and **international military cooperation** is within the capabilities of the National Guard. Most brigade size National Guard units reside in multiple states. Due to the nature of split-state force structure, the involved states develop relationships that ensure unity of effort and support across state boundaries. Development of interstate training plans, resourcing responsibilities, and command authorities are similar to the skill sets required to operate in regional and international coalitions. These skills coupled with GCC support can build the necessary capacity to develop partner relationships with neighboring countries, to ensure **unity** of **effort**, **interoperability**, and **mutual support**. These four goals further protect U.S. interests and stature in the global community. Essential to the **relationship** and **building strong partnerships** is correctly **identifying** the **threat** and the environments the capability operates within to **deter threats** and **respond** to **conflict**.25

### 2NC---Solvency---Follow On

#### The Bureau paves the way for follow on.

James N. Williams, 12 (Lieutenant Colonel James N. Williams, Army National Guard, March 2012, accessed on 6-30-2022, United States Army War Project Strategy Research Project, “The National Guard State Partnership Program: Element of Smart Power”, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA562110.pdf>, HBisevac)

Any new directives, regulations or statutory authorities would be most effective with a “**bottom-up**” **approach**, using input from the National Guard to the **greatest extent possible**. Given the vastness and diversity of the programs requirements, the coordinators at the National Guard Bureau level should be the “trusted advisors” to ensure that **language incorporated** into evolving **guidance** ensure the **flexibility** required to administer the program **effectively** “where the rubber meets the road.”

The Bureau can **most effectively synthesize** the **discrete nuances** across the program into a **cohesive representation** for the further **development** of **directives** and authorities. Without initial input from the program level, any top-driven attempts to develop guidance will ultimately fail to achieve the balance and flexibility required to effectively administer the program. The **National Guard Bureau** has had over twenty years experience with this program and is the only single agency that truly has the “**big picture**.” The Bureau is more than capable of fairly and honestly representing the needs of the partner nations consistent with the requirements of the Department of State, the Geographic Combatant Commanders and the American taxpayers.

### 2NC---Solvency---Follow-on---Climate-Specific

#### Fed follows on.

Adrianna Pita, 7-1 (Adrianna Pita, Assistant Director of Events at The Brookings Institution, 7-1-2022, accessed on 7-2-2022, “What does the Supreme Court’s EPA ruling mean for climate regulation?”, <https://www.brookings.edu/podcast-episode/what-does-the-supreme-courts-epa-ruling-mean-for-climate-regulation/>, HBisevac)

PITA: On environmental issues, as on others where **federal action** has been **stymied** by a lot of this **congressional dysfunction** or inaction, the states have sometimes stepped in, and in some cases, as with the vehicle emission standards that you mentioned, sometimes, a large enough or influential enough state or groups of states can kind of set **national standards** for things, even though it’s not technically a national policy. Where is there any avenue for state action on these sorts of the power plant regulation issues?

### 2NC---Solvency---Commitment/Credibility

#### National Guard provides credible commitments AND partnerships.

Zach Sheely, 6-3 (Sgt. 1st Class Zach Sheely, National Guard Bureau, 6-3-2022, accessed on 7-1-2022, United States Army, “National Guard Leaders Emphasize Value of State Partnership Program”, <https://www.army.mil/article/257248/national_guard_leaders_emphasize_value_of_state_partnership_program>, HBisevac) \*\*edited for gendered language\*\*

“Stability makes the National Guard **uniquely suited** to conduct these partnership missions,” he said. “~~Guardsmen~~ [soldiers] typically remain in their states during their entire term of service, unlike our active-duty brethren who move every few years. This **constancy** creates **trust** through **long-term associations** that last **decades**.”

U.S. Airmen with the Indiana Air National Guard, and Slovak armed forces personnel participate in joint training Feb. 22, 2022, at the 122nd Fighter Wing, Fort Wayne, Indiana. The joint training was held to further build a robust State Partnership that Indiana and Slovakia have held for over 25 years. The State Partnership program demonstrates Indiana’s deep commitment to our **NATO allies**, as well as **European security** and **stability**.

Along with Ukraine, the National Guard is partnered with 23 European nations, including 14 NATO allies. Eifert said the conflict in Ukraine has reinforced the NATO coalition, with a focus on building and strengthening partnerships.

“I think one of the outcomes of the invasion of Ukraine is it has really rallied the NATO alliance and our allies and partners in ways we haven’t seen in a while,” he said.

Army Maj. Gen. Gregory Knight, Vermont’s adjutant general, said a key focus of the SPP has been **interoperability**, demonstrated by the Vermont National Guard providing F-35 combat aircraft support to the NATO Air Policing mission in Europe.

“Working with our NATO allies on aviation platforms, [it’s] an **incredibly detailed** level of **training**,” he said.

While the focus of the SPP has been military-to-military tactics exchanges, Knight said the Vermont National Guard is pursuing a whole of society approach to its partnerships with North Macedonia, Senegal, and one of the most recent additions to the SPP, Austria, respectively.

“Recently, I hosted the Austrian minister of defense in Vermont,” he said. “We met with the governor and held a business roundtable. There were a lot of discussions on renewable energy and things that had nothing to do with the military. But that’s really the foundational element that will start the partnership. And there’s just huge potential for it to grow from there.”

State Partnership Program engagements occur with countries worldwide, with National Guard elements paired with partner nations in every geographic combatant command. The Florida Guard is addressing ongoing security threats, “like human trafficking, illegal drugs and arms trade, and countering China’s growing global influence in our own hemisphere,” within the Caribbean, said Eifert.

This year alone, the National Guard has assisted U.S. Southern Command in accomplishing theater campaign objectives by conducting 30 engagements in eight countries, with another 12 scheduled this fiscal year. These exchanges include small-unit security, maritime search and rescue, noncommissioned officer leadership development, public affairs, small-unit patrolling, **logistics** and **sustainment**, and **cyber protection**.

One of the elements that sets U.S. military forces apart from potential peer and near-peer adversaries is the development and application of the noncommissioned officer corps — a requirement of NATO membership and a component of many state partnership activities, said Air Force Maj. Gen. Daryl Bohac, adjutant general for the Nebraska National Guard.

The Nebraska Guard has worked closely with the Texas National Guard to develop an NCO corps in shared partner Czech Republic’s armed forces. “They are a full NATO member and actively participating in the support of Ukrainian armed forces in their counter efforts against the evasion of threats,” Bohac said.

While close ties in Europe have been reaffirmed by recent events, Eifert said the **sky** is the **limit** for the State Partnership Program to expand and evolve.

“The ***bang for the buck*** that you get out of this program to grow, it seems like a no brainer to me, especially given the impact it has directly on our National Defense Strategy,” he said.

#### States are viewed as representatives of the federal government

Robinson 7 – JD @ Yale (Nick, “Citizens Not Subjects: U.S. Foreign Relations Law and the Decentralization of Foreign Policy,” *Akron Law Review*, Lexis)//BB

State and local governments are arguably seen as representing the U.S. government abroad in a more official capacity than U.S. non-state actors. The governments of these localities are democratically elected and so it is more likely that they will be seen as acting on behalf of the American people. Additionally, the federal government generally has a greater ability to control the actions of these localities than non-state actors. Therefore, there is a greater chance that nonintervention by the federal government to stop offensive activity will be seen as federal endorsement of such activity. Such logic though should caution against court intervention in these cases rather than encourage it. If localities' actions damage U.S. foreign policy interests, the federal government can easily preempt the state or local policies in question. Further, with the world's increased interconnectedness, it is more likely that if a foreign government takes offense to a locality's policy it can discriminate between the policy of the locality and the policy of the federal government. n155

### 2NC---Solvency---Cyber

#### They have the experience.

Zach Sheely, 6-3 (Sgt. 1st Class Zach Sheely, National Guard Bureau, 6-3-2022, accessed on 7-1-2022, United States Army, “National Guard Leaders Emphasize Value of State Partnership Program”, <https://www.army.mil/article/257248/national_guard_leaders_emphasize_value_of_state_partnership_program>, HBisevac)

This year alone, the National Guard has assisted U.S. Southern Command in accomplishing theater campaign objectives by conducting 30 engagements in eight countries, with another 12 scheduled this fiscal year. These exchanges include small-unit security, maritime search and rescue, noncommissioned officer leadership development, public affairs, small-unit patrolling, **logistics** and **sustainment**, and **cyber protection**.

#### Past exercises prove.

Jeffrey Caton, 19 (Jeffrey Caton is president of Kepler Strategies LLC and an intermittent professor of program management with Defense Acquisition University and an associate professor of cyberspace operations and defense transformation chair, 1-31-2019, accessed on 7-1-2022, United States Army War College Press, “Examining the Roles of Army Reserve Component Forces in Military Cyberspace Operations”, <https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/384/>, HBisevac) ARNG = Army National Guard

With the increased concern for Russian military cyberspace activity, the SPP programs with the Baltic nations have **grown** in prominence. Baltic Ghost started as a series of **cyber defense workshops** facilitated by U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) to build and sustain cyber partnerships amongst Estonia and the Maryland ARNG, Latvia and the Michigan ARNG, and Lithuania and the Pennsylvania ARNG.139 Baltic Ghost transitioned to become a training exercise in September 2015―held simultaneously in the capitals of Tallinn (Estonia), Riga (Latvia), and Vilnius (Lithuania)―and focused on the coordination of responses to **cyberattacks** on **critical infrastructure**.140 The exercise was most recently hosted by USEUCOM in June 2017, with participation by the ARNG state partners and assistance by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. Baltic Ghost 2017 pursued an objective “to test cooperation between the three Baltic States and the United States in the event of an escalating cyber incident, the solution of which requires internationally coordinated joint action.”141 In August 2017, the Maryland ARNG also supported Estonia in the **Baltic Jungle** **cyber exercise**, which included opportunities to exchange experiences in the areas of **cyber range development**, **education**, and **research**.142 In September 2017, members of the Ohio and Serbian armed forces worked together in the second annual Cyber Tesla exercise, which examined cyber incident preparation and responses processes.143

The ARNG also supports the **education** and **training** of partner nations at U.S. facilities. In July 2015, the ARNG PEC welcomed the first group on international military students for a 6-week integrated information technology training course. Four students from Bulgaria, Poland, and the Slovak Republic attended, with two Illinois ~~Guardsmen~~ [soldiers] training in the same class with their Polish state partner.144

### 2NC---Solvency---Interoperability/Integration

#### SPP programs enhance interoperability AND allied integration.

Tracey Poirier, 17 (Lieutenant Colonel Tracey Poirier, Vermont Army National Guard, 1-4-2017, accessed on 7-1-2022, United States Army War College Strategy Research Project, “Increasing Interoperability and Preparedness through the State Partnership Program”, <https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3481.pdf>, HBisevac)

The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) has continually received **rave reviews** from Combatant Commanders. Major General Frederick S. Rudesheim, US Army South Commander, called the program “almost incalculable.”3 Admiral James Winnefeld, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called it “one of the best foreign policy bargains our nation has.”4 Perhaps the most ringing endorsement comes from Admiral James Stavridis, Former US European Command Commander, when he stated the SPP is, “a **very powerful tool**. It is unmatched. They are, bang for the buck, one of the best things going. Anything that enhances state partnership is money in the bank for the regional combatant commanders.” 5 In fact, it is **difficult** to find a **criticism** of the program from **anyone** who has experienced it on the ground. Given such reviews, why would the US government not expand its model to include more interactions that would improve interoperability with partner nations?

The SPP model uses the power of American ideas and perpetuates them through personal relationships. Additionally, it can give the US the opportunity to **improve infrastructure** in various regions around the globe advancing our **logistical readiness**. However, the effectiveness of ideas and relationships are difficult to measure and too often, we choose not to. The Partnership Program is no exception. The program’s annual report shows measures of performance only and does not assess its effectiveness.

This paper will explore the power of sustained relationships and idea sharing in relation to the National Guard State Partnership Program. It will make a case for logistical preparation of the battlefield through the program for both infrastructure improvement and economic development. Furthermore, it will address the ineffectiveness of the current means of program assessment and provide recommendations for improvement.

The Power of Ideas, Relationships, and Being Prepared

Only history will tell if the success of the US is one that will last, but there is little doubt that the power it holds in the current international world order is unmatched. Whether we are watched in covetousness, fear, awe, or disdain--we are watched. American power likely lies in a combination of realms that include economic, political and military components, but we should not discount the power of American ideas. The idea that liberty could act as a cornerstone for responsible government was one of America’s first and greatest ideas. While there is much debate on whether democracy is a right fit for all nations, liberty in the form of self-determination is viewed as necessary for the liberal world order. President George Bush stated in his second inaugural address, “the survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our land is the expansion of freedom in all the world.”6 However, liberty is not the only American idea that resonates around the globe. Capitalism, free trade, and civic responsibility are all ideas that have found purchase in even the most unlikely global forums.

Ideas are not necessarily epiphenomenal, however. Ideas, often thought of as dependent variables, can also be independent in that the idea itself will play a role in the way people shape their environment.7 It is this concept that explains why decisions and changes that the United States makes are felt around the globe. Our ideas take on a cultural power of their own and become a useful tool in advancing the international world order. Given the power of our ideas, the US needs to spend conscious effort in sharing the good ones. The culture of ideas often spreads on its own; however, adding the power of a mutually beneficial relationship can increase the results.

The power of relational transactions is readily understood by most; however, Americans tend to apply the concept within their own cultural paradigms. This can be a dangerous practice, especially now that the US unipolar moment is at an end.8 Although the idea of unipolarity was generally accepted after the fall of the Soviet Union, perhaps the US was never truly in a unipolar moment. The US has always relied on allies and partners to attain its goals when acting on foreign soil. Essentially, the US cannot accomplish power projection on land in the current liberal world order without assistance from partners. That assistance may take the form of merely granting access, but in most cases provides local industry and services and, in the best cases, labor and resources. These partnerships take time and effort to be effective and do not come without challenges such as that of alignment of interests and degree of commitment.9 Strong relationships with these potential partners will naturally **reduce** the friction of **coalition creation**.

Relationships with some level of **permanence**, nurtured over time, have a **far greater likelihood** of producing goal alignment and commitment that can overcome **integration** and **interoperability issues**. However, the way in which the US government manages foreign diplomatic relationships on various levels such as US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Foreign Service is very similar to the active military service in that individuals move from position to position throughout their career within an area of expertise. Both organizations’ personnel systems are not organized in such a way to encourage long-term relationships. While the relationship between a given country and the US may be enduring, the relationships with individuals in the foreign diplomacy realm tend to be fleeting. Short-term assignments can be **detrimental** to relationship building and keep the US from realizing a full level of **logistical preparation** in these partner regions. In much the same way as the spread of ideas and building of long-term relationships helps to integrate with partners on a cognitive level, building partner capacity in a physical sense through **logistical preparation** and **infrastructure improvement** can ensure **interoperability**. Having interoperability is important if we should find ourselves in a conflict or humanitarian assistance role in areas without a significant US or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) presence.

Michael Desch writes that military effectiveness is a “**preponderance** in the **material power assets** available to the state.”10 This availability includes both the equipment and supplies that a country brings to the fight and the supplies and access they are able to acquire in the regions where they are involved. The ability to set the theater **prior** to a conflict is paramount to the success of any long-term engagement. The Marine Expeditionary Unit is often the first unit to arrive in a theater in a crisis. It can sustain itself for only 15 days before it needs resupply.11 Even when entire divisions enter a theater with full sustainment packages, all the supplies must travel along the local lines of communication and often rely on local labor at debarkation sights. Longterm sustainment of forces in theater requires compatible infrastructure and local contracts to be effective and efficient. The State Partnership Program is **ideally suited** to creating the relationships needed in countries throughout the world that increase our **preparedness** for conflict wherever it may arise.

### 2NC---Solvency---Logistics

#### They have the experience.

Zach Sheely, 6-3 (Sgt. 1st Class Zach Sheely, National Guard Bureau, 6-3-2022, accessed on 7-1-2022, United States Army, “National Guard Leaders Emphasize Value of State Partnership Program”, <https://www.army.mil/article/257248/national_guard_leaders_emphasize_value_of_state_partnership_program>, HBisevac)

This year alone, the National Guard has assisted U.S. Southern Command in accomplishing theater campaign objectives by conducting 30 engagements in eight countries, with another 12 scheduled this fiscal year. These exchanges include small-unit security, maritime search and rescue, noncommissioned officer leadership development, public affairs, small-unit patrolling, **logistics** and **sustainment**, and **cyber protection**.

#### They’re key to logistical preparedness.

Tracey Poirier, 17 (Lieutenant Colonel Tracey Poirier, Vermont Army National Guard, 1-4-2017, accessed on 7-1-2022, United States Army War College Strategy Research Project, “Increasing Interoperability and Preparedness through the State Partnership Program”, <https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3481.pdf>, HBisevac)

The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) has continually received **rave reviews** from Combatant Commanders. Major General Frederick S. Rudesheim, US Army South Commander, called the program “almost incalculable.”3 Admiral James Winnefeld, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called it “one of the best foreign policy bargains our nation has.”4 Perhaps the most ringing endorsement comes from Admiral James Stavridis, Former US European Command Commander, when he stated the SPP is, “a **very powerful tool**. It is unmatched. They are, bang for the buck, one of the best things going. Anything that enhances state partnership is money in the bank for the regional combatant commanders.” 5 In fact, it is **difficult** to find a **criticism** of the program from **anyone** who has experienced it on the ground. Given such reviews, why would the US government not expand its model to include more interactions that would improve interoperability with partner nations?

The SPP model uses the power of American ideas and perpetuates them through personal relationships. Additionally, it can give the US the opportunity to **improve infrastructure** in various regions around the globe advancing our **logistical readiness**. However, the effectiveness of ideas and relationships are difficult to measure and too often, we choose not to. The Partnership Program is no exception. The program’s annual report shows measures of performance only and does not assess its effectiveness.

This paper will explore the power of sustained relationships and idea sharing in relation to the National Guard State Partnership Program. It will make a case for **logistical preparation** of the battlefield through the program for both **infrastructure improvement** and economic development. Furthermore, it will address the ineffectiveness of the current means of program assessment and provide recommendations for improvement.

### 2NC---Solvency---PNs Say Yes

#### Partner nations say yes

CALL 18 (The Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Security Cooperation and the State Partnership Program,” https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/19-01%20State%20Partnership%20Program%20%28Lo%20Res%29.pdf)//BB

Another aspect of the SPP that distinguishes it from similar engagements by active component forces stems from the National Guard’s dual status as both a state and a federal organization. In its federal status, the National Guard is a reserve component of the Army and the Air Force and is trained, organized, and equipped to conduct a wide spectrum of military activities. However, the National Guard is also the organized militia of each state, and, in that capacity, routinely operates under the control of its state governor, typically to respond to disasters and civil disorders. National Guard personnel in a “Title 32 status” have also conducted counterdrug, border security, and airport security missions. The practical expertise the National Guard has acquired in these areas may be complemented by the skills that National Guard personnel develop in their civilian occupations. For example, a National Guard Soldier may serve as an infantryman in his Guard unit, but may be a state trooper, paramedic, or emergency dispatcher in his civilian job. The expertise that National Guard units have acquired in conducting these types of operations are often in demand among foreign militaries, which frequently play a major role in their nation’s disaster response plans, and may play significant roles in their nation’s border security, civil disorder, or counterdrug operations. Although active component forces have significant expertise in these areas, as evidenced, for example, by the role active component personnel played in responding to the earthquake in Haiti and the floods in Pakistan in 2010, it is typically not exercised with the frequency of National Guard forces and, in certain cases, is intentionally limited by law.

### 2NC---Solvency---Readiness/Cyber

#### Solves readiness.

Whitney Hughes, 6-1 (Sgt. 1st Class Whitney Hughes, National Guard Bureau, 6-2-2022, accessed on 7-1-2022, Air National Guard, “**National Guard strengthens NATO readiness in Europe**”, <https://www.ang.af.mil/Media/Article-Display/Article/3050338/national-guard-strengthens-nato-readiness-in-europe/>, HBisevac)

ARLINGTON, Va. – More than 20,000 service members from over 20 countries supporting NATO, including the National Guard, showcased their integrated military capabilities during large-scale exercises throughout Europe in April and May.

The world’s largest peacetime military alliance conducted activities ranging from **cyber warfare** to **airborne operations** across Baltic and Balkan regions, bordering the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

The exercises are designed to ensure the United States, NATO and partner nations “are prepared to defend every inch of NATO territory with a strong, combat-credible force to ensure we stay stronger together in the face of any aggression,” said Gen. Christopher Cavoli, U.S. Army Europe and Africa commanding general.

Guard members traveled to Europe from Connecticut, Colorado, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont and West Virginia to support exercises Locked Shields, Swift Response and DEFENDER-Europe 2022.

So far this year, more than 4,000 Guard members supported these and other exercises in Europe.

“The National Guard has been a **major contributor** to U.S. European Command exercises this year,” said U.S. Air Force Maj. Gen. Jessica Meyeraan, director of USEUCOM exercises and assessments. “When these forces train alongside allies and partners, it’s mutually beneficial. Not only does it improve **interoperability** and **capability** within the alliance, the National Guard units receive immeasurable benefit from these training engagements.”

In April, West Virginia and North Carolina National Guard members joined exercise Locked Shields 22, one of the world’s largest international cyber defense exercises with more than 2,000 participants from 24 nations. The annual exercise was run virtually by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia, April 19-21.

Participants formed cyber rapid reaction teams and deployed to assist a fictional country in handling a large-scale cyber incident.

“I think Locked Shields showcased the **unique capabilities** the National Guard is able to bring to the **cyber battlefront**,” said U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Ian Frist, an exercise participant with the West Virginia Guard’s 197th Regiment (Regional Training Institute). “Living in both worlds gives me an incredibly unique perspective on **cybersecurity operations** that I felt was indispensable during the exercise.”

In addition to participating in exercises remotely from the United States, Guard members traveled to Europe to participate in exercises like Swift Response 22, which focused on airborne and air assault operations. The annual U.S. Army Europe and Africa Command multinational training exercise included forces from 17 countries from May 2-20 in Norway, Latvia, Lithuania and North Macedonia.

In North Macedonia, Vermont National Guard members built on their partnership with their NATO counterparts.

The two militaries are uniquely familiar with each other, having trained together since 1993 as part of the Department of Defense National Guard Bureau State Partnership Program. The program pairs each state’s National Guard with the armed forces of partner countries in a cooperative, mutually beneficial relationship. The SPP has 87 partnerships with 95 countries – 45% of the world’s nations. Twenty-two of those partnerships are in Europe, 13 with NATO members.

“Now that North Macedonia is a part of NATO, it opens the door for them to participate in more training exercises with the U.S. and its NATO partners,” said U.S. Army Col. Justin Davis, Vermont National Guard director of plans and operations. “As our state partner, it only increases our relationship-building between the Vermont National Guard and North Macedonia.”

Before participating in Swift Response, the Vermont National Guard had already conducted more than 350 military-to-military engagements with North Macedonia. Most of the 120 Vermont Army National Guard members who traveled to North Macedonia were members of Company A, 3rd Battalion, 172nd Infantry (Mountain), 86th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Mountain). Many of these Soldiers were recently deployed in desert terrain to support U.S. Central Command.

“For most of our Soldiers it will be the first time they have trained in Europe,” said U.S. Army Capt. Aaron Harkness, assistant plans officer with the battalion. “The environment, terrain, and training mission are different from what we have been focusing on over the last two years. It will be great for us to get back to training in a mountainous environment where we can utilize the terrain to our advantage.”

In addition to training on the ground, another 120 National Guard members from Maryland Air National Guard’s 175th Wing supported the exercise from the sky with 10 A-10 Thunderbolt II aircraft.

“While operating in North Macedonia posed unique challenges, they were quickly overcome by world-class host nation support, and the solely unique capabilities of the A-10 were brought to the fight with 100% success,” said U.S. Air Force Maj. Chris Hoffman, a pilot with the wing and the project officer for the North Macedonian portion of the exercise. “The team-building across multiple military branches and NATO partners was unparalleled.”

Simultaneously to the 9,000 multinational personnel conducting Swift Response, more than 8,000 more were taking part in DEFENDER-Europe 22, which continues through the end of June. More than 1,300 Guard members made up roughly one-third of the U.S.-based personnel who traveled to Europe to participate in the exercise.

DEFENDER-Europe 22 spans nine countries: Denmark, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia and Estonia. The annual U.S. Army-led multinational joint exercise builds readiness and interoperability between 11 U.S., NATO and partner militaries.

“When we started the exercise, I asked you all to become a strong team because that’s what this alliance is all about,” said Slovakian Lt. Gen. Pavel Macko, the deputy chief of the general staff of the armed forces of the Slovak Republic. “I’ve seen a strong team, many different uniforms, heard different accents, but I can tell you we speak the same language of values, we speak the same the language of tactics.”

These annual large-scale exercises are not new or unfamiliar to the National Guard, U.S. military, or their NATO allies. Exercises in Europe are planned and conducted year-round to maintain the readiness of strategic partnerships while sustaining normal operations in the rest of Europe.

The Guard will continue to be a significant presence in the ranks of the 64,000 U.S. military personnel supporting U.S. European Command exercises.

“The propensity to utilize National Guard units during U.S. European Command exercises and operations is a testament to the **unique capability** and expertise these service members bring to the theater,” said Meyeraan. “As we continue to train alongside our allies and partners, the National Guard will continue to have a significant role in those activities.”

### 2NC---Solvency---Spillover

#### SPP actions spill over.

Peter Howard, 4 (Peter Howard is the economics director at Policy Integrity, and a former economic fellow, May 2004, accessed on 7-2-2022, International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 5, No. 2, “The Growing Role of States in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the State Partnership Program”, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44218880?seq=1>, HBisevac)

With its focus on decision making in Washington, foreign policy analysis has overlooked the important role **state governments** are now playing in U.S. **foreign policy**. Under the U.S. federal system, states have a significant policy role, but one largely limited to domestic and economic matters. Foreign and defense policy are assumed to remain the responsibility of the federal government. Yet, states are getting more and more involved in these matters, and their impact is growing. Aside from the now routine gubernatorial international trade mission, state governments have adopted outspoken positions on issues such as the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, human rights abuses in Nigeria and Burma, use of Holocaust-era bank accounts, and war with Iraq. State national guards have come to play an essential role in recent overseas military campaigns and homeland security operations. This growth of international activity by states remains underappreciated due to existing approaches to foreign policy analysis.

This article argues that states can and do play an important role in contemporary U.S. foreign policy. From both a federalism and decision-making perspective, states have a limited international role and minimal influence in shaping the policies of the U.S. federal government toward other nations. As a result, state involvement in international affairs is most often seen as economic activity. An implementation perspective, however, reveals a growing role for states in carrying out U.S. foreign policy, including the "high politics” of national security issues. This article will discuss the value of studying foreign policy implementation and the **growing role** of states through an investigation of the State Partnership Program (**SPP**). The SPP links **State National Guard units** to the **militaries** of **other countries** through U.S. military engagement programs. The state-level National Guard then becomes the **primary site** for implementing U.S. military engagement programs. An implementation perspective reveals that this program provides a growing role for states in shaping U.S. foreign policy.

### 2NC---Solvency---AT: Security Coop Key

#### The CP achieves the same objectives as security cooperation.

James N. Williams, 12 (Lieutenant Colonel James N. Williams, Army National Guard, March 2012, accessed on 6-30-2022, United States Army War Project Strategy Research Project, “The National Guard State Partnership Program: Element of Smart Power”, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA562110.pdf>, HBisevac)

The mission of the State Partnership program is to “enhance combatant commander’s ability to establish **enduring** **civil-military relationships** that improve **longterm international security** while building **partnership capacity** across all levels of society.” 17 Essentially, the program pairs the militaries of partner nations with the National Guard of a particular U.S. state. The original intent of the program was to develop relationships and to assist in reforming the defense establishments of the former Soviet states, primarily through military-to-military engagements which also provide valuable training for the National Guard.18

The first partnerships were established in 1993, pairing New York with Estonia, Michigan with Latvia, and Pennsylvania with Lithuania. Today the program involves 63 partnerships with 70 countries throughout all six Geographical Combatant Commands, with more countries requesting participation. Virtually all of the fifty-four U.S. states and territories are involved in the program, with some states having more than one partner nation.

The program directly **supports Security Cooperation** activities designed to develop relationships that promote specific U.S. **security interests**; develop **allied** and friendly **capabilities** for **self-defense** and **multi-national operations**; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and **contingency access** abroad.19 In terms of the Global War on Terror, there should be little doubt that the United States received valuable assistance at a critical time as a result of the State Partnership Program. Some partner nations provided troops for direct employment, and in a number of instances they deployed alongside their National Guard counterparts. Others filled peacekeeping missions to relieve coalition partners for duty in Afghanistan and Iraq, or provided critical basing and logistical support, as well as intelligence sharing. In terms of the Global War on terror, clearly, the State Partnership Programs meets the **military objectives** of **security cooperation**.

Yet while the original focus was on military-to-military training exchanges, over the years the program has taken on more of a “whole of government” approach based on the needs and desires of the host nations. Some of the other activities are military-to civilian events, termed “inter-agency activities”, primarily involving training in military support to civil authorities, including training in law enforcement and response to manmade and natural disasters, “but can include other areas of cooperation and capacity building.” 20

While the SPP is a DoD program, it is managed in concert with the State Department and all activities abroad are conducted with the approval or concurrence of the various Ambassadors or Chief’s of Mission as well as the Geographic Combatant Commands. In this way, activities are coordinated so that unity of effort is assured relative to the corresponding Theater and Country Campaign Plans and the Mission Strategic Plans of the State Department. Through this coordinated effort, the SPP supports the goals of the various departments and agencies’ nested strategies in support of National Security Objectives.

Additionally, there are also some concurrent non-military engagements involving civilian-to-civilian activities. Typically these involve “education, medical, legal, business and professional exchanges.” These events are often facilitated, or arranged, through the SPP but funded through other means such as “the state, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or private resources, or by another federal agency.” However, these activities are coordinated through and endorsed by the U.S. Ambassador (to the host nation) and briefed to the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC).21 According to the National Guard Bureau, “the typical SPP event is a week-long subject matter expert exchange, with three to five National Guard subject matter experts participating, with an average cost of approximately $20,000.” 22

The State Partnership Program has **morphed itself** over nearly two decades from a tool for developing military professionalism and capacity to **something more** attuned to the President’s vision outlined in the 2010 National Security Strategy. Through natural progression, and the needs of the partner states, the program today also functions as a bridge between the diplomatic efforts of federal and state governments and quasigovernment and non-governmental agencies. In short, the SPP has been facilitating a “**whole of society**” approach to engagement as envisioned by the President and others for many years. It could be said that the SPP has, perhaps inadvertently, identified a gap in our **previous diplomatic efforts**. And while SPP may not have the capacity to bridge that gap entirely, it is certainly a model for further expansion of citizen-diplomacy.

#### The counterplan accesses all of their solvency mechanisms.

Matthew Hughes, 21 (Captain Matthew Hughes, is a U.S. Army foreign area officer and holds a master of arts in intelligence studies from American Military University and holds a bachelor of science degree from the U.S. Military Academy, March 2021, accessed on 7-1-2022, US Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, “Fifth Wave Terrorism: Threats, Implications, and Risk Management for U.S. Forces”, <https://www.ikn.army.mil/apps/MIPBW/MIPB_Features/Hughes.pdf>, HBisevac)

Expand the National Guard’s State Partnership Program in sub-Saharan Africa. The State Partnership Program involves partnerships between individual (U.S.) states and foreign nations through which states’ National Guard units conduct **formal engagements** and **training** with partner nations’ armed forces, law enforcement, emergency response personnel, and other organizations. The State Partnership Program contains only 13 partnerships among the 46 sub-Saharan countries in Africa, a region likely containing hotspots for fifth wave threats associated with New Tribalism and Jihadist groups.20 New partnerships with fragile states demonstrating institutional capacity can strengthen **security cooperation efforts** by establishing **long-term relationships** fostering **professionalization** of armed forces, **partner capacity**, and **interoperability**. Furthermore, upper echelons of National Guard units can enhance defense institution building at the operational defense sector level by providing partner nation counterparts with assistance and expertise in **readiness**, **c**ommand **and** **c**ontrol, **logistics**, and **operational planning**.21

#### It is security cooperation

CALL 18 (The Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Security Cooperation and the State Partnership Program,” https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/19-01%20State%20Partnership%20Program%20%28Lo%20Res%29.pdf)//BB

The SPP’s success centers on the National Guard’s ability to provide trained and professional Soldiers and Airmen who bring civilian and disaster/ emergency response skillsets to their engagement with partner nations. These capabilities, along with the authority to engage with security and disaster/emergency response organizations in addition to the partner nation’s military, provide a uniquely useful security cooperation tool for the geographic combatant commanders. As the SPP grows, it has become increasingly integrated in combatant commanders’ theater security cooperation strategies, as well as U.S. ambassadors’ integrated country plans. Multiple current and former combatant commanders and U.S. ambassadors have testified to the benefits of the program, as well as the access, influence, and insight it provides. The future vision of U.S. security cooperation that integrates multi-agency and multinational entities in a whole-of-society approach, where the American military engages partners and allies through civic, economic, and societal frameworks to help them participate in bolstering global security, lies within the SPP. The National Guard remains committed to providing effective, relevant security cooperation through the enduring relationships created by the SPP. The lessons learned captured by CALL are an essential step in that journey.

### 2NC---Solvency---AT: U.S Key

#### CP solves. It’s security cooperation that effectively solves any “US Key” argument

Anderson 19, former Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (James, “Shifting the Burden Responsibly: Oversight and Accountability in U.S. Security Sector Assistance,” *CSIS*, https://www.csis.org/analysis/shifting-burden-responsibly-oversight-and-accountability-us-security-sector-assistance-0)//BB

The state partnership program has also proved a cost-effective, small-footprint tool for supporting security cooperation goals of the geographic combatant commands and our diplomatic community. Over the last 24 years, we have established 73 partnerships with 79 countries across all six geographic commands. These partnerships have brought diplomatic and military engagement via the national guard elements resulting in individual, professional, and institutional contacts and relationships, enhancing influence and trust on a worldwide basis.

## AFF

### 2AC---Theory

#### Reject 50-state fiat on NATO topic-

#### 1---Topic education –

#### A. Distracts from “security cooperation” key debates.

#### B. We already had two domestic policy topics in a row, no new education.

#### 2---Fairness – no comparative solvency evidence, aff literature doesn’t assume uniform state foreign policy.

#### 3---Illogical. No judge controls both FG and states. AND, their interp allows any-non FG actor, which leads to object and abuse international fiat

### 2AC---Solvency---Oversight

#### SPP fails---confusion and lack of oversight render the program ineffective.

GAO, 12 (United States Government Accountability Office, May 2012, accessed on 7-3-2022, “Improved Oversight, Guidance, and Training Needed for National Guard’s Efforts with Foreign Partners”, <https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-12-548-highlights.pdf>, HBisevac)

Many **S**tate **P**artnership **P**rogram stakeholders, including State Partnership Program Coordinators, Bilateral Affairs Officers, and combatant command officials, cited benefits to the program, but the program lacks a **comprehensive oversight framework** that includes clear program **goals**, **objectives**, and metrics to measure **progress** against those goals, which limits the Department of Defense’s (DOD) and Congress’ ability to assess whether the program is an effective and efficient use of resources. The benefits described by all stakeholders focused on the program’s contributions to meeting their specific missions, such as building security relationships, providing experience to guardsmen, and supporting combatant commands’ missions. Goals, objectives, and metrics to measure progress are necessary for management oversight, and National Guard Bureau officials told GAO that they recognize the need to **update** the program’s goals and develop metrics and have initiated efforts in these areas. Officials expect completion of these efforts in summer 2012. Until program goals and metrics are implemented, DOD cannot **fully assess** or **adequately oversee** the program.

State Partnership Program **activity data** are **incomplete** as well as inconsistent and **funding data** are **incomplete** for fiscal years 2007 through 2011; therefore GAO cannot provide complete information on the types and frequency of activities or total funding amounts for those years. GAO found that the multiple data systems used to track program activities and funding are **not interoperable** and users apply varying methods and definitions to guide data inputs. The terminology used to identify activity types is **inconsistent** across the combatant commands and the National Guard Bureau. Further, funding data from the National Guard Bureau and the combatant commands were incomplete, and while the National Guard Bureau provided its total spending on the program since 2007, it could not provide information on the cost of individual activities. Although the National Guard Bureau has initiated efforts to improve the accuracy of its own State Partnership Program data, without common agreement with the combatant commands on what types of data need to be tracked and how to define activities, the data cannot be easily reconciled across databases.

The most **prominent challenge** cited by State Partnership Program stakeholders involved how to fund activities that include U.S. and **foreign partner** **civilian participants**. Activities involving civilians, for example, have included subjectmatter expert exchanges on military support to civil authorities and maritime border security. Although DOD guidance does not prohibit civilian involvement in activities, many stakeholders have the **impression** that the U.S. military is **not permitted** to engage civilians in State Partnership Program activities and some states may have chosen not to conduct any events with civilians due to the perception that it may **violate DOD guidance**. DOD and the National Guard Bureau are working on developing additional guidance and training in this area. Until these efforts are completed, **confusion** may **continue to exist** and **hinder** the program’s **full potential** to fulfill National Guard and combatant command missions.

### 2AC---Solvency---Fails

#### SPP fails

Dickerson 13, Lieutenant Colonel @ US National Guard (Jeffrey, “Shifting State Partnership Program Resources to the Asia-Pacific Region,” *US Army War College*, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA589403.pdf)//BB

Some critics come from Congress, who raised concerns over SPP’s effectiveness, conformity to federal law, nesting with TSCPs, and encroachment upon or conflicts with DoS and USAID interests, responsibilities, and programs.48 In a 2011 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, congressional researchers noted that the program suffers from written assessments “limited in scope” and focused on “outputs… rather than outcomes”49 The report also noted that “the SPP has no dedicated statute authority”50 of its own and uses several different statues within United States Code (U.S.C.) to authorize SPP activities. These statues range from Title 10 U.S.C. (Armed Forces), to Title 32 U.S.C. (National Guard), to Title 22 U.S.C. (Foreign Relations and Intercourse).51 The 2011 CRS report provided several options for Congress to consider: (1) consider a Directive Type Memorandum regarding SPP funding, (2) direct periodic evaluations, (3) require centralized approval of SPP activities, and (4) codify the SPP in law. 52 Still, the report acknowledged SPP’s ability to build enduring relationships; capitalize upon unique civilian skill sets of National Guard Soldiers and Airmen and the dual state and federal status of the National Guard; remain engaged with high and low priority nations; and develop unique relationships between states and foreign countries.53 Despite the issues outlined in the CRS’s report, a 15 subsequent U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report characterized the SPP as “a force enabler for the combatant commands”. 54 In May 2012, the GAO conducted an investigation into SPP and found several problems. They identified a lack of comprehensive oversight that clearly defined and outlined the program’s goals, objectives, and measures of performance. There was insufficient data available for an assessment, to include management of funding from 2007-2011, multiple data management systems, inconsistent program terminology between the GCCs and National Guard Bureau (NGB), and challenges with funding civilian participation in the program.55 The GAO, therefore, found that neither Congress nor the DoD can quantitatively assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the program.56 Thus, the GAO made the following recommendations to the DoD in May 2012: develop an oversight process to measure program effectiveness and standardize data management; develop specific guidance for funding civilian participation in the program; and develop additional training for SPP Coordinators and Bi-Lateral Affairs Officers.57 In an effort to address the Congressional concerns, NGB began implementing a more formal process for assessing the program’s goals, and tracking program funding in accordance with the recommendations in the GAO’s report. NGB has also initiated a more comprehensive and formal training process for Bi-Lateral Affairs Officers and SPP Coordinators, 58 but the ability to quantitatively assess the program has yet to be Reached.

### 2AC---NB---DoD

#### Funds come from the same place.

Megan Lambert, 21 (Megan Lambert, Captain, United States Air Force BA from Colorado State University and MLS from University of Denver, March 2021, accessed on 7-1-2022, Calhoun, The Naval Post Graduate School Institutional Archive, “THE NATIONAL GUARD STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM: IMPROVING SECURITY COOPERATION IN COUNTERTERRORISM AND HUMANITARIAN CRISIS RESPONSE”, <https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/67147/21Mar_Lambert_Megan.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>, HBisevac) NGB = National Guard Bureau

Historically, the SPP has faced issues stemming from the way in which the program is funded and how funding interacts with program management and manning. This section will detail the intricacies of SPP funding and how it creates challenges in meeting national security cooperation objectives. The SPP is managed by the NGB, and the stable-state program management personnel are sourced from the NG. However, engagements with Partner Nations are funded through COCOM Operations and Maintenance (OM) funds. Significantly, the NG personnel must be on active duty (Title 10) orders when they participate in engagements overseas. Thus, a problem in funding is created when moving personnel from Title 32 to Title 10 status, as the care and feeding of these personnel is not captured within OM funds, nor is it accounted for in authorizations under traditional NGB funding streams. Furthermore, engagements are designed to meet specific objectives, which are associated with different authorities. Therefore, any “activity that relies on multiple security cooperation authorities must comply with all legal and policy requirements for each authority relied on, and use the appropriate funding for each authority.”55 The intricacies of complex engagements spanning multiple objectives complicate planning and manning the activities appropriately in order to utilize the best personnel available to optimize each engagement.

#### Links to tradeoff---requires DoD personnel who are working on other SC activities

CALL 18 (The Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Security Cooperation and the State Partnership Program,” https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/19-01%20State%20Partnership%20Program%20%28Lo%20Res%29.pdf)//BB

Much of the management of State Partnership Program (SPP) activities is handled by SPP coordinators assigned to each state’s National Guard headquarters, and by military officers assigned full-time to the U.S. Embassy accredited to the partner nation ‒ normally from the state National Guard involved in the partnership ‒ whose duty description includes coordinating SPP and often other Department of Defense (DOD) security cooperation activities. The combatant commands (CCMDs) manage the latter group, providing for their pay and performance evaluations. These officers serve in a Title 10 status, typically hold the rank of captain through lieutenant colonel, but have different titles and tours of duty depending on the CCMD to which they are assigned. For example, officers serving in embassies within the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) are known as bilateral affairs officers (BAOs) and serve two-year tours, which can be extended. Those in the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) AOR are known as traditional combatant commander’s activities (TCAs) coordinators and are usually on six-month temporary duty assignments, which can be extended. In nations without a BAO, TCA, or similar officer, the state’s SPP coordinator travels to the partner nation to coordinate SPP activities. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) would prefer to have a BAO, TCA, or similar officer stationed at the U.S. Embassy for each of the 73 partnerships, and it is currently working on a plan to fund this.

### 2AC---NB---PTX

#### Links to politics. Requires Congressional funding.

Dickerson 13, Lieutenant Colonel @ US National Guard (Jeffrey, “Shifting State Partnership Program Resources to the Asia-Pacific Region,” US Army War College, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA589403.pdf)//BB

The primary deterrent to SPP expansion within the Asia-Pacific region, as well as within other geographic regions, is lack of adequate funding. NGB currently receives a congressional funding allocation of $13,000,000 total for all 65 state partnerships.73 This essentially equates to $200,000 per partnership annually. Additionally, each new partnership costs approximately $830,000 initially.74 Based upon an expectation that congressional funding will remain at the current level for the next ten years, NGB currently forecasts expansion of the program at the rate of two countries per year over the course of the next ten years.75 Regrettably, this forecasted growth rate does not immediately take full advantage of the maximum partnering capacity of the National Guard. NGB estimates full partnering capacity of all 54 states and territories to be 85 partnerships.76 At the forecasted growth rate of two partnerships per year, it will take a full decade for the U.S. to maximize the full potential of the SPP. In order to take full advantage of the states’ maximum partnering capacity, DoD should immediately expand the program by 20 additional partnerships. Congress would need to increase the funding for the SPP from its current allocation of $13,000,000 to $26,600,000 initially in order to fund the initial partnership start-up costs, followed by an increase in annual funding of $4,000,000 thereafter for a total yearly funding of $17,000,000 annually to maintain 85 state partnerships.

### 2AC---INB---Non-Unique

#### NU---SPP high now

CALL 18 (The Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Security Cooperation and the State Partnership Program,” https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/19-01%20State%20Partnership%20Program%20%28Lo%20Res%29.pdf)//BB

For more than 20 years, the National Guard has played an integral role in international security cooperation. Through the State Partnership Program (SPP) – which has grown from 13 partnerships with the newly independent nations of Eastern Europe in the early 1990s to 73 partnerships today across all six geographic combatant commands (CCMDs) – the National Guard has contributed to the accomplishment of the U.S. national security objectives by developing and sustaining enduring relationships around the world.

### 2AC---INB---Soft Power Defense

#### Soft-power is either resilient or everything else that Trump has done thumps.

**Brands 2018** - Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor at the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (Hal, "Not Even Trump Can Obliterate America's Soft Power," Jan 18, https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-01-18/not-even-trump-can-obliterate-america-s-soft-power)

Third, Trump has weakened American soft power through his own behavior. He is hardly the only president to say loathsome things, but he is unique in displaying his unattractive qualities so openly, so unembarrassedly, so repeatedly. The president’s use of racist and xenophobic appeals, his disdain for democratic norms, his generally crass style of rhetoric and action — all these characteristics have been dragging down global respect for America since the moment he took office. The outraged global reaction to the “shithole countries” incident was sadly familiar — it mimicked the criticism the president earned through his refusal to condemn white supremacists after the violence last summer in Charlottesville, Virginia, as well as several other episodes. There is no ambiguity about the effect this is having. As early as June 2017, America’s global favorability in the Pew poll of global attitudes and trends had dropped from 64 percent at the end of Barack Obama’s presidency to 49 percent under Trump. Large majorities of global respondents described the American president as “intolerant,” “arrogant” and “dangerous.” Even Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin — ambitious dictators of revisionist countries — had higher personal favorability ratings than Trump. As Trump’s own defense secretary, James Mattis, has remarked, the U.S. needs to “get the power of inspiration back.” That’s not going to happen as long as Trump is president. The real question is how long it will take American soft power to recover once he departs. The good news is that U.S. soft power has traditionally been quite resilient — it has survived globally unpopular presidents before. The reason for this, as the Harvard scholar Joseph Nye points out, is that over the long term U.S. soft power derives less from the image of any individual than from the broader attractiveness of America’s society, culture and political values. The bad news, however, is that Trump can nonetheless do damage that will not be so easy to repair. As Nicholas Burns and Ryan Crocker, two of America’s most distinguished diplomats, have noted, the brain drain affecting the State Department today will have a lasting effect on America’s ability to exert non-military power effectively, because the department is losing so many individuals with experience that takes years or even decades to develop. (The fact that applications for entry-level spots in the Foreign Service are also down will make replacing that expertise all the harder.) More problematic still, even if Trump does not succeed in making the U.S. a less tolerant, less democratic, less attractive society, he may affect global views of America even after he leaves office. Once Trump is gone, most governments and populations around the world will probably breathe a sigh of relief. But they won’t forget that Americans elected such an individual as its president, and they will surely wonder what that says about the judgment and the character of the nation that has long claimed to be the “last, best hope of mankind.” Most of the countries the U.S. has traditionally worked with will be eager for their relationships with the superpower to get back to normal. Yet they will have seen what the U.S. electoral system is capable of producing, and so it will be a long time before the world ever looks at America quite the same way again.

#### Soft power is irrelevant to leadership.

**Fedirka 2017** - Senior Analyst @ Geopolitical Futures (Allison, "Hard Power is Still King," Jul 20, https://geopoliticalfutures.com/hard-power-still-king/)

Soft Power Doesn’t Make Great Powers Nevertheless, many remain fixated on soft power. Just this week, a U.K.-based consultancy firm called Portland, in cooperation with the USC Center on Public Diplomacy, published a report ranking the world’s top 30 countries by soft power. The ranking is based on the composite score of soft power elements: culture, digital footprint, government, engagement, education and business/enterprise. The first thing that stands out is that European countries dominate the list, and these countries outrank others that are geopolitical heavyweights. Ireland outranks Russia, and Greece is above China. In fact, Russia, China and Turkey are all in the bottom six of this top-30 ranking. That two small European countries are considered more powerful than three much larger countries – countries that are major geopolitical centers of gravity – should automatically raise questions about the credibility of soft power. A second observation is that most of the countries at the top of the soft power ranking – France, the U.K., the U.S. and Germany – are also among the world leaders in hard power. The U.S. has regularly demonstrated that through hard power measures such as sanctions or military activity, it can coerce other countries to change their behavior. Germany is the economic powerhouse of the European Union and has threatened economic measures against smaller EU countries, especially Greece, to coerce them into supporting EU regulations. France’s cultural influence – a component of soft power – does have global reach, but the foundation for this cultural influence was colonization, a product of hard power. Soft power reads well on paper, but its dependence on persuasion makes it largely inconsequential in the world of geopolitics, whereas hard power dictates reality and the course of events.

#### Too many alt causes to soft power *swamp* their internal links.

**Betley 2017** - studied philosophy, politics, and economics at St. Olaf College (Alexander M, "The decline of American soft power - will it persist after Trump?," Oct 6, https://www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2017/10/decline-american-soft-power-will-it-persist-after-trump)

Turmoil, disengagement But today, as noted by Mattis, the turmoil associated with domestic political discord, as well as a disengagement with the international community on key issues, puts U.S. soft power severely at risk. Domestically, the president’s DACA debacle, as well as his failure to unequivocally denounce the violence instigated and perpetrated by neo-Nazis and white supremacists in Charlottesville, have left much of the world reeling. In the instance of Charlottesville, where President Donald Trump resorted to proclaiming that there was “blame on both sides,” it took a foreign leader, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, to rightfully condemn the events as “horrifying,” “racist,” and “evil.” Though Global Trumpism (to use Mark Blyth’s aptly entitled phrase) seems to be sweeping the Western world, basic liberal democratic values remain a fundamental linchpin of global order. Trump’s antics, glaringly hypocritical to professed American values, repel foreign actors and damage our image abroad — ultimately undermining our soft power. Additionally, blunders over the support of NATO, withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord, and bellicose threats of meeting the North Korean challenge with “fire and fury like the world has never seen” further weaken our international standing. Paris has been, more than anything, an acknowledgment of the grave threat climate change poses to human society. Though the accord doesn’t contain binding agreements upon signatory states, the concerted will of the international community to hold strong to Paris leaves the United States isolated from international political consensus on perhaps the most sensitive issue of our time. Taking a serious toll Recent polling data from the Pew Research Center suggests these occurrences are having a serious toll on our power of attraction. Whereas only 25 to 30 percent of Europeans polled during Barack Obama's administration felt the U.S. was “on the decline,” recent surveys taken during the Trump administration show this number has spiked to 52 percent. Fewer countries than ever before view the United States as the world’s leading economic power (many replacing it with China). Nearly 75 percent of the world has given Trump a vote of no confidence in his ability “to do the right thing regarding world affairs.” This is in stark contradistinction to Obama’s time in office, where at any given moment the world population believed he would “do the right thing regarding world affairs” over 75 percent of the time. These trends and numbers, however, only confirm what many of us had already feared — President Trump’s unwillingness or inability to protect and advance fundamental U.S. interests due to the political necessity of maintaining his base at home. And although Mattis and Nye are both optimistic of the United States' ability to retain or recover many of her soft power resources in the future, such assurances in an age of pressing political challenges and revisionist international powers are surely no guarantee. Rather, it is much more likely this cascade begun by the Trump administration, indicative of the deeper and systemic pathologies of American political institutions, will persist far beyond a single presidency. As the ancient Greek historian, Thucydides, once warned, the delusional self-aggrandizement and egoism of a declining power accelerates its demise. Cleon-like, Trump is accelerating ours, ushering in the tragic and untimely decline of American soft power.

#### Soft power fails.

Jim Lacey 13 — Jim Lacey, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Marine Corps War College, holds a Ph.D. in Military History from Leeds University, 2013 (“Soft Power, Smart Power,” National Review Online, April 22nd, Available Online at http://www.nationalreview.com/article/346131/soft-power-smart-power, Accessed 05-27-2013)

During World War II, Stalin’s advisers encouraged him to seek the favor of the pope. He famously replied: “How many divisions does the pope have?” Decades later, the Soviets came to realize that papal power was not something to cavalierly disregard. Many, in fact, claim that Pope John Paul II’s moral authority was decisive in breaking the Soviet hold on Poland and propelling the Evil Empire toward its final demise. It was, therefore, a true example of the clout of “soft power.” Of course, one can maintain that view only by discounting the massive U.S. and NATO military forces that kept Soviet hard power in check for decades. A few years back, a number of policymakers, jumping on a popular academic trend given its greatest voice by Joseph Nye, began espousing a theory of soft power. In this new and shiny vision, America could wield its greatest global influence through the power of its example. The world would just look at how good we were, and how great it was to be an American, and clamor to follow us. Somehow these visionaries neglected to notice that Europe’s almost total unilateral disarmament had failed to translate into influence on the global stage. Rather, it had done the opposite. In a remarkably short time, European opinions on any matter of consequence ceased to matter. Worse, a large segment of the world took a good look at the American example and was repelled. Some of these people launched the 9/11 attack. At some point, it became clear that those holding a world vision that included returning to eighth-century barbarism were not finding our example attractive. Our deep-thinking strategists realized they needed a new answer. What they came up with was even more seductive than soft power. In the future, America would prosper through the employment of “smart power.” One wonders if our policymakers had been willfully employing “dumb power” for the previous two centuries. In any case, smart-power advocates claimed that a new policy nirvana was attainable, if only we could find the right mix of soft and hard power. Well, soft power and smart power were fascinating intellectual exercises that led nowhere. Iran is still building nuclear weapons, North Korea is threatening to nuke U.S. cities, and China is becoming militarily more aggressive. It turns out that power is what it has always been — the ability to influence and control others — and deploying it requires, as it always has, hard instruments. Without superior military power and the economic strength that underpins it, the U.S. would have no more ability to influence global events than Costa Rica. When President Obama made the strategic decision to pivot toward Asia, he did not follow up by sending dance troupes to China, or opening more cultural centers across the Pacific’s great expanse. Rather, he ordered the U.S. military to begin shifting assets into the region, so as to show the seriousness of our intent. If North Korea is dissuaded from the ultimate act of stupidity, it will have a lot more to do with our maintenance of ready military forces in the region than with any desire the North Korean regime has for a continuing flow of Hollywood movies. By now every serious strategist and policymaker understands that if the United States is going to continue influencing global events it requires hard power — a military — second to none. That is what makes a new report from the well-respected Stockholm International Peace Research Institute troubling. According to SIPRI, in 2012, China’s real military spending increased by nearly 8 percent, while Russia’s increased by a whopping 16 percent. Worse, SIPRI expects both nations to increase spending by even greater percentages this year. The United States, on the other hand, decreased real spending by 6 percent last year, with much larger cuts on the way. After a decade of war, much of our military equipment is simply worn out and in need of immediate replacement. Moreover, technology’s rapid advance continues, threatening much of our current weapons inventory with obsolescence. As much as the utopians (soft-power believers) want to deny it, American power is weakening even as the world becomes progressively less stable and more dangerous. In a world where too many states are led by men who still believe Mao’s dictum that “Power comes from the barrel of a gun,” weakness is dangerous. Weakness is also a choice. The United States, despite our current economic woes, can easily afford the cost of recapitalizing and maintaining our military. We are not even close to spending levels that would lead one to worry about “imperial overstretch.” Rather, our long-term security is being eaten up so as to fund “entitlement overstretch.” I suppose that one day, if left unchecked, the welfare state will absorb so much spending that the only military we can afford will be a shadow of what has protected us for the past seven decades. Soft power will then cease to be one option among many and, instead, become our only choice. We will become as relevant to the rest of the world as Europe. I wonder how many people realize just how different their daily lives will become if that day arrives. For a long time, American hard power has cast a protective shield around the liberal world order. It will not be pretty when that is gone.

### 2AC---INB---FAF---Warming Defense

#### No climate impact

Amber Kerr et al. 19 (Amber Kerr is an agroecologist with a PhD from UC Berkeley, and was the coordinator of the USDA California Climate Hub, based at the University of California, Davis, Daniel Swain is a Climate Scientist at UCLA, Andrew King is a lecturer in Climate Science and ARC DECRA fellow at the School of Earth Sciences and ARC Centre of Excellence for Climate Extremes, University of Melbourne, Peter Kalmus is an American climate scientist and data scientist at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Richard Bettis is Chair in Climate Impacts at the University of Exeter and Head of Climate Impacts in the Met Office Hadley Centre, 6/4/19, accessed 11/17/21, “Claim that human civilization could end in 30 years is speculative, not supported with evidence”, https://climatefeedback.org/evaluation/iflscience-story-on-speculative-report-provides-little-scientific-context-james-felton/)AGabay

There is no scientific basis to suggest that climate **breakdown will** “annihilate intelligent **life**” (by which I assume the report authors mean **human** **extinction**) by 2050. However, climate breakdown does pose a grave threat to civilization as we know it, and the potential for mass suffering on a scale perhaps never before encountered by humankind. This should be enough reason for action without any need for exaggeration or misrepresentation! A “Hothouse Earth” scenario plays out that sees Earth’s temperatures doomed to rise by a further 1°C (1.8°F) even if we stopped emissions immediately. Peter Kalmus, Data Scientist, Jet Propulsion Laboratory This word choice perhaps reveals a bias on the part of the author of the article. A temperature can’t be doomed. And while I certainly do not encourage false optimism, assuming that humanity is doomed is **lazy** and counterproductive. Fifty-five percent of the global population are subject to more than 20 days a year of lethal heat conditions beyond that which humans can **survive** Richard Betts, Professor, Met Office Hadley Centre & University of Exeter: This is clearly from Mora et al (2017) although the report does not include a citation of the paper as the source of that statement. The way it is written here (and in the report) is misleading because it gives the impression that everyone dies in those conditions. That is not actually how Mora et al define “deadly heat” – they merely looked for heatwaves when somebody died (not everybody) and then used that as the definition of a “deadly” heatwave. North America suffers extreme weather events including wildfires, drought, and heatwaves. Monsoons in China fail, the great rivers of Asia virtually dry up, and rainfall in central America falls by half. Andrew King, Research fellow, University of Melbourne: Projections of extreme events such as these are very difficult to make and **vary greatly** between differentclimate **models**. Deadly heat conditions across West Africa persist for over **100 days a year** Peter Kalmus, Data Scientist, Jet Propulsion Laboratory: The deadly heat projections (this, and the one from the previous paragraph) come from Mora et al (2017)1. It should be clarified that “deadly heat” here means heat and humidity beyond a two-dimension threshold where at least one person in the region subject to that heat and humidity dies (i.e., not everyone instantly dies). That said, in my opinion, the projections in Mora et al are conservative and the methods of Mora et al are sound. I did not check the claims in this report against Mora et al but I have no reason to think they are in error. 1- Mora et al (2017) Global risk of deadly heat, Nature Climate Change The knock-on consequences affect national security, as the scale of the challenges involved, such as pandemic disease outbreaks, are overwhelming. Armed conflicts over resources may become a reality, and have the potential to escalate into nuclear war. In the worst case scenario, a scale of destruction the authors say is beyond their capacity to model, there is a ‘high likelihood of human civilization coming to an end’. Willem Huiskamp, Postdoctoral research fellow, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research: This is a highly questionable conclusion. The reference provided in the report is for the “Global Catastrophic Risks 2018” report from the “Global Challenges Foundation” and not peer-reviewed literature. (It is worth noting that this latter report also provides no peer-reviewed evidence to support this claim). Furthermore, if it is apparently beyond our capability to model these impacts, how can they assign a ‘high likelihood’ to this outcome? While it is true that warming of this magnitude would be catastrophic, making claims such as this without evidence serves only to undermine the trust the public will have in the science. Daniel Swain, Climate Scientist, University of California, Los Angeles: It seems that the eye-catching headline-level claims in the report stem almost entirely from these **knock-on effects**, which the authors themselves admit are “beyond their **capacity** to **model**.” Thus, from a scientific perspective, the purported “high likelihood of civilization coming to an end by 2050” is essentially personal **speculation** on the part of the report’s authors, rather than a clear conclusion drawn from **rigorous assessment** of the available **evidence**.

**Models are wrong AND are exaggerated**

Vijay Jayaraj 21 (Vijay Jayaraj has a M.Sc., Environmental Science, University of East Anglia, England), Research Contributor for the Cornwall Alliance for the Stewardship of Creation, 3/11/21, accessed 10/17/21, “Why I Am a Climate Realist”, https://cornwallalliance.org/2021/03/why-i-am-a-climate-realist/)AGabay

The answer to my question trickled in slowly over a number of years. Evidence began to emerge that **scientists** **acknowledged** a large **gap** between the **actual** **observed** real-world temperature datasets (from satellites) and those temperature predictions from **computer climate models**. While these differences may not prove the allegations against the Climategate scientists, they do confirm one thing: the computer climate models exaggerate the future warming rate due to their high sensitivity to carbon dioxide emissions. As a result, the models continue to show an excessive and unreal warming rate for future decades. Despite plenty of evidence, the IPCC continues to use these **faulty model predictions** to inform the **public** and **policymakers** about future changes in temperature. A steady stream of scientific studies has documented the **evidence for lack of dangerous warming**—IPCC’s level of warming based on fifth- and sixth-generation (CMIP5 and CMIP6) models and the apparent absence of climate-induced ecological collapse. In 2020 alone, over 400 peer**-reviewed scientific papers** took up a **skeptical position** on **climate** **alarmism**. These papers—and hundreds from previous years—address various issues related to climate change, including problems with climate change observation, climate reconstructions, lack of anthropogenic/CO2 signal in sea-level rise, natural mechanisms that drive climate change (solar influence on climate, ocean circulations, cloud climate influence, ice sheet melting in high geothermal heat flux areas), hydrological trends that do not follow modeled expectations, the fact that corals thrive in warm, high-CO2 environments, elevated CO2 and higher crop yields, no increasing trends in intense hurricanes and drought frequency, the myth of mass extinctions due to global cooling, etc. Academia is filled with scientific literature that **contradicts** the position of those who believe climate change is **unprecedented**. Also, during the course of the last decade, it became apparent that most of Al Gore’s claims in his 2006 documentary were false. Contrary to his claims, polar bear populations remained steady, the Arctic did not become ice free during the summer of 2014, and storms did not get stronger due to global warming. In simple words, Gore misled the world and promoted falsehood as science, and he continues to do so while profiting from a renewable industry that is sold as the cure for global warming. Yet, he himself generates carbon dioxide emissions many times higher than an average family’s. So, not only are the predictions of models wrong, but also the interpretations of climate data and the propaganda of a climate doomsday were also wrong. Today, we know the modern warming rate is not **unprecedented**. Warming of such magnitude has **happened twice** within the past **2000** **years**. Further, ice at both poles is at historic highs, even compared with the Little Ice Age of the 17th century. Besides, there has been no increase in extreme weather events due to climate change and the loss of lives due to environmental disasters has drastically reduced during the last 100 years. So, I am a climate realist. I acknowledge that there has been a gradual increase in global average temperature since the end of the Little Ice Age in the 17th century. I acknowledge that climate change can happen in both ways—warming and cooling. I do understand that anthropogenic CO2 emissions and other greenhouse gases could have positively contributed to the warming from mid-20th century onwards. I also acknowledge that warming and the increased atmospheric carbon dioxide that has contributed to it have actually helped society. The current atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration, nearly 50 percent higher than in the 17th century, and the warming—which has occurred chiefly in winter, in higher latitudes and altitudes, and at night, thus raising cold temperatures but with little effect on hot temperatures—have actually resulted in optimal conditions for global plant growth, thus aiding in the flourishing of the agricultural sector. The Bengal tiger populations have bounced back, and polar bear populations are steady, thanks to conservation efforts. Forest area in Europe is increasing every year, and countries are planting tree saplings at a record rate. Life expectancy has reached all-time highs in many countries, and more people are constantly pulled out of extreme poverty every year (although business lockdowns to fight COVID-19 threaten to reverse that trend). Access to freshwater has improved and human productivity has increased drastically. So, there is no actual **climate emergency**. Instead, what we have are celebrities, activists, un-elected political bodies like the UN, and even some climate scientists religiously promoting a popular doomsday belief. The models do not know the future, and neither do the Climategate scientists. But an exaggerated view of **future** warming provides the ideal background for anti-carbon-based fuels policies that will undermine the **economic well-being** of every society in the world. We must not allow that.

#### Their models are bad and offend consensus

Piper 19 -- Kelsey Piper, citing John Halstead climate change mitigation researcher at the Founders Pledge. [Is climate change an "existential threat" — or just a catastrophic one? 6-28-2019, https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/6/13/18660548/climate-change-human-civilization-existential-risk]

I also talked to some researchers who study existential risks, like John Halstead, who studies climate change mitigation at the philanthropic advising group Founders Pledge, and who has a detailed online analysis of all the (strikingly few) climate change papers that address existential risk (his analysis has not been peer-reviewed yet).

Halstead looks into the models of potential temperature increases that Breakthrough’s report highlights. The models show a surprisingly large chance of extreme degrees of warming. Halstead points out that in many papers, this is the result of the simplistic form of statistical modeling used. Other papers have made a convincing case that this form of statistical modeling is an irresponsible way to reason about climate change, and that the dire projections rest on a statistical method that is widely understood to be a bad approach for that question.

Further, “the carbon effects don’t seem to pose an existential risk,” he told me. “People use 10 degrees as an illustrative example” — of a nightmare scenario where climate change goes much, much worse than expected in every respect — “and looking at it, even 10 degrees would not really cause the collapse of industrial civilization,” though the effects would still be pretty horrifying. (On the question of whether an increase of 10 degrees would be survivable, there is much debate.)

Does it matter if climate change is an existential risk or just a really bad one?

That last distinction Halstead draws — of climate change as being awful but not quite an existential threat — is a controversial one.

That’s where a difference in worldviews looms large: Existential risk researchers are extremely concerned with the difference between the annihilation of humanity and mass casualties that humanity can survive. To everyone else, those two outcomes seem pretty similar.

To academics in philosophy and public policy who study the future of humankind, an existential risk is a very specific thing: a disaster that destroys all future human potential and ensures that no generations of humans will ever leave Earth and explore our universe. The death of 7 billion people is, of course, an unimaginable tragedy. But researchers who study existential risks argue that the annihilation of humanity is actually much, much worse than that. Not only do we lose existing people, but we lose all the people who could otherwise have had the chance to exist.

In this worldview, 7 billion humans dying is not just seven times as bad as 1 billion humans dying — it’s much worse. This style of thinking seems plausible enough when you think about past tragedies; the Black Death, which killed at least a tenth of all humans alive at the time, was not one-tenth as bad as a hypothetical plague that wiped us all out.

Most people don’t think about existential risks much. Many analyses of climate change — including the report Vice based its article on — treat the deaths of a billion people and the extinction of humanity as pretty similar outcomes, interchangeably using descriptions of catastrophes that would kill hundreds of millions and catastrophes that’d kill us all. And the existential risk conversation can come across as tone-deaf and off-puttingly academic, as if it’s no big deal if merely hundreds of millions of people will die due to climate change.

Obviously, and this needs to be stressed, climate change is a big deal either way. But there are differences between catastrophe and extinction. If the models tell us that all humans are going to die, then extreme solutions — which might save us, or might have unprecedented, catastrophic negative consequences — might be worth trying. Think of plans to release aerosols into the atmosphere to reflect sunlight and cool the planet back down in the manner that volcanic explosions do. It’d be an enormous endeavor with significant potential downsides (we don’t even yet know all the risks it might pose), but if the alternative is extinction then those risks would be worth taking.

But if the models tell us that climate change is devastating but survivable, as most models show, then those last-ditch solutions should perhaps stay in the toolkit for now.

Then there’s the morale argument. Defenders of overstating the risks of climate change point out that, well, understating them isn’t working. The IPCC may have chosen to maintain optimism about containing warming to 2 degrees Celsius in the hopes that it’d spur people to action, but if so, it hasn’t really worked. Maybe alarmism will achieve what optimism couldn’t.

That’s how Spratt sees it. “Alarmism?” he said to me. “Should we be alarmed about where we’re going? Of course we should be.”

Swedish teenager Greta Thunberg has taken an arguably alarmist bent in her advocacy for climate solutions in the EU, saying, “Our house is on fire. I don’t want your hope. ... I want you to panic.” She’s gotten strong reactions from politicians, suggesting that at least sometimes a relentless focus on the severity of the emergency can get results.

So where does this all leave us? It’s worthwhile to look into the worst-case scenarios, and even to highlight and emphasize them. But it’s important to accurately represent current climate consensus along the way. It’s hard to see how we solve a problem we have widespread misapprehensions about in either direction, and when a warning is overstated or inaccurate, it may sow more confusion than inspiration.

Climate change won’t kill us all. That matters. Yet it’s one of the biggest challenges ahead of us, and the results of our failure to act will be devastating. That message — the most accurate message we’ve got — will have to stand on its own.

### 2AC---INB---FAF---FAF Bad

#### Foreign affairs federalism disunites messaging and angers other actors

Baasch & Prakash 16 Ryan Baasch, Law Clerk to Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson, 2015-16. Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Law Prof @ University of Virginia. [Congress and The Reconstruction of Foreign Affairs Federalism, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 47]//BPS

I. Cacophonous Foreign Affairs The case against state involvement in foreign affairs is easy to make. States are unqualified to act in the international arena because they lack the information and the expertise that comes from continued and sustained engagement in foreign matters. Because of their ignorance and inexperience, states are apt to anger allies and undermine the actions and priorities of the more expert federal political branches. Those untutored in foreign matters should not be suffered to hamper those more informed and skilled, however good the intentions of the former. Further, the international ventures of state officials run counter to popular expectations. Voters expect that local officials will stick to local matters and that federal officials--senators, representatives, presidents--will steer our nation's diplomacy. In sum, foreign affairs federalism, as it operates today, imposes substantial costs and renders the United States disunited before the world. Some scholars disagree with our diagnosis. A few of them claim that state intervention generates weighty benefits. Others suggest that the drawbacks of state freelancing are insignificant, or are manageable. We disagree. This Part highlights the drawbacks of state involvement in foreign affairs. It then maintains that the supposed benefits of many voices in foreign affairs are illusory.

#### Nuclear war with Russia

Spiro '99 (Peter J. Spiro, Associate Professor at Hofstra Law School, 1999, Lexis//GH-Aspomer)

Zschernig has been questioned even by those who otherwise propound federal exclusivity. n87 But the decision seems both explained and justified (at least at the time) by its Cold War context. In the tinderbox world of superpower competition, the potential consequences of giving offense were obviously profound. One could not expect the Soviets necessarily to understand that when a state official spoke, **it was not for the nation**; or at least one would not want to risk error in assessing that perception. At the very least, **there was the specter of *state action* upsetting the elaborately choreographed relationship between East and West** Blocs; at worst, **one could plausibly draw a scenario in which offense caused by state action lit the fuse to World War III**. Nor against this backdrop could one rely on the political branches to beat back state action before the damage was done; n88 the context, in other words, supported the strict application of a dormant federal power. n89 [\*1243] Zschernig found parallels in two other contexts at the juncture of state activity and foreign relations. In applying the dormant foreign Commerce Clause to strike down a state tax on foreign-owned cargo containers, the Court in Japan Line emphasized the "paramount" requirement that the federal government "speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments." n90 The Court stressed the danger that a state tax on international instrumentalities could provoke the retaliation of foreign nations, which "retaliation of necessity would be directed at American transportation equipment in general, not just that of the taxing state, so that the Nation as a whole would suffer." n91 As in Zschernig, the Japan Line Court nullified the state measure notwithstanding the absence of an affirmative federal policy (either through treaty or statute) on the issue. California, the Court concluded, "may not tell this Nation or Japan how to run their foreign policies" in "an area where a uniform federal rule is essential... Even a slight overlapping of tax - a problem that might be deemed de minimis in a domestic context - assumes importance when sensitive matters of foreign relations and national sovereignty are concerned." n92 Perhaps even more clearly than the dormant foreign affairs power, this sort of severe application of the dormant foreign Commerce Clause would have seemed defensible, especially insofar as it built upon a well-settled dormant power in the domestic commerce context. n93 Japan Line was handed down against an international economic backdrop not far removed from the corresponding national security context, where before theentrenchment of today's free trade regimes the specter of trade wars loomed in economic relations even between friendly states. [\*1244] Finally, one can also integrate into the rule of federal exclusivity the designation of customary international law as part of federal common law. Under the regime of Swift v. Tyson, n94 the federal courts were free to apply general common law, including customary international law, without regard to the common law interpretations of state courts; there was no need specially to justify the application of customary international law in the absence of controlling state or federal statutory or constitutional law. n95 That changed with Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, n96 which denied the federal courts the power to create common law "except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress." n97 The presumption thereafter was that federal common lawmaking had to be grounded in some particular federal interest. n98 It was only with the Supreme Court's 1964 decision in Sabbatino that the application of customary international law as federal common law was found acceptable under Erie. n99 That holding can be justified on the same basis as the dormant [\*1245] foreign affairs power. Inappropriate interpretation of or noncompliance with customary international law could cause offense to foreign nations, which might respond with action against the nation as a whole. The Court did not clearly articulate its holding in such terms, adverting only to unspecified "potential dangers" n100 were Erie extended to legal problems affecting international relations, and noting "a concern for uniformity in this country's dealings with foreign nations." n101 The decision did, however, cite commentary that advocated federal court interpretation of customary international law, "lest the provincialism of state courts lead to impolitic judicial decisions offensive to the sensibilities of foreign nations." n102 As with the dormant foreign affairs power cases, the rule against state court interpretation of customary international law would seem to have been justified, especially in a Cold War context. To take the facts of Sabbatino itself, the federal government couldn't have state courts misapplying the act of state doctrine n103 to deny the effectiveness of Cuban (and other Communist Bloc) nationalizations; the risk of upsetting the superpower balance would have been too great to trust the responsibility of applying or interpreting the relevant standards to nonfederal actors. n104 And that perhaps explains why [\*1246] the inclusion of customary international law in the category of federal common law has, until recently, been accepted as uncontroversial. n105 And so these three different strands of the exclusivity principle - the dormant foreign affairs power, the dormant foreign commerce power, and the inclusion of customary international law as a part of federal common law - all seemed sustainable in a world that would not differentiate between the component unit and the whole. However important they would otherwise be, federalism values could not be vindicated in the face of a plausible and substantial risk that unconstrained state action would result in dramatic harm to the nation as a whole. C. The Case for Maintaining Federal Exclusivity If one assumed a world in which nations were still held responsible for the acts of their component units, one could support a fairly strong case for confirming the holdings of Zschernig, Japan Line, and Sabbatino, and the precept that the states should be denied the tools to **interfere** with national foreign relations. n106 Constitutional pedigree aside, the functional [\*1247] underpinnings of the exclusivity principle are powerful. It is not just that individual states will take action that will harm other states, though that fact highlights the problems of state-level action from a democratic process perspective. It is that such decisions will be consistently distorted in the face of significant externalities; state-level actors, because they do not shoulder the consequences of their actions, will not take into account those consequences in the decision-making balance. These externalities will also tend to create **information deficiencies**; **because the states will not shoulder the consequences of their conduct, they have less incentive to understand what those consequences will be**. Indeed, a standard lament of state-level foreign policy activity is that it is based on insufficient expertise. n107 Assuming continued externalities, the case against state-level action remains strong. The magnitude of state and local international activity has grown dramatically in recent years, so that one might expect a growing risk of unwelcome resulting entanglements; though much of this activity is benign, some provokes the traditional concerns of the exclusivity principle. The persistent potential for subfederal action to **disrupt national foreign relations** is demonstrated by the recent diplomatic controversy and constitutional litigation concerning state and local sanctions against companies doing business in Burma. n108 Though they enjoy the formal power to suppress it, the political branches of the federal government remain less well positioned to police this activity than the courts. The changing construction of international society aside, n109 perhaps the best argument for softening the rule of federal exclusivity highlights the end of the Cold War and the diminished ultimate dangers of foreign retaliation. In recent years there has been a marked blurring of the distinction between foreign and domestic affairs; so fast has the line eroded - hastened by the communications revolution, the greater ease of travel, and the growing priority of trade over traditional national security issues - that globalization has become almost an instant cliche. The international arena is now very much of local interest, as reflected in the dramatically [\*1248] heightened profile of state and local governments on the world scene. This is particularly pronounced in matters relating to trade and investment. One in six private-sector jobs in the United States is now linked to the global economy. n110 The number of Americans working for foreign companies in the United States now stands at five million; foreign direct investment in the United States has quadrupled since 1981. n111 Subfederal jurisdictions now see international trade and foreign investment as critical to their economic well-being. They compete ferociously for foreign investment with tax breaks and other incentives. n112 Most states now maintain at least one trade office abroad; n113 many have concluded trade-related agreements with foreign entities; n114 and the foreign trade mission has become a standard responsibility for governors and large-city mayors. Most of these trade and investment-related activities are unobjectionable, from both policy and constitutional perspectives. n115 [\*1249] The growing importance of the world to the states has also made the states more important to the world. If they stood as independent nations, seven American states would be counted among the top twenty-five countries in terms of gross domestic product; even Vermont, with the smallest economy among the states, would outrank almost 100 nations. n116 It is thus not surprising that foreign authorities, themselves critically interested in global commerce, court state-level officials to attract investment from and promote exports within the subfederal jurisdictions. Moreover, state and local governments directly control vast procurement budgets; the annual expenditures of state and local governments exceeds one trillion dollars. n117 Subfederal governments now have international economic clout. The problem is that this clout can and will occasionally be deployed in ways that **offend** foreign nations.

#### Risks retal against the whole country

Glennon and Sloane 16 Michael J. Glennon, ILaw Prof @ Tufts University. Robert D. Sloane, Law Prof @ Boston University [Foreign Affairs Federalism: The Myth of National Exclusivity, Print]//BPS

2. The Danger of Retaliation against the Entire Nation Above all, however, the Framers stressed a concern at the outset that continues to be politically relevant today: "that the peace of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a PART," for "[t]he union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its members."107 State involvement in the international realm risks conflicts with nations that may retaliate—economically, militarily, or otherwise—against the United States as a whole.108 For the Framers, this was no hypothetical danger. Their experience under the Articles of Confederation underscored the very real threats and concrete retaliatory conduct, including war, that state disregard of national treaty obligations had provoked. Since 1789, the Supreme Court has consistently echoed the same concerns. In 1832, in Brown v. Maryland,109 the Court struck down a Maryland law that required licenses for certain imports, emphasizing that the state law at issue could spark disputes with other nations. "What answer," Chief Justice Marshall asked, "would the United States give to the complaints and just reproaches to which such an extraordi¬nary circumstance would expose them? No apology could be received, or even offered."110 It is one thing, the Court has suggested, for a state to expose itself to the risks of conflict with a foreign power, but it is quite another to arrogate to itself the power to expose its fellow states to those risks. Hence, in the same vein, the Court in 1875 struck down a California law that in effect regulated immi¬gration, and by implication, commerce with foreign nations. The injured nation could not direct a claim for redress to California, the Court observed, because California could: hold no exterior relations with other nations. It [the foreign claim] would be made upon the government of the United States. If that government should get into a difficulty which would lead to war, or to suspension of intercourse, would California alone suffer, or all the Union?111 A century later, in 1979, California imposed an ad valorem property tax on foreign-owned cargo containers. The Court again invalidated the state law, mind¬ful that the "risk of retaliation by Japan ... [was] acute, and such retaliation of necessity would be felt by the Nation as a whole."112 The Court's concerns in this regard are now embodied in the so-called "one voice" doctrine—a putative requirement, inferred from the Constitution's text and structure, that the nation speak with one voice in the realm of foreign affairs. The one-voice doctrine often reflects a reasonable national interest in bolstering the efficacy of American foreign policy. The national interest sometimes benefits from at least the appearance of national unity and popular support. Open conflict between the federal and state governments on key foreign policy questions can undermine national foreign policy objectives. Of course, sometimes the foreign policy of the federal government is less than clear. Yet the federal government’s silence with respect to a particular issue of foreign policy does not neces¬sarily imply an absence of a federal policy. Still less does it indicate that the states should feel free to enter the field. Federal silence, inaction, or ambiguity may be calculated. Sometimes the best policy is to do and say nothing, or deliberately to attempt, with nuance, to leave national policy unclear.113 But the question is whether the doctrine has been expanded beyond the limit of its logic.114

### 2AC---AT Russian Backlash

#### The counterplan triggers Russian backlash

SIRECI and COLETTA 9 (SIRECI, JONATHAN, and DAMON COLETTA. Sireci; MS @ Troy Univeristy, BS @ United States Air Force Academy. Coletta; Professor of Political Science @ United States Air Force Academy.“Enduring without an Enemy: NATO’s Realist Foundation.” Perspectives, vol. 17, no. 1, 2009, pp. 57–81. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23616104. Accessed 4 Jul. 2022.)LR

From a defensive realist perspective, longer partnerships can signal more of a threat against the common enemy of the cooperating states. This variable ties into the final independent variable: the number of military partnerships a state is engaged in. An increased number of partnerships a state is engaged in can threaten its opposing powers, who may feel the need to engage in partnerships of their own to maintain a balance of alliances and power. The use of American state-level militaries with nation-states designates the expanded role of American states in national defense. The purpose of the State Partnership Program is to create less of a defensive reaction by opposing states that are more likely to be threatened by the expansion of American military endeavors. The stationing of Russian troops in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia was a reaction to the formation of the State Partnership Program. Threatened by the encroachment of American forces (regardless of the fact they were reserve troops), **Russia sought countermeasures to create a balance of power** against the offshore hegemony. The defensive actions taken by Russia led the United States to sent only reserve forces. Under defensive realism, it becomes increasingly difficult for American troops to operate in a former Soviet realm, since any activity taken can easily be perceived as hostile and aggressive.

#### China proves

Balachandran 6-22 (P.K, M.A.in Sociology University of Delhi, BA and MA in Politics and Sociology @ Delhi University. “Nepal Backs Away From US State Partnership Program”, https://thediplomat.com/2022/06/nepal-backs-away-from-us-state-partnership-program/#:~:text=Suspicious%20about%20the%20military%20content,a%20U.S.%20disaster%20mitigation%20program.)LR

Suspicious about the military content and wary of antagonizing China, Nepal rejects a U.S. disaster mitigation program. Fearing that the U.S. State Partnership Program (SPP) is a trap to involve Nepal in an anti-China military alliance, the Sher Bahadur Deuba government has rejected the program. The Deuba government – like predecessor governments in 2015, 2017 and 2019 – was initially impressed with the SPP for its disaster mitigation content, but it had to reject the partnership in the end, because the mood in Nepal is unambiguously against foreign programs that smack of a military alliance. Nepali governments have generally not wanted any transnational agreements that could jeopardize their delicately balanced relationship between India and the United States on the on hand and China on the other. Flush with success in convincing the Deuba government to get the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact ratified by the Nepali parliament in February, the U.S. moved to bolster the military dimension to Nepal-U.S. relations by pushing ahead with a pending request from Nepal to join the SPP. The SPP is a bilateral program that is outwardly peaceful in intent. But it is perceived to have deep-set military objectives with consequences not only for Nepal’s internal security, but also for relations with its two big neighbors, China and India. Critics in Nepal say that joining the SPP would be tantamount to signing onto to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS). The impact on Sino-Nepal relations would be catastrophic if the SPP leads to stronger Nepal-U.S. military ties. At the same time, India might not be thrilled either. Under the SPP, the Indian Army’s exclusive and unique relationship with the Nepali Army would be diluted, a prospect the conservative Indian top brass cannot reconcile with. Critics say that while disaster mitigation is fine, the rub lies elsewhere: The SPP is administered by the National Guard Bureau, guided by State Department foreign policy goals, and executed by each U.S. state’s senior military officer (the state adjutant general) in support of the Department of Defense policy goals. “Through SPP, the National Guard conducts military-to-military engagements in support of defense security goals but also leverages whole-of-society relationships and capabilities to facilitate broader interagency and corollary engagements spanning military, government, economic and social spheres,” the U.S. National Guard website says. In other words, the SPP is a multi-purpose vehicle to advance wide-ranging U.S. political and strategic objectives under the overall cloak of humanitarian engagement. Worried about Nepal coming under more pressure from the United States, Chinese Ambassador to Nepal Hou Yanqi called on Nepal’s home minister, ostensibly to get confirmation of Nepal’s continued adherence to the “One China” policy. But sources said that the SPP was the envoy’s main concern. Nepal’s condemnation of Russia for its aggression in Ukraine had made Beijing suspicious about growing links between the Deuba and the Biden regimes.

### 2AC---Perm---Do Both---Shields PTX

#### Perm shifts backlash to the states

A. Brooke Overby, 3 (A. Brooke Overby, Professor of Law, Tulane University School of Law, 2003, accessed on 7-4-2022, Temple University of the Commonwealth System of Higher Education Temple Law Review, Summer, 76 Temp. L. Rev. 297,“Our New Commercial Law Federalism”, <https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/temple76&div=16&id=&page=>, HBisevac)

We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Today we hold that Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the States' officers directly. The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. It matters not whether policymaking is involved, and no case-by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty.n65 The concerns articulated in New York and echoed again in Printz addressed the erosion of the lines of political accountability that could result from federal commandeering.n66 Federal authority to **compel implementation** of a national legislative agenda through the **state legislatures** or officers would **blur** or launder the **federal provenance** of the legislation and **shift** **political** consequences and **costs** thereof to the **state legislators**. Left unchecked, Congress could foist upon the states expensive or unpopular programs yet **shield itself** from accountability to citizens. While drawing the line between constitutionally permissible optional implementation and impermissible mandatory implementation does not erase these concerns with accountability, it does ameliorate them slightly.

### 2AC---Perm---Do the CP

#### The counterplan requires federal action

USC, ND (10 U.S. Code § 341 - Department of Defense State Partnership Program https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/341)LR

Authority.— (1)In general.—The Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, is authorized to establish a program of activities described in paragraph (2), to support the security cooperation objectives of the United States, between members of the National Guard of a State or territory and any of the following: (A)The military forces of a foreign country. (B)The security forces of a foreign country. (C)Governmental organizations of a foreign country whose primary functions include disaster response or emergency response. (2)State partnership.— Each program established under this subsection shall be known as a “State Partnership”. (b)Limitations.— (1)In general.— An activity with forces referred to in subsection (a)(1)(B) or organizations described in subsection (a)(1)(C) under a program established under subsection (a) may be carried out only if the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, determines and notifies the appropriate congressional committees not less than 15 days before initiating such activity that the activity is in the national security interests of the United States. (2)Prohibition on activities with units that have committed gross violations of human rights.— The conduct of any assistance activities under a program established under subsection (a) shall be subject to the provisions of section 362 of this title. (c)Coordination of Activities.— The Chief of the National Guard Bureau shall designate a director for each State and territory to be responsible for the coordination of activities under a program established under subsection (a) for such State or territory and reporting on activities under the program. (d)Regulations.— This section shall be carried out in accordance with such regulations as the Secretary of Defense shall prescribe for purposes of this section. Such regulations shall include accounting procedures to ensure that expenditures of funds to carry out this section are accounted for and appropriate. (e)Availability of Authorized Funds for Program.— (1)In general.—Funds authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense, including funds authorized to be appropriated for the Army National Guard and Air National Guard, are authorized to be available— (A)for payment of costs incurred by the National Guard of a State or territory to conduct activities under a program established under subsection (a); and (B)for payment of incremental expenses of a foreign country to conduct activities under a program established under subsection (a). (2)Limitations.— (A)Active duty requirement.— Funds shall not be available under paragraph (1) for the participation of a member of the National Guard of a State or territory in activities in a foreign country unless the member is on active duty in the Armed Forces at the time of such participation. (B)Incremental expenses.— The total amount of payments for incremental expenses of foreign countries as authorized under paragraph (1)(B) for activities under programs established under subsection (a) in any fiscal year may not exceed $10,000,000. (f)Rule of Construction.— Nothing in this section shall be construed to supersede any authority under title 10 as in effect on December 26, 2013. (Added and amended Pub. L. 114–328, div. A, title XII, § 1246(a)–(c), (d)(1), (2)(B), Dec. 23, 2016, 130 Stat. 2520, 2521; Pub. L. 115–232, div. A, title XII, § 1210, Aug. 13, 2018, 132 Stat. 2023; Pub. L. 116–92, div. A, title XVII, § 1731(a)(16), Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 1813.)

#### Federal gov’t is a shared division of power---includes states.

Legal Dictionary 16 [Federal Government. August 7, 2016. https://legaldictionary.net/federal-government/]

A federal government is a system of government that divides the power between a larger central government, and the local and regional governments beneath it. In the United States, the federal government’s powers were established by the Constitution. Perfect examples of federal governments are those that function best in large countries with a broad diversity among its citizens, though where a common culture still exists, which ties everyone together. To explore this concept, consider the following federal government definition.

Definition of Federal Government

Noun

A system of government in which power is divided between a central, larger government, and the local, regional, or state governments beneath it.

Origin

1635-1645 Latin foederal – (league)